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Abstract 
Proof of causation in toxic torts has presented persistent 
problems for the legal system, because the probabilities that 
science can know fit poorly with the demands for particularistic 
proof imposed by the law’s deterministic model of causation. Some 
scholars have hoped that genomic and molecular information will 
at last provide scientific certainty—definitive, individualized proof 
of toxic causation. 
This Article argues that the opposite is true. Scientific 
research will increasingly elucidate the ways in which 
environmental exposures and human genes interact to produce 
disease, but this deeper knowledge will extend rather than resolve 
the problem of causal indeterminacy in toxic torts. Genomic and 
molecular understanding, instead of sounding the death knell for 
proposals to reform toxic tort causation law, will strengthen the 
argument for those reforms. 
This Article proposes a probabilistic causal contribution 
model to replace the model of deterministic causation in toxic 
torts, building on earlier scholarly proposals and the creativity of 
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a handful of courts. The Article explores how the model would 
work and argues that it is superior to present doctrine when 
assessed against the goals of the tort system. 
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I. Introduction 
Forty years after a jury first found that several asbestos 
product manufacturers each had caused someone’s asbestosis and 
pleural mesothelioma,1 sick people continue to come to court 
seeking compensation for illnesses that they allege were caused 
by exposure to various toxins. The defendants sued for making, 
selling, using, or disposing of the allegedly toxic products 
continue to protest that something else—dumb luck, bad genes, 
someone else’s similar product, some entirely different toxin, or 
mother nature—is what really made the plaintiffs sick, and, more 
important, that the plaintiffs cannot prove otherwise. 
Proof of toxic tort claims conforms poorly to the traditional 
deterministic legal model of but-for causation, because toxic 
injuries almost never involve an observable chain of physical 
events allowing easy inference of a causal relation between a 
particular defendant’s conduct and a particular plaintiff’s harm. 
Courts turn to science to replace causal intuition, but a 
disjunction remains between the probabilities that science can 
know and the determined result that the law wants proven. The 
resulting problem has produced hundreds of court opinions and 
numerous calls for doctrinal reforms in recognition of the 
difficulties that toxic causation presents. Yet, despite decades of 
thoughtful jurisprudence and scholarship, the core legal 
conception of toxic causation has hardly changed at all. 
Science has changed, however, quickly and at an accelerating 
pace. The ability to peer into the genome heralds new insights 
into human susceptibility to toxic substances. Molecular 
technologies provide glimpses of previously inaccessible toxic 
mechanisms. Computing power allows this research to be 
conducted on a scale and at a rate never before possible. 
                                                                                                     
 1. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 
1973) (holding that “the jury could find that each defendant was the cause in 
fact of some injury to Borel” although “it is impossible, as a practical matter, to 
determine with absolute certainty which particular exposure to asbestos dust 
resulted in injury”); see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 39–70 (1985) 
(describing the Borel trial); Joseph Sanders, Risky Business: Causation in 
Asbestos Cancer Cases (and Beyond?), in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 11, 15–17 
(Richard Goldberg ed., 2011) (describing the indivisible injury causation 
rationale of the Borel decision). 
240 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013) 
The law looks to this new science, hoping that its increased 
resolving power will at last build a bridge from probability to 
certainty. The dream is that genomic knowledge will lead to 
deterministic proof of the existence or absence of causal 
mechanism in individual cases. That “holy grail” of particularistic 
evidence would at last eliminate much of the indeterminacy that 
has plagued proof of specific causation in toxic tort claims;2 it also 
could fatally undermine arguments for exceptional judicial 
treatment of toxic tort claims, restoring to tort law a universally 
applicable deterministic model of but-for causation.  
This Article argues that the predominant reality is more 
likely to be exactly the opposite: at the highest magnifications, 
certainty will dissolve into probability. Scientific research will 
increasingly elucidate the ways in which environmental 
exposures and human genes interact to produce disease, but for 
the legal system, this deeper knowledge will extend rather than 
resolve the causal indeterminacy problem in toxic torts—and will 
therefore increase the justification for doctrinal adjustments to 
address that problem.3 
Part II describes the traditional deterministic model of 
causation and how it fails in many toxic tort cases. Part III 
explains why it is likely that scientific success will exacerbate 
rather than solve that failure. Part IV proposes an alternative 
vision based on a probabilistic causal contribution model of 
causation. Part V assesses the proposal against goals of tort law. 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Joseph Sanders, Apportionment and Proof in Toxic Injury Cases, 10 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 200, 202 (2000) (“Specific causation evidence seems to be 
the holy grail of toxic torts.”). “Specific causation” refers to causation of the 
individual plaintiff’s case of disease, in contrast to the exposure-disease link 
that is often referred to as “general causation.” See infra notes 20–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. This Article develops an argument and solution briefly suggested in an 
earlier Article, Steve C. Gold, The More We Know, the Less Intelligent We Are?—
How Genomic Information Should, and Should Not, Change Toxic Tort 
Causation Doctrine, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 421–22 (2010). 
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II. The Persistent Problem: Toxic Injury and the Traditional, 
Deterministic Model of Causation 
A. The Traditional, Deterministic Model of Causation 
Some notion of causation inheres in the most elementary 
formulation of a tort claim. The claim that “defendant wronged 
plaintiff” implies a relation between the parties that is 
distinguishable from plaintiff’s relation with persons other than 
the defendant. To further say that the wrong was more than 
abstract—that “defendant harmed plaintiff”—is to connect 
defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injury via a causal relation 
that is distinguishable from the vagaries of a universe in which 
people just get injured sometimes. The concept is so intuitive that 
torts casebooks typically apply it well before they get around to 
expressing it.4 Yet articulating the meaning of causation is 
sufficiently difficult that the effort has long occupied 
philosophers, scientists, legal scholars, and judges.5 
Part of that effort involved disentangling the factual from the 
normative in everyday assessments of causal responsibility. We 
have come a long way from the legal fiction that any given event 
has a single objective cause,6 but the frank acknowledgment that 
the doctrine of proximate cause invokes policy choices did not 
extinguish the law’s reliance on the idea that events have 
                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 333 (9th ed. 2011) (introducing cause-in-fact by noting that 
“[f]rom the outset of the book we have implicitly accepted the notion that a 
defendant . . . should not have to compensate an injured plaintiff unless the 
plaintiff’s injury is causally connected to the defendant’s negligent conduct”); cf. 
Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation in Liberal Political 
Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 587–88 (1987) (arguing that dissociating 
causation from standard of care is irrational under efficiency theories). 
 5. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 
1985); Carl F. Cranor, Genetic Causation, in ARE GENES US? 125, 127–30 (Carl 
F. Cranor ed., 1994) (discussing common sense, scientific, and legal notions of 
causation, and noting that causal ascriptions depend on context and on interests 
of ascribing person); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, 
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by 
Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1018–39 (1988). 
 6. See Morton J. Horowitz, The Rise and Early Progressive Critique of 
Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 471, 479–
80 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
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determinate factual causes.7 Having shooed policy preferences 
into the back room of proximate cause, standard tort doctrine 
continues to insist that cause-in-fact reflects an objectively 
knowable reality—albeit knowable, ex post, only by 
counterfactual inference. 
Causation-in-fact has traditionally been proven by 
persuading the fact finder that the familiar but-for test is 
satisfied: “Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm 
would not have occurred absent the conduct.”8 The first two 
restatements of the law of torts framed the required causal 
connection as a requirement that a cause be “a substantial factor 
in bringing about the harm.”9 They explained “substantial factor” 
as a limiting additional requirement distinguishing, from among 
all but-for causes, those that were legally cognizable.10 The Third 
Restatement of Torts, opining that this use of “substantial factor” 
led to inchoate results, abandoned the term entirely,11 completing 
                                                                                                     
 7. Id. at 479–85 (describing the legal realist assault on the doctrine of 
objective causation and the rise of the distinction between “actual” and “legal” 
cause). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 26 (2010). 
 9. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 431 (1965). 
 10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1934) (“[T]hat the harm would not 
have occurred had the actor not been negligent . . . is necessary but . . . is not of 
itself sufficient [to establish that negligence was a legal cause of harm].”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965) (same); id. § 433 (listing 
considerations important to determining whether an act is a “substantial 
factor”); see Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762, 766–67 (Conn. 1929) (adopting 
this view of “substantial factor”); but see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. j & reporters’ note (2010) (describing 
varied applications of “substantial factor”). Before publication of the First 
Restatement, some courts used “substantial factor” to justify the intuitively 
correct outcome in cases of multiple sufficient causes, in which a literal 
application of the “but-for” test would exonerate both causes. See Anderson v. 
Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 49 (Minn. 1920) 
(classic “two fires” case); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965) 
(stating that in such circumstances “the actor’s negligence may be found to be a 
substantial factor” in bringing about harm); Joseph Sanders et al., The 
Insubstantiality of the “Substantial Factor” Test for Causation, 73 MO. L. REV. 
399, 416–17 (2008) (describing this use of “substantial factor”). 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 26 cmt. j, reporters’ note (2010) (noting that the term “substantial 
factor” seemed “to be doing scope-of-liability (proximate-cause) duty” in addition 
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(as asserted in the commentary) the conceptual separation of 
normatively driven proximate cause from (presumably objective) 
cause-in-fact.12 
The Third Restatement modeled a but-for factual cause as 
any necessary element of a set of causes that, together, are 
sufficient to bring about the result.13 This reflects an entirely 
deterministic conception of cause.14 Its philosophic underpinning 
is the theory that causal laws connect fully specified sets of 
causes to effects in an invariant, rather than probabilistic, way. 
Take away a true cause, in this model, and the effect always 
disappears, unless the effect is overdetermined—that is, unless 
some other sufficient causal set exists that does not include this 
cause. Leave the cause in existence, and the effect is inevitable, 
unless some other necessary element of the causal set is removed. 
It may be impossible ever to fully specify a likely infinite set of 
causal antecedents, but this model of causation posits that we can 
nevertheless make generalizations about the element of a set of 
antecedents that is of interest, e.g., the one alleged to be the 
cause of harm in a given tort case.15 Such a generalization reflects 
an experience-based imputation of a causal role ex ante that is 
applied ex post to make inferences about the antecedent’s 
determined causal role in the actual event. 
                                                                                                     
“to provid[ing] the standard for determining factual causation,” and was 
sometimes used to stiffen and sometimes to relax causation standards). 
 12. Id. § 29 cmt. g. Although this separation is familiar to every American 
law student who has completed the first-year torts course, a distinguished 
British jurist recently questioned the use of cause-in-fact “as a kind of filter 
which you have to get through in order to qualify for the final round of being 
selected as legal causation.” Lord Hoffmann, Causation, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 3, 4–6 (2011). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 26 cmt. g (2010). As the Third Restatement explains, this model is generally 
consistent with the “NESS” (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set) test. Id. § 26 
cmt. c, reporters’ note; see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1788–1803 (1985) (explaining the NESS test). As Wright 
noted, however, but-for cause taken alone is not equivalent to the NESS test. 
Wright, supra note 5, at 1021–22 nn.109–11. 
 14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 26 cmt. c (2010). 
 15. See Wright, supra note 5, at 1045. 
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This model also treats causation as a dichotomous, yes-or-no 
proposition: it either existed in a given case or it did not. Such 
treatment is not unique to causation, of course. In an adversarial 
truth-seeking system designed to choose between competing 
versions of events, many elements of claims or defenses are 
treated that way. But in today’s doctrine some of these elements, 
dichotomous as they are, nevertheless are commonly aligned on a 
continuous quantitative scale rather than being limited to 
quantum values of zero or one. Many jurisdictions, for example, 
ask fact-finders to apportion fault or, more broadly, 
“responsibility.”16 Causation, however, has proven mostly 
resistant to treatment as a continuous variable.17 
B. The Lack of Fit in Toxic Injury Cases 
A toxic tort plaintiff claims that exposure to some chemical, 
radiological, or biological agent caused a disease. A fundamental 
difficulty in proving such a claim is that exposure and disease 
usually do not correlate perfectly: some people get sick without 
exposure, and some people receive exposure without getting 
sick.18 In marked contrast to traumatic injury cases, the disease 
process itself is unobserved and unobservable as it occurs, and 
inscrutable afterward.19 What evidence then will permit an 
                                                                                                     
 16. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. 
(2010) (describing comparative fault and comparative responsibility regimes). 
 17. See id. § 26 cmt. a (limiting apportionment based on causation to 
“separately caused” damages); id. § 26 cmt. c (prescribing that “the factfinder 
divides divisible damages into their indivisible component parts”); id. § 26 cmt. f 
(listing circumstances in which damages can be divided by causation); see also, 
e.g., James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898, 909 (N.J. 1998) (noting 
that despite legal scholarship advocating reforms, “courts have been resistant to 
novel models of causation”); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15 
S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (“Causation in fact is an all-or-nothing 
proposition.”). 
 18. If disease only appeared after exposure, causation might still be 
inferred, even if exposure frequently occurred without disease. Austin Bradford 
Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL 
SOC’Y MED. 295, 296 (1965) (giving examples). 
 19. See Richard W. Wright, Proving Causation: Probability Versus Belief, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 195, 205–06 (distinguishing cases 
of alleged toxic injury from “bash-crash-slash” situations). 
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inference that a plaintiff’s illness would not have occurred but for 
the exposure, to establish deterministically modeled causation-in-
fact? 
Courts initially demand proof of “general causation,” asking 
whether the exposure in question is ever a sine qua non for the 
plaintiff’s disease, or whether the existence of cases of disease 
after exposure is merely coincidental.20 To prove general 
causation, plaintiffs have attempted to rely on toxicology studies 
(either in vitro or in vivo in experimental animals), evidence of 
toxins’ biological mechanisms of action, simple inference from 
exposure dose and chronology, and epidemiologic studies (which 
investigate the relative risk of disease that is associated with 
exposure in samples of human populations). Many courts have 
insisted on the primacy of epidemiology for proof of general 
causation, in part because of situations in which many claims 
were brought despite large bodies of powerful epidemiologic 
studies that failed to find any association between the exposure 
and the disease the exposure allegedly caused.21 
Even strong proof of general causation may be unavailing, 
however. The existence of disease without exposure leads courts 
to further demand proof of “specific causation,” asking whether 
this plaintiff’s case of disease is one that would not have occurred 
but for the exposure.22 The difficulty lies in determining what if 
any additional proof a plaintiff must, may, or can adduce to prove 
specific causation. 
                                                                                                     
 20. General causation is sometimes expressed as whether an agent “is 
capable of” causing a disease, but more than theoretical capability is implied. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 
cmt. c (2010); Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1158 
(E.D. Wash. 2009); cf. Joseph Sanders, Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic 
Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (2010) (“The general 
causation question is whether a substance . . . has been shown to harm any 
individuals.”). 
 21. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 
1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[E]pidemiological 
studies . . . are the only useful studies having any bearing on causation.”); 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717–18 (Tex. 1997) 
(requiring a statistically significant epidemiologic result of relative risk greater 
than two). 
 22. E.g., Henricksen, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. 
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For some courts, epidemiology may—or must—serve that 
function, but only if the epidemiologic studies find that exposure 
more than doubles the risk of disease, which would imply that 
exposure accounted for more than one-half of the incidence of the 
disease. From this statistic based on the incidence of disease in 
exposed and unexposed populations, courts have reasoned that it 
is “more likely than not” that an individual plaintiff’s disease is a 
case associated with the exposure.23 Some commentators view 
this “doubling+” requirement24 as too stringent. James Robins 
and Sander Greenland, for example, showed that if the inference 
of general causation is accepted, then in most circumstances the 
epidemiologic relative risk is a lower bound of the probability that 
a given individual who has both exposure and illness is a case of 
“true” causation.25 
On the other hand, others have argued that because relative 
risk is undeniably a property of samples and populations, but 
specific causation is a property of an individual case, 
epidemiologic data cannot support inferences about specific 
causation at all.26 Some courts have effectively demanded that a 
plaintiff produce particularistic evidence—proof of some fact that 
will distinguish a plaintiff’s case of disease from the cases that 
would have occurred even absent exposure.27 To try to satisfy 
                                                                                                     
 23. E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 781 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Estate of George v. Vt. 
League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 375 (Vt. 2010). 
 24. Richard Wright seems to have coined this elegant shorthand for the 
“relative risk must exceed two” rule. Richard W. Wright, Liability for Possible 
Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 41 LOYOLA 
L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1318 (2008). 
 25. James M. Robins & Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causation 
Under a Stochastic Model for Individual Risk, 45 BIOMETRICS 1125, 1129–32 
(1989); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(4) (2010) (“[A]ny judicial requirement that 
plaintiffs must show a threshold increase in risk or a doubling in incidence in a 
group study in order to satisfy the burden of proof of specific causation is 
usually inappropriate.”). 
 26. See Wright, supra note 5, at 1054 (“[P]articularistic evidence is 
necessary for causal explanation . . . .”); Wright, supra note 24, at 1318 (arguing 
that epidemiologic data provide no evidence that toxic exposure “actually 
caused” harm in individual case); Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011] UKSC 10, 157 
(Lord Rodger), 170 (Lady Hale), 190–91 (Lord Mance). 
 27. See, e.g., Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1162–
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such demands, some plaintiffs have turned to medical experts 
who try to rule out other plausible causes, a method called 
differential diagnosis or differential etiology. Some plaintiffs have 
tried to rely on epidemiologic studies coupled with analysis of the 
plaintiff’s individual characteristics that put the plaintiff at a 
particularly heightened risk.28 
The interaction of population-derived relative risk data and 
proof of specific causation under the traditional deterministic and 
dichotomous causation model received unusually explicit 
attention in two cases decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In each case, a group of plaintiffs 
alleged tortious exposure to radiation from uranium mining and 
milling. 
In June v. Union Carbide Corp.,29 twenty-seven former 
residents of Uravan, Colorado, alleged that radioactive 
contamination from uranium and vanadium mining and milling 
operations in the company town had caused their thyroid disease 
or non-thyroid cancer. General causation was not in dispute: the 
defendants had to concede that ionizing radiation in general is 
capable of causing cancer, and that products of uranium and 
vanadium radioactive decay, such as iodine-131, cause thyroid 
cancer in particular. In an attempt to prove specific causation, 
plaintiffs relied on experts who estimated each plaintiff’s 
radiation dose and opined that such exposure was a “substantial 
factor” contributing to their various diseases.30 The defendants 
argued, and the district and appellate courts agreed, that such 
testimony could not suffice to prove causation because it did not 
assert that any plaintiff’s illness would not have occurred but for 
exposure to the Uravan radiation. 
The Tenth Circuit panel analyzed the description of factual 
causation in both the Second Restatement of Torts, which used 
                                                                                                     
63, 1177 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (noting that plaintiff could not distinguish his case 
of leukemia from one that would have occurred without chemical exposure). 
 28. See, e.g., Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 384 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting) 
(discussing the argument that a firefighter’s individual risk of contracting 
lymphoma from inhaled chemicals was higher than the average risk reported in 
epidemiologic studies). 
 29. June v. Union Carbide Corp, 577 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 30. Id. at 1237. 
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the “substantial factor” formulation, and the Third Restatement, 
which consciously deleted reference to “substantial factor.” The 
court concluded that despite the difference in language, the two 
restatements equivalently established but-for as the sine qua non 
for factual causation.31 The restatements admitted only one 
exception—situations involving multiple sufficient causes—and 
the court reasoned that even in such situations, proof of causation 
requires a showing that the alleged cause would have been a but-
for cause in the hypothetical absence of the other sufficient 
cause(s). 
In support of that reasoning, the court cited several 
illustrations given in the Third Restatement, including “the one 
most pertinent to the case before us,” a hypothetical product 
liability case in which a plaintiff whose daughter has a birth 
defect alleges that a drug manufacturer failed to warn of the 
drug’s teratogenicity.32 The plaintiff claims the drug caused the 
birth defect; the manufacturer claims that an independent 
genetic condition caused it. The Tenth Circuit noted that 
according to the Restatement, the plaintiff must show that the 
drug, acting alone, would have caused the birth defect, not 
merely that the drug could have caused the defect.33 This 
formulation echoes the distinction typically made between 
general causation and specific causation.34 
The majority held that the plaintiffs had “failed to present to 
the [district] court evidence, or even an argument” that radiation 
released by defendants constituted “either a but-for cause of . . . 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 1241. 
 32. Id. at 1244 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. e, illus. 2 (2010)). 
 33. Id. Actually, the illustration was not particularly pertinent to June, 
because it illustrated the rule for multiple sufficient causes and therefore 
necessarily assumed that both the parents and the drug company presented 
sufficient evidence that either the genetic condition or the drug alone would 
have caused the injury. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2010). The real question lurking in June is whether 
demanding such evidence can be realistic in a case like June, and how to 
respond if it is not. 
 34. Many courts have said that general causation requires proof that an 
exposure can cause the plaintiff’s condition, and specific causation requires 
proof that the plaintiff’s exposure did cause the plaintiff’s individual case. E.g., 
Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1334 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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or . . . a necessary component of a causal set that would probably 
have caused” any of the plaintiffs’ medical conditions.35 Judge 
Holloway dissented in part, arguing that for those plaintiffs with 
thyroid disease, the testimony of one of plaintiff’s experts created 
a material issue of disputed fact with respect to but-for 
causation.36 Judge Holloway did not question the majority’s 
explication of “but-for” as the sole test for causation.37 
In Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co.,38 three plaintiffs alleged 
that their cancers had been caused by radiation exposure from 
another uranium mill in New Mexico. They submitted evidence 
similar to the plaintiffs’ evidence in June,39 but argued that New 
Mexico law, unlike Colorado law as interpreted in June, would 
permit a finding of causation based on the “substantial factor” 
test.40 The district judge dismissed the action on summary 
judgment. A Tenth Circuit panel that included none of the June 
judges unanimously affirmed—but in three separate opinions. 
Judges Lucero and McKay agreed—often verbatim—with 
June’s embrace of mechanistic “but-for” causation as the only 
valid interpretation of causation-in-fact. They held that New 
Mexico law allowed for substantial factor causation in lieu of but-
for causation only in two exceptional cases. Regarding the first 
exception, multiple sufficient causes, the court followed June, 
holding that “[o]nly a substance that would have actually (that is, 
probably) caused the cancer can be a factual cause without being 
a but-for cause.”41 Regarding the second, alternative liability, the 
court saw no “basis for alternative liability where only one 
                                                                                                     
 35. June, 577 F.3d at 1245 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 36. Id. at 1253–54 (Holloway, J., dissenting). The majority refused on 
procedural grounds to consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that persuaded Judge 
Holloway. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1252–54. 
 38. Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 39. See id. at 1170–71 (Lucero, J., concurring) (describing testimony of 
plaintiffs’ experts, including one who testified in June, regarding the “assigned 
share” of risk and the lack of other known significant risk factors). 
 40. Id. at 1167. 
 41. Id. at 1168 (quoting June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1243 
(10th Cir. 2009)). 
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potential wrongdoer has been identified and the injury may 
simply have resulted from natural causes.”42 
Judge Lucero nevertheless disagreed with Judge McKay’s—
and the June majority’s—application of the but-for standard. 
Judge Lucero embraced Judge Holloway’s partial dissent in June, 
but found the factual presentation in Wilcox insufficient to prove 
but-for causation, by contrast with June.43 
Of the six judges on the two panels, only Judge Holmes 
seemed willing to contemplate the possibility that “the but-for 
standard of causation” ought not apply to cases like June and 
Wilcox.44 But Judge Holmes did not decide that any other 
standard should or would apply, opining instead that plaintiffs 
had waived any argument for a different standard.45 Judge 
Holmes agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the but-for 
test.46 
It is easy to understand the uneasiness reflected in the 
opinions of Judges Holloway, Lucero, and Holmes. In applying a 
deterministic model of causation, the Tenth Circuit effectively 
reinforced the specific causation requirement for toxic tort 
plaintiffs. The court demanded proof that each individual 
plaintiff would not have developed cancer absent exposure to the 
radiation released by the defendants in the respective cases. How 
could any plaintiff possibly do this? 
The majorities, in very similar terms, denied that they had 
set the plaintiffs an impossible task.47 They rooted their 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 1167. The court stated that alternative liability applies when 
“two or more defendants engage in simultaneous or nearly identical negligent 
acts but only one of these acts causes the injury complained of, thus making it 
difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to prove which defendant caused the 
harm” and distinguished asbestos cases in which “it is clear the plaintiff’s injury 
was caused by asbestos” but the defendant that caused the harm could not be 
specified. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1170–73 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 1173 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 1169 (“[W]e are not persuaded this requirement is so 
insurmountable . . . .”); June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (stating that in holding that plaintiffs did not attempt to prove but-for 
causation, the court was “not being hypertechnical”). 
WHEN CERTAINTY DISSOLVES INTO PROBABILITY 251 
explanations in the preponderance of the evidence standard: 
although a plaintiff must show that she or he “actually” would 
not have become ill absent a defendant’s tortious exposure of the 
plaintiff to a toxic substance,48 the plaintiff need not prove this to 
an “absolute certainty.”49 “Actually” actually means “probably”50 
or “likely,”51 the majorities stated. 
This question-begging explanation still leaves one to ponder 
what type of evidence might have satisfied the plaintiff’s burden. 
How could a plaintiff show it was “likely” that the defendants’ 
radiation releases “actually” caused his or her disease? Neither 
majority opinion says. Their discussions of but-for causation, 
however, are so mechanistic as to give the impression that only 
particularistic evidence—something about plaintiff’s disease that 
betrayed its origin, like the ballistics marks on a bullet—could 
suffice. Perhaps—the opinions don’t say—a sufficiently large 
population-based relative risk estimate derived from an 
epidemiologic study could also have satisfied the majorities. 
Neither of those options was available to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs in each of these cases did prove, however, that 
the defendants exposed them to radiation. The defendants did not 
deny that such exposure increased the likelihood that a person 
would develop the diseases from which the plaintiffs suffered. 
That increased risk is known partly because of an understanding 
of what ionizing radiation does to DNA, but also because of the 
observation that more disease is found in populations exposed to 
additional radiation than in populations not exposed.52 
Nevertheless, even though the defendants had exposed the 
                                                                                                     
 48. June, 577 F.3d at 1243. 
 49. Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 50. June, 577 F.3d at 1243. 
 51. See Wilcox, 619 F.3d at 1167 (characterizing plaintiffs’ position as an 
argument that causation could be proven “without regard to whether the 
injuries would likely have occurred in the absence of defendant’s action”); id. at 
1169 (stating that a toxic tort plaintiff must demonstrate but-for causation “only 
to a reasonable degree of medical probability—not a certainty”). 
 52. See Samuel D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a 
New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 266–67 (1960) (noting 
that the causal connection between radiation and cancer “can be measured only 
by a statistical increase in the incidence of the disease”). 
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plaintiffs to known risk factors for their diseases, no plaintiff 
could obtain any recovery. 
Ex hypothesi, the defendants’ conduct was tortious—perhaps 
because reasonable precautions were available that would have 
avoided the haphazard broadcast of radionuclides in the 
community. The plaintiffs’ evidence fairly supported the inference 
that someone got sick who, if the mine and mill operators had 
behaved differently, would not have been sick. Yet the 
deterministic concept of causation demands that this plaintiff 
show that he or she is the “someone” whose disease would not 
have occurred absent the defendants’ wrongful conduct. In many 
cases, as in June and Wilcox, this will be impossible, resulting in 
denial of all recoveries against defendants who nevertheless 
wrongfully made people sick. 
III. Solutions Illusory and Real: The False—and True—Promise 
of Genomics 
The deterministic model of causation has performed poorly 
when confronted with the mechanistic opacity of toxic torts. That 
opacity is as intolerable to science and medicine as it is 
inconvenient for law. But science has developed tools to attack it. 
In just two decades, researchers have sequenced the human 
genome, developed information processing capacity to conduct 
statistical analysis of very large numbers of genetic variations, 
invented techniques to rapidly assay the effects of toxic substance 
exposure on highly variable genetic material, and learned new 
ways to detect disease-related changes at the sub-cellular or 
molecular level. 
Observing all this biomedical research from the law school 
across campus, legal scholars understandably envision that one 
day the molecular impacts of carcinogens, mutagens, and other 
toxins will be as easy to detect and attribute as the impacts from 
wayward cricket balls, deformed automobile parts, and 
misdirected scalpels. If so, “an increasing number of people will 
have the tools necessary to prove sine qua non causation in toxic 
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tort litigation,”53 making it easier for deserving plaintiffs to 
prevail and, by implication, allowing courts accurately to dismiss 
claims when those tools are available but do not provide the 
desired proof. At last, cause-in-fact in toxic torts will be as certain 
as in any other tort. Or will it? 
A. A Bit of Genomics 
The seed that grew into the Human Genome Project, 
interestingly, germinated in the soil of a toxic tort problem. In the 
early 1980s, veterans and their families demanded compensation 
for injuries allegedly resulting from service members’ deliberate 
experimental exposure to radiation by the government during the 
Cold War; in response, Congress commissioned a study of the 
feasibility of detecting low-level damage to DNA caused by 
environmental exposures.54 The researchers given the task 
realized that they would have to “scan many genomes’ worth of 
DNA to pick up what were sure to be small alterations in the 
mutation rate.”55 A scientist at the Department of Energy 
conceived “a more manageable goal, that of sequencing the entire 
human genome once rather than many times,” and the seed was 
planted.56 It would be about a half-decade before the first federal 
appropriation for the Human Genome Project sprouted.57 
                                                                                                     
 53. Andrew R. Klein, Causation and Uncertainty: Making Connections in a 
Time of Change, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 35 (2008); see also Gary E. Marchant, 
Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7, 8 (2006) (“New genetic 
methods and data have the potential to fill some of the scientific uncertainties 
and data gaps in toxic tort litigation, thus making toxic tort litigation more 
accurate and fair.”); Sanders, supra note 20, at 1399 n.132 (“[T]he field of 
toxicogenomics offers the long run possibility that we will be able to ascertain 
causation at the level of the individual case, radically changing all specific 
causation testimony.”). 
 54. CHRISTOPHER WILLS, EXONS, INTRONS, AND TALKING GENES 72 (1991). 
According to Wills, other significant compensation claims of the era, including 
those of Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange and of people living near 
the damaged Three Mile Island nuclear plant, also contributed to the political 
impetus for the study. Id. at 71. 
 55. Id. at 74. 
 56. Id. at 75. 
 57. Id. at 81. 
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Remarkably, it took only a bit more than twice that time to 
harvest the crop: a highly accurate sequential listing, coordinated 
with physical locations on the chromosomes, of about three billion 
nucleotide base pairs that constitute human nuclear DNA.58 The 
success of the Human Genome Project spawned a slew of other 
“omics” projects pursuing comprehensive indices of classes of 
human biochemicals.59 Some of this research promises better 
understanding of the genetic and environmental components of 
disease etiology, and thus may be directly relevant to the 
causation issue in toxic torts.60 
1. Genes and Disease 
A gene is a segment of DNA that encodes information, which 
may be translated into a sequence of amino acids. The amino acid 
chain can then be formed into all or part of a protein. Biologists 
did not need to sequence the entire human genome to understand 
that a person’s inherited genotype could affect the phenotype—
                                                                                                     
 58. Press Release, Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., International 
Consortium Completes Human Genome Project (Apr. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.genome.gov/11006929; see also Int’l Human Genome Sequencing 
Consortium, Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome, 409 
NATURE 860, 873, 875 (2001) (estimating the total number of bases in the 
genome). A nucleotide or “base” is one of the four different molecules that bond 
together to form a strand of DNA. ISRAEL ROSENFIELD ET AL., DNA 73 (2011). In 
the double helix of the DNA molecule, each base is “paired” with its 
complementary nucleotide. Id. 
 59. See Mirsolava Janković, Glycans as Biomarkers: Status and 
Perspectives, 30 J. MED. BIOCHEMISTRY 213, 213–14, 219 (2011) (describing 
glycomics, study of sugar-protein molecules); Paolo Vineis & Frederica Perera, 
Molecular Epidemiology and Biomarkers in Etiologic Cancer Research: The New 
in Light of the Old, 16 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1954, 
1955 (2007) (“[N]ew technologies/markers, such as proteomics, metabonomics, 
and epigenomics, will become highly relevant . . . .”). 
 60. Two examples are the Environmental Genome Project and HuGENet 
(Human Genome Epidemiology Network). See generally Samuel H. Wilson & 
Kenneth Olden, The Environmental Genome Project: Phase I and Beyond, 4 
MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 147 (2004) (describing Environmental Genome 
Project); Wei Yu et al., HugeWatch: Tracking Trends and Patterns of Published 
Studies of Genetic Association and Human Genome Epidemiology in Near-real 
Time, 16 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 1155 (2008) (describing HuGENet and related 
projects). 
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the person’s observable traits—in important health-related ways. 
The most straightforward situations involve an inherited allele, a 
specific variation in a given gene, which changes the coded 
protein in a way that produces a particular disease or condition.61 
The story of a genetic disease can be considerably more 
complicated, however, even for diseases caused by changes in a 
single protein coded by a single gene. Cystic fibrosis is a case in 
point. In 1989, researchers announced the sequencing of “the 
cystic fibrosis gene,” which codes for a protein involved in 
transporting molecules across cell membranes.62 A person who 
inherits from each parent a copy of a variant allele that results in 
the omission of one amino acid from the protein will have cystic 
fibrosis.63 But since that discovery, researchers have identified 
more than 1,600 different mutations that can produce cystic 
fibrosis.64 The mutations, located in various parts of the gene, 
affect the protein in various ways that produce disease of varying 
severity.65 
Genes also relate to diseases in even more complex ways. For 
example, people with a particular variation of a gene called 
APOE are dramatically more likely to develop Alzheimer’s 
disease than people without that allele: ten times more likely if 
they inherited two copies of the variant gene, four times if they 
inherited one copy.66 But other genes also appear to play roles in 
                                                                                                     
 61. For example, alteration of one DNA nucleotide in a gene that codes for 
hemoglobin yields a substitution of one amino acid in that protein, which 
changes the molecule’s shape—producing the sickle-cell phenotype—and 
reduces its ability to carry oxygen. Muin J. Khoury & Janice S. Dorman, Genetic 
Disease, in MOLECULAR EPIDEMIOLOGY 365, 370 (Paul A. Schulte & Frederica P. 
Perera eds., 1993). 
 62. Sherman Elias et al., Carrier Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: A Case 
Study in Setting Standards of Medical Practice, in GENE MAPPING 186, 187 
(George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992). 
 63. Id. at 188; Steven M. Rowe et al., A Breath of Fresh Air, SCI. AM., Aug. 
2011, at 69, 71. 
 64. Rowe et al., supra note 63, at 72; see also WILLS, supra note 54, at 210 
(stating that in initial experiments fewer than 70% of cystic fibrosis patients’ 
genes tested displayed the variation that deleted one amino acid). 
 65. Rowe et al., supra note 63, at 72; see also WILLS, supra note 54, at 212–
13 (“[M]utations are found all over the gene.”). 
 66. Gina Kolata, Vast Gene Study Yields Insights on Alzheimer’s, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A1. 
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Alzheimer’s disease, albeit much smaller roles.67 There is no one 
“Alzheimer’s disease gene.” 
The Alzheimer’s pattern is not unusual. Susceptibility 
alleles, rare variants of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, 
significantly increase a woman’s risk of developing breast 
cancer.68 But genome-wide association studies—which examine 
large numbers of genes in persons with and without a disease to 
determine if particular DNA variations are statistically 
associated with higher disease incidence—identified half a dozen 
new susceptibility alleles; these occur relatively frequently in the 
population, but individually confer small increments of risk 
ranging from seven to twenty-six percent.69 Thus, the degree to 
which disease or other phenotypic change results from variation 
in a gene, which biologists call “penetrance,” varies from gene to 
gene.70 Sometimes, the risk conferred by a variation in a 
                                                                                                     
 67. Pooled data from numerous studies revealed associations between five 
genes and the incidence of Alzheimer’s disease; each of these alleles is 
associated with an increase in risk of 10 to 15%. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Athina Christopoulou & John Spiliotis, The Role of BRCA1 
and BRCA2 in Hereditary Breast Cancer, 10 GENE THERAPY & MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 95, 96 (2006), http://www.gtmb.org/pages/Vol10A/PDF/09. 
Christop&Spiliot,95-100.pdf (noting that women carrying mutations have a 40% 
to 85% lifetime risk, versus 12.5% in general population). 
 69. Paul D.P. Pharoah et al., Polygenes, Risk Prediction, and Targeted 
Prevention of Breast Cancer, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2796, 2797–99 (2008). 
 70. See Eleanor Raffan & Robert K. Semple, Next Generation Sequencing—
Implications for Clinical Practice, 99 BRIT. MED. BULL. 53, 62–63 (2011) 
(defining variable penetrance as “the variable tendency of genetic mutations to 
translate into clinical disease;” noting that “every genome sequenced” includes 
numerous alleles implicated in disease); see also Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Normality 
and Variation: The Human Genome Project and the Ideal Human Type, in ARE 
GENES US?, supra note 5, at 99, 100 (noting that most identified genetic 
differences are risk factors for, or provide a vulnerability to, development of a 
specific disease, rather than determinants of disease); Evgeny N. Imyanitov et 
al., Searching for Cancer-Associated Gene Polymorphisms: Promises and 
Obstacles, 204 CANCER LETTERS 3, 8 (2004) (“[L]ow penetrance is often 
exemplified as something like 1.5-fold risk elevation.”); see generally SUZANNE H. 
REUBEN, PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL, REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER RISK: 
WHAT WE CAN DO NOW 1 (2010) (“Single-gene inherited cancer syndromes are 
believed to account for less than 5 percent of malignancies in the United 
States.”). 
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particular gene may depend on a person’s genotype at other genes 
or on the action of other biochemical constituents.71 
2. Toxic Exposure and Disease—and Genes 
Biologists also did not need to sequence the entire human 
genome to understand that different people may respond to the 
same dose of the same toxin in different ways. Even for acutely 
lethal poisons, although there may be a dose above which no 
person (or research animal) can survive, toxicologists typically 
determine what dose is lethal for half of the organisms. Because 
the toxin and dose are the same for all the exposed organisms, 
something—a variation from organism to organism, a variation in 
the environment from organism to organism, or pure random 
chance—must explain why the toxin is lethal to some but not to 
others.72 
More extreme variations typify the chronic or latent toxicity 
ordinarily involved in toxic tort cases. Consider tobacco smoke, 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 63 (stating that variable 
penetrance “is usually ascribed either to environmental factors or to unspecified 
‘genetic modifiers’”); Marc A. Schaub et al., Linking Disease Associations with 
Regulatory Information in the Human Genome, 22 GENOME RES. 1748, 1748 
(2012) (noting that for the vast majority of DNA variations found to be 
associated with disease, “it is likely that the underlying mechanism linking 
them to the phenotype is regulatory” rather than a change in coded protein 
sequence). The effects of the breast cancer susceptibility alleles, for example, are 
modified by other genes that alter the body’s response to environmental insults 
such as radiation. Logan C. Walker et al., Use of Expression Data and the 
CGEMS Genome-Wide Breast Cancer Association Study to Identify Genes that 
May Modify Risk in BRCA1/2 Mutation Carriers, 112 BREAST CANCER RES. & 
TREATMENT 229, 229, 233 (2008). Cystic fibrosis is another example: some people 
have symptoms worse than would be suggested by the change in the protein 
coded by the “cystic fibrosis gene” because a group of several hundred helper 
proteins recognize the altered protein as defective and destroy it before it can be 
put into position to do its job. Rowe et al., supra note 63, at 72. See generally 
James R. Griesemer, Tools for Talking: Human Nature, Weismannism, and the 
Interpretation of Genetic Information, in ARE GENES US?, supra note 5, at 69, 82 
(observing that genes “cause” inherited somatic characteristics but “[t]he body is 
a cause in inheritance . . . . Proteins and other cell components are causally 
responsible for the events of cell division and DNA replication”). 
 72. FRANK C. LU, BASIC TOXICOLOGY 102 (1985). 
258 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013) 
which is almost universally acknowledged to cause lung cancer.73 
Many people with lung cancer seem to have acquired the disease 
by smoking.74 But some people smoke to a ripe old age,75 and only 
a small fraction of even the heaviest smokers ever contract lung 
cancer.76 On the other hand, though lung cancer was very rare 
before smoking became common, some people who never smoked 
did—and do—get lung cancer.77 What explains the differences? 
The search for explanations commonly distinguishes 
extrinsic from intrinsic potential sources of inter-individual 
difference: environment versus genetics.78 Perhaps exposure to 
something other than tobacco smoke—say, diesel exhaust—
causes lung cancer in some non-smokers, while another factor—
say, a diet rich in just the right antioxidants—inhibits 
                                                                                                     
 73. As recently as 2005, however, Britain’s Imperial Tobacco successfully 
defended a tort claim by disputing that it had been “scientifically established” 
that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer. See McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 
[2005] C.S.O.H. 69, 5.694–5.695, 6.149–6.17, 9.9 (stating that the burden of 
proof on causation was not satisfied); id. 9.10 (finding that epidemiologic data 
failed to prove individual causation).  
 74. See Graham G. Giles & Peter Boyle, Smoking and Lung Cancer, in 
TOBACCO AND PUBLIC HEALTH 485, 486 (Peter Boyle et al., eds. 2004) (estimating 
that 83% to 92% of lung cancer deaths in five developed countries are 
attributable to smoking). 
 75. See, e.g., George Davey Smith, Epidemiology, Epigenetics and the 
“Gloomy Prospect”: Embracing Randomness in Population Health Research and 
Practice, 40 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 537, 537–38 (2011) (describing a healthy 
centenarian believed to have smoked 170,000 cigarettes). 
 76. See, e.g., Adrian Cassidy et al., Lung Cancer Risk Prediction: A Tool for 
Early Detection, 120 INT’L J. CANCER 1, 1 (2006) (noting that eighty-five percent 
of heavy smokers will not develop lung cancer). 
 77. See Asta Scesnaite et al., Similar DNA Methylation Pattern in Lung 
Tumours from Smokers and Never-smokers with Second-hand Tobacco Smoke 
Exposure, 27 MUTAGENESIS 423, 423 (2012) (acknowledging that 10% to 15% of 
lung cancer deaths occur in people who never smoked). Exposure to 
environmental tobacco smoke may explain some of those cases. See Giles & 
Boyle, supra note 74, at 495. 
 78. See generally Jennifer E. Below, Factors that Impact Susceptibility to 
Fiber-Induced Health Effects, 14 J. TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH 246 (2011) 
(noting that only five percent of people exposed to asbestos develop 
mesothelioma and discussing genetic, nutritional, and other environmental 
factors that may affect susceptibility to the disease); Davey Smith, supra note 
75, at 539 (describing studies that partition contributions to health outcomes 
from genetics, shared environment, and non-shared environment). 
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carcinogenesis in the lungs of some smokers.79 Or perhaps a 
fortunate genetic endowment protects some lifelong smokers 
from lung cancer, while a genetic mischance induces lung cancer 
in some non-smokers.80 Both environmental and genetic 
differences between individuals appear responsible for at least 
some of the variation in individuals’ responses to toxic 
exposures.81 For the most part, it has been impossible (or at 
least impractical) to identify, quantify, and tease apart these 
possibilities using the investigatory tools of toxicology, 
environmental epidemiology, conventional biochemistry, and 
classical genetics.82 
3. The Tools of Toxicogenomics 
Technologies developed during and after the Human 
Genome Project provide new tools of vast potential power. DNA 
microarrays and even more powerful next-generation sequencing 
technologies allow assays of many genes at once and make it 
                                                                                                     
 79. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 76, at 2 (identifying dietary and other 
environmental factors that affect lung cancer risk); Giles & Boyle, supra note 
74, at 487 (listing other environmental causes of lung cancer); Elizabeth A. 
Ward et al., Research Recommendations for Selected IARC-Classified Agents, 
118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1355, 1358 (2010) (describing meta-analyses showing 
diesel exhaust associated with slightly elevated risk of lung cancer (relative 
risks 1.33 (95% confidence interval 1.24–1.44) and 1.47 (1.29–1.67)). 
 80. See Ping Zhan et al., CYP1A1 MspI and exon7 Gene Polymorphisms 
And Lung Cancer Risk: An Updated Meta-Analysis and Review, 30 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CLINICAL CANCER RES. 99, *15 (2011) (explaining that variations 
of two genes are associated with increased risk of lung cancer, and some 
variations particularly increase risk in smokers). 
 81. For example, the authors of a study that observed “[m]arked inter-
individual variation in response to the same level of exposure” to air pollution 
concluded “that susceptibility might be due to genetic factors.” Shuang Wang et 
al., Methods for Detecting Interactions Between Genetic Polymorphisms and 
Prenatal Environment With a Mother-Child Design, 34 GENETIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 
125, 131 (2010). 
 82. See David Altshuler et al., Genetic Mapping in Human Disease, 322 SCI. 
881, 881 (2008) (describing limitations of classical genetics); Michael D. Waters 
et al., Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing Toxicant-Related Disease, 544 
MUTATION RES. 415, 415 (2003) (describing the potential of toxicogenomics to 
address previously “intractable” problems). 
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practicable to sequence an individual’s entire genome.83 The 
young but rapidly developing science of toxicogenomics marries 
the experimental techniques of toxicology to the analytical 
techniques of genomics.84 Using laboratory animals or cells or 
tissues cultured in vitro, researchers can expose genetic material 
containing many variations of many genes to a suspected toxin 
and observe any variations in response, or they can compare 
exposed and non-exposed genetic material and observe any 
differences.85 New technologies allow detection not only of 
variations (polymorphisms) in the DNA sequence of particular 
genes, but also rearrangements and other variations of the 
structure of genes along a chromosome.86 
Alternatively, researchers can study the genes of samples of 
actual human populations and determine whether observable 
genetic differences are associated with differential exposure to 
toxins or with differential toxic effects among those exposed.87 
                                                                                                     
 83. Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 55; see also, e.g., S. Le Scouarnec & 
S.M. Gribble, Characterising Chromosome Rearrangements: Recent Technical 
Advances in Molecular Cytogenetics, 108 HEREDITY 75, 79 (2012) (describing how 
the Human Genome Project took more than a decade, but a whole human 
genome now can be sequenced in a few days); D.A. Wheeler et al., The Complete 
Genome of an Individual by Massively Parallel DNA Sequencing, 452 NATURE 
872, 872 (2008) (reporting first sequencing of a human’s genome using 
“massively parallel” next-generation technology). 
 84. See generally Gerald T. Ankley et al., Toxicogenomics in Regulatory 
Ecotoxicology, 40 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 4055, 4056 (2006) (documenting increasing 
numbers of toxicogenomics publications in each of the next five years following 
the first such publication, in 2000); Syril Pettit et al., Current and Future 
Applications of Toxicogenomics: Results Summary of a Survey from the HESI 
Genomics State of Science Subcommittee, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 992, 995 
(2010) (reporting that toxicogenomics has improved understanding of biological 
mechanisms of toxicity but biological understanding of toxicogenomic data 
remains limited). 
 85. See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining 
Public Health, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 190 (2005) (“DNA microarrays . . . permit 
thousands of genes to be monitored simultaneously to determine whether they 
have been activated or deactivated as a result of chemical exposure.”); see also 
Le Scouarnec & Gribble, supra note 83, at 76 (explaining how microarrays 
work). 
 86. Le Scouarnec & Gribble, supra note 83, at 75. 
 87. See e.g., Peter Soderkvist & Olav Axelson, On the Use of Molecular 
Biology Data in Occupational and Environmental Epidemiology, 37 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 84, 84–86 (1995) (describing study models); Wang et 
al, supra note 81, at 131 (discussing results of study of gene-environment 
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This extension of epidemiologic methods marks the field of 
molecular epidemiology.88 
A goal of toxicogenomic and molecular epidemiologic studies 
is to identify biomarkers—biochemical characteristics that reveal 
a toxic relation of interest. A biomarker of exposure is an 
observable change that occurs with exposure but is otherwise 
absent. A biomarker of effect is an observable, medically 
significant, harmful change that occurs with exposure but is 
otherwise absent. A biomarker of susceptibility, by contrast, is an 
observable genetic variation that alters the extent to which an 
exposure causes toxic harm.89 Researchers have begun to find 
markers of each type. 
For example, as stem cells divide and differentiate into 
various types of white blood cells, metabolites of benzene interact 
with DNA to cause errors during the copying of chromosomes.90 
Research has revealed that blood cells of individuals 
occupationally exposed to benzene are more likely to have 
particular chromosomal aberrations associated with the 
development of certain forms of a group of cancers called acute 
myelogenous leukemia (AML).91 The observation suggests a 
biological mechanism of benzene carcinogenicity, tending to 
confirm classical epidemiologic studies that detected an 
association between exposure to benzene and incidence of AML. 
It also could provide a marker of benzene exposure or effect.92 
                                                                                                     
interaction in variable health effects of air pollution). 
 88. See Margaret R. Spitz & Melissa L. Bondy, The Evolving Discipline of 
Molecular Epidemiology of Cancer, 31 CARCINOGENESIS 127, 127 (2010) 
(explaining that molecular epidemiology is an extension of classical 
epidemiology using biomarkers); Vineis & Perera, supra note 59, at 1954 
(defining molecular epidemiology). 
 89. See Grodsky, supra note 85, at 181–87. 
 90. See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137, 
143–46 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing testimony 
about chromosome aberrations associated with benzene exposure). 
 91. See Luoping Zhang et al., The Nature of Chromosomal Aberrations 
Detected in Humans Exposed to Benzene, 32 CRITICAL REV. TOXICOLOGY 1, 4–12 
(2002) (reviewing published research). 
 92. See id.; see also Luoping Zhang et al., Nonrandom Aneuploidy of 
Chromosomes 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 21 Induced by the Benzene Metabolites 
Hydroquinone and Benzenetriol, 45 ENVTL. MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS 388, 394–
95 (2005) (finding that preliminary work in exposed humans shows benzene 
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Other studies have found potential biomarkers of 
susceptibility. For instance, epidemiologic studies strongly linked 
mesothelioma incidence to asbestos exposure, but estimates of 
relative risks varied.93 In a region of Turkey with high 
environmental exposure to a form of asbestos, researchers found 
that mesothelioma was not randomly distributed but rather 
clustered in certain families, suggesting that susceptibility to 
asbestos-induced mesothelioma has a genetic component.94 
Although the full picture is far from clear, one study of asbestos-
exposed people found higher susceptibility in those with certain 
variations in a gene that codes for an enzyme that catalyzes 
production of antioxidant molecules.95 
Another example involves the suspected link between tobacco 
smoke and breast cancer, which eluded conventional 
epidemiologic investigation.96 Genomic investigations observed 
that variations in a gene that codes a carcinogen-neutralizing 
enzyme dramatically influenced the breast cancer danger from 
smoking. Women whose genes coded for the most protective form 
                                                                                                     
selectively affects certain chromosomes). 
 93. See J. Corbett McDonald, Epidemiology of Malignant Mesothelioma—
An Outline, 54 ANN. OCCUP. HYG. 851, 852 (2010) (listing studies). 
 94. R.M. Rudd, Malignant Mesothelioma, 93 BRIT. MED. BULL. 105, 108 
(2010); see also Below, supra note 78, at 254 (suggesting that genome-wide 
association studies (GWAS) would likely reveal genetic susceptibility factors). 
Other factors, including random sampling error, could account for some of the 
variation in relative risk results as well. See Michael D. Green, Second Thoughts 
About Apportionment in Asbestos Litigation, 37 SW. L. REV. 531, 538 (2008) 
(describing gaps in knowledge of mesothelioma causation); see also McDonald, 
supra note 93, at 852–55 (discussing possible differences in forms of asbestos 
that study subjects were exposed to).  
 95. Aki Murakami et al., Heme Oxygenase-1 Promoter Polymorphism is 
Associated with Risk of Malignant Mesothelioma, 1 LUNG 333 (2012); see also 
Joseph R. Testa et al., Germline BAP1 Mutations Predispose to Malignant 
Mesothelioma, 43 NATURE GENETICS 1022, 1022, 1025 (2011) (reporting that 
mutations in a gene that codes for a tumor suppressor protein may be associated 
with heightened risk of several cancers even without asbestos exposure, but 
predominantly mesothelioma if asbestos exposure is present). 
 96. See David H. Phillips & Seymour Garte, Smoking and Breast Cancer: Is 
There Really a Link?, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1, 1 
(2008) (explaining that epidemiologic associations are lacking despite evidence 
from rodent studies and presence of activating enzymes and DNA adducts in 
human breast tissue). 
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of the enzyme had no increased risk of breast cancer even if they 
smoked, but women smokers with less protective forms of the 
gene were eight times more likely to get breast cancer than were 
women with the same genotype who did not smoke.97 The gene 
variations thus could act as biomarkers of susceptibility. 
These examples show the potential of toxicogenomics and 
molecular epidemiology but should not obscure the difficulties 
facing these sciences. Biologists did not need, or should not have 
needed, to sequence the entire human genome to understand that 
sequencing the genome alone would not tell the entire story of 
disease or of toxicity.98 The links between genes, toxic substances, 
and disease form a web far more complex than previously 
imagined. 
Genome-scale studies test vast numbers of genes and 
alleles99—so many that random chance would produce large 
numbers of coincidental associations between gene and disease 
(or between gene and toxicity). Although genomic researchers 
abide by a statistical significance convention orders of magnitude 
more stringent than the typical 95% level used in most scientific 
                                                                                                     
 97. Rick Weiss, What’s Your Cancer Profile?, Scientists Focus on an 
Overlooked Class of Genes that May Determine Your Odds, WASH. POST, Sept. 
19, 1995, at Z12. The gene in question is distinct from the so-called “breast 
cancer genes” BRCA1 and BRCA2. See Christine B. Ambrosone et al., Cigarette 
Smoking, N-Acetyltransferase 2 Genotypes, and Breast Cancer Risk: Pooled 
Analysis and Meta-analysis, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & 
PREVENTION 15, 25 (2008) (explaining that “cigarette smoking is associated with 
an increase in breast cancer risk among women with NAT2 slow acetylator 
genotypes”). 
 98. RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX 16–17, 80–82 (2000). 
 99. So far, at least 16 million single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)—
variations that change one DNA base pair—have been identified. Simon N. 
Stacey et al., A Germline Variant in the TP53 Polyadenylation Signal Confers 
Cancer Susceptibility, 43 NATURE GENETICS 1098, 1099 (2011). That number is 
rapidly increasing. See Altshuler et al., supra note 82, at 833 (discussing how 
the number of known SNPs rose from 1.4 million in late 1990s to more than 10 
million by 2008). At least two million variations involving small insertions or 
deletions of DNA have been found as well. Julienne M. Mullaney et al, Small 
Insertions and Deletions (InDels) in Human Genomes, 19 HUM. MOLECULAR 
GENETICS R131, R133 (2010). Some researchers suggest that these and other 
structural variations in DNA may be even more important than SNPs. Yingrui 
Li et al., Structural Variation in Two Human Genomes Mapped at Single-
Nucleotide Resolution by Whole Genome de Novo Assembly, 29 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 723, 723, 728 (2011). 
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investigation, false positive results are easy to obtain and difficult 
to exclude.100 Associations must be investigated to assess their 
biological reality.101 And the effect of a given allele on toxic 
susceptibility may not be a fixed value; it may vary depending on 
the alleles found at other genes or on other environmental 
factors.102 
Furthermore, a gene’s base sequence is not its only 
biologically relevant feature. All of a person’s cells have the same 
DNA, except for mutations acquired in individual cells during 
life,103 but they do many different things.104 Whether a gene is 
expressed or not, and to what extent—that is, whether its DNA is 
actively being transcribed into RNA and translated into 
assembled proteins—is critical to the proper functioning of cells, 
tissues, and organs.105 Deviations from normal gene expression 
                                                                                                     
 100. See Ian P.M. Tomlinson et al., Investigation of the Effects of DNA 
Repair Gene Polymorphisms on the Risk of Colorectal Cancer, 27 MUTAGENESIS 
219, 219 (2012) (describing a study that failed to support previously reported 
gene-disease associations); Samuel P. Dickson et al., Rare Variants Create 
Synthetic Genome-Wide Associations, PLOS BIOLOGY, Jan. 2010, at 1, 5–7. 
 101. Spitz & Bondy, supra note 88, at 130; see also Inês Barroso, Non-
Coding but Functional, 489 NATURE 54, 54 (2012) (“[A]ssociation is not 
causality, and identifying those variants which are causally linked to a given 
disease or trait . . . has been difficult.”). 
 102. See Camille Limoges, Errare Humanum Est: Do Genetic Errors Have a 
Future, in ARE GENES US?, supra note 5, at 113, 121 (noting that even in 
Mendelian disorders caused by changes in a single gene, phenotype is often 
subject to modification by other genes and environmental factors); Christopher 
A. Maxwell et al., Genetic Interactions: The Missing Links for a Better 
Understanding of Cancer Susceptibility, Progression and Treatment, 7 
MOLECULAR CANCER 4, *8 (2008), http://www.molecular-cancer.com/content/ 
pdf/1476-4598-7-4.pdf (“The detection of these [gene-gene] interactions will be 
invaluable to our understanding of cancer risk.”); Leonardo A. Pinto et al., 
Impact of Genetics in Childhood Asthma, 84 JORNAL DE PEDIATRIA S68, S68, S72 
(2008) (noting that asthma involves many genes and results from interaction of 
genetic and environmental factors); Christopher P. Wild, Environmental 
Exposure Measurement in Cancer Epidemiology, 24 MUTAGENESIS 117, 117 
(2009) (“[P]recise contribution of specific risk factors and their interaction, both 
with each other and with genotype, continues to be difficult to elucidate.”). 
 103. See generally WILLS, supra note 54, at 91 (explaining that about one 
DNA base per 500,000 is mutated during a lifetime). The gametes (sperm and 
egg cells), of course, do not contain the same DNA as other body cells. Id. 
 104. See ROSENFIELD ET AL., supra note 58, at 108–13. 
 105. Id. at 95–101, 108–13. 
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are important to many disease processes.106 Gene expression is 
controlled in part by regulatory genes107 and in part by an 
epigenome of other biochemical constituents that provides 
instructions that influence gene activity.108 The epigenome is 
easily altered by environmental factors, sometimes in ways that 
echo long after the exposure and sometimes in ways that (unlike 
a change to a gene) cannot be detected later.109 
All this complexity has implications for the genetic study of 
disease as well as for the study of toxicogenomics. Both the power 
and the limits of toxicogenomics will affect proof of specific 
causation in toxic torts. 
B. The False Promise 
A number of commentators have eagerly anticipated the day 
when science exposes the presumed deterministic mechanism of 
toxic causation for all to see.110 The hope is that biomarkers will 
                                                                                                     
 106. See generally Altshuler et al., supra note 82, at 881. 
 107. Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 14; see also Joseph R. Ecker, 
Serving Up a Genome Feast, 489 NATURE 52, 52 (2012) (“[T]he space between 
genes is filled with enhancers (regulatory DNA elements), promoters (the sites 
at which DNA’s transcription into RNA is initiated) and numerous previously 
overlooked regions that encode RNA transcripts that are not translated into 
proteins but might have regulatory roles.”). 
 108. Constituents of the epigenome include methyl groups that may be 
attached to DNA bases, histone proteins associated with DNA, non-coding DNA 
sequences, RNA sequences that interfere with or otherwise regulate the 
translation of DNA into protein, and other aspects of a cell’s biochemistry. See 
Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical 
Implications of Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 5–8 (2009) (describing 
composition and function of epigenome); Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356 
(describing epigenetic effects). 
 109. See Kathryn Z. Guyton et al., Improving Prediction of Chemical 
Carcinogenicity by Considering Multiple Mechanisms and Applying 
Toxicogenomic Approaches, 681 MUTATION RES. 230, 235 (2009) (noting that 
epigenetic effects are important “especially during critical developmental 
windows”). 
 110. E.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the 
Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1723 (2007); Klein, supra note 53, at 
6–8; Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic 
Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1441–42 (2005); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic 
Susceptibility and Biomarkers in Toxic Injury Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS 67 
(2000). 
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mark the truth or falsity of an individual plaintiff’s causal 
allegation or a defendant’s suggested alternate cause. The image 
one gets is of tiny molecular flags waving from damaged DNA or 
proteins: red for benzene, green for X-rays, blue and yellow for 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in tobacco smoke, etc. At the 
dawn of the genomic era, it was easy for both scientists and law 
professors to anticipate the discovery of those flags.111 Deeper 
knowledge, however, has brought reason for doubt. 
Scientists searching for biomarkers are concerned to ensure 
that the biomarkers are valid.112 Biomarker validity, from the 
scientific perspective, entails a number of technical requirements 
related to the marker’s intended use.113 Despite the large amount 
of research into potential biomarkers, validation of new markers 
remains frustrating.114 
To fulfill the hopes of tort scholars seeking relief from the 
puzzle of toxic causation, biomarkers must be valid both in a 
general sense and in a very particular way. In a general sense, 
the markers must be analytically valid so the results of a search 
for them can be trusted.115 With respect to the legal system’s 
needs, however, markers can only eliminate the indeterminacy of 
toxic causation claims if they can reliably distinguish between 
“true” and “false” causation claims in ill people. This implies, on 
the one hand, that a marker’s presence demonstrates the 
                                                                                                     
 111. For an example from medical research literature, see Soderkvist & 
Axelson, supra note 87, at 85 (suggesting that different patterns of DNA and 
protein adducts may be detected for different carcinogens). For an example from 
legal scholarship, by an author who is both a lawyer and a scientist, see 
Marchant, supra note 110, at 109 (suggesting that biomarkers will help resolve 
“vexing causation issues”). 
 112. See generally Paul A. Schulte & Frederica P. Perera, Validation, in 
MOLECULAR EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 61, at 79. 
 113. See Nada Majkic-Singh, Biomarkers: From Standardization to 
Performance, 30 J. MED. BIOCHEM. 183, 183 (2011) (stating that a valid 
biomarker must be sufficiently sensitive, accurate, precise, specific, and 
reproducible for its intended use). 
 114. See Patrick M.M. Bossuyt, Defining Biomarker Performance and 
Clinical Validity, 30 J. MED. BIOCHEM. 193, 194 (2011) (noting “lack of progress 
in the methodology for biomarker evaluation”); Martin Latterich & Jan E. 
Schnitzer, Streamlining Biomarker Discovery, 29 NATURE BIOTECH. 600, 600 
(2011) (observing that validation has been a “bottleneck”). 
 115. See Bossuyt, supra note 114, at 194 (discussing analytical validity). 
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suspected cause-and-effect mechanism, and on the other, that a 
marker’s absence demonstrates that the disease was caused by 
something other than the suspected cause.116 
For the presence of a marker to establish specific causation 
more deterministically than is possible with today’s evidence, the 
marker must link the exposure to the plaintiff’s disease and 
exclude other causes. A marker might unambiguously show that 
a particular disease is present. That won’t prove causation, 
however (except for the unusual disease that has been shown by 
other means to be a signature of a particular exposure, in which 
case the molecular marker would not be needed). A marker might 
even be able to distinguish that a particular case of disease was 
induced by an environmental toxin such as a carcinogen, instead 
of being “endogenous.”117 That might be definitive if human 
beings were lab rats living in controlled environments in which 
only the exposure of interest varied, but that is decidedly not the 
case.118 Given the myriad of potentially harmful environmental 
agents to which we are all exposed, a biomarker’s presence alone 
will suffice to prove a plaintiff’s case only if the marker is specific 
to the exposure–disease combination.119 
                                                                                                     
 116. This discussion addresses only the potential of biomarkers to show that 
exposure to a particular toxic agent caused disease, as opposed to some other 
toxic agent, a genetic or other endogenous cause, or an unknown cause. There 
seems to be no particular reason to believe that biomarkers would be at all 
helpful in identifying a cause among multiple purveyors of a single 
indistinguishable substance, which would add its own layer of causal 
indeterminacy. 
 117. See Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (E.D. 
Wash. 2009) (noting a distinction between environmentally-caused cases of 
leukemia and “de novo,” “endogenous,” “primary,” or “idiopathic” cases).  
 118. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FOURTH NATIONAL 
REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS (2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdf/FourthReport.pdf (presenting data on 
blood and urine levels of 212 chemicals in a sampling of the American 
population); David Ewing Duncan, The Pollution Within, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
Oct. 2006, at 116, 126 (describing 165 potentially toxic chemicals identified in 
samples of author’s body). 
 119. See Schulte & Perera, supra note 112, at 103 (explaining that a 
“specific” marker of exposure “attribut[es] negative results to a high percentage 
of unexposed persons”). For an example of the importance of marker specificity 
to a finding of causation, albeit in a different factual context, see Precourt v. 
Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 856 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (D.N.H. 2012) (denying 
beef processor’s motion for summary judgment on crossclaim against beef 
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Conversely, for the absence of a marker to disprove causation 
definitively, the marker must invariably be associated with 
disease caused by the suspect agent. This would imply that 
exposure produces the disease in question via a single 
biochemical pathway, that the pathway always produces the 
marker, and that the marker can always be detected after the 
disease has manifested.120 Given the myriad of metabolic and 
mutagenic pathways by which some substances can cause illness, 
a biomarker’s absence alone will suffice to disprove a plaintiff’s 
case only if the marker is perfectly sensitive to the exposure–
disease combination.121 
In other words, the dream of certainty depends on the 
discovery of “signature” biomarkers that would connect harm to 
exposure in the same way that the handful of currently known 
“signature” diseases do.122 Biomarker studies ordinarily accept a 
trade-off between sensitivity and specificity.123 Biological and 
environmental complexity—of the human genome, the 
epigenome, metabolic and developmental processes, exposures, 
and their numbingly vast numbers of potential interactions—
militate against the possibility that biomarkers of “signature” 
                                                                                                     
supplier because proof that bacteria from decedent was genetically identical to 
bacteria in supplier’s meat did not exclude the possibility that plaintiff was 
infected by genetically identical bacteria from another source).  
 120. See generally Carl F. Cranor, The Challenge of Developing Science for 
the Law of Torts, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, 261, 262–63 (Richard Goldberg 
ed., 2011) (distinguishing induction period from latency period of a disease and 
explaining that either or both may be long). 
 121. See Schulte & Perera, supra note 112, at 103 (noting that “sensitive” 
marker of exposure “pick[s] up a high percentage of individuals in the exposed 
group”). For an example in which the sensitivity of a marker was questioned, 
see Declaration of Martyn T. Smith, Ph.D. ¶¶ 25–26, Milward v. Acuity 
Specialty Prods. Grp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 639 F.3d 11 
(1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1002 (2012) (No. 07CV11944), 2008 WL 
7425049 (asserting that the failure to detect a chromosome abnormality after 
benzene exposure did not exclude possibility that benzene caused the same 
disease by a different mechanism). 
 122. See Grodsky, supra note 110, at 1707 (discussing possibility of 
signature biomarkers). 
 123. See, e.g., Sandhya Pruthi et al., Evaluation of Serum Estrogen-DNA 
Adducts as Potential Biomarkers for Breast Cancer Risk, 132 J. STEROID 
BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 73, 75–76 (2012) (explaining this general 
trade-off). 
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specificity and sensitivity are prevalent in our cells just waiting 
to be found.124 
Some types of biochemical damage are thought to be common 
to numerous disease pathways or exposures. Oxidative stress is 
an example. Oxidation is thought to play a role in the genesis of 
cancer and other diseases,125 but finding valid oxidative 
biomarkers for particular substance–disease links has proven 
difficult.126 Oxidative damage from a given exposure may affect 
diverse biochemical components of human tissue;127 conversely, 
many different exposures may cause harm through an oxidative 
mechanism.128 Moreover, everybody’s DNA is oxidized during life, 
so any putative oxidative biomarker must be found against a 
background incidence of oxidative damage, which is highly 
variable from person to person.129 That background incidence and 
variability, whether it results from differences in genotype, 
environmental exposure, or both, makes it more difficult to find 
the type of specific and sensitive biomarkers needed for 
particularistic proof of toxic causation in individual cases.130 
Some markers have proven to be less sensitive or specific 
than they at first seemed. For example, benzene is thought to 
cause certain leukemias by inducing relatively large-scale 
aberrations in chromosomes.131 But although studies have found 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Latterich & Schnitzer, supra note 114, at 602 (describing how study 
bias and genetic and epigenetic variability of patients, including gender, 
ethnicity, age, diet, and environmental factors, have contributed “to a level of 
biological complexity beyond the scope of what can be typically interrogated”). 
 125. See Cosetta Minelli et al., Interactive Effects of Antioxidant Genes and 
Air Pollution on Respiratory Function and Airway Disease: A HuGE Review, 173 
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 603, 603 (2011) (describing that oxidative stress is 
mechanism for air pollutants causing lung disease; Ward et al., supra note 79, 
at 1356 (stating that oxidative stress is believed to be carcinogenic mechanism)).  
 126. See Eileen D. Kuempel et al., Carbon Black: Kuempel et al. Respond, 
119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 333, 333 (2011) (noting that “methodological 
challenges to the validation of oxidative stress biomarker assays remain”). 
 127. Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356. 
 128. See Minelli et al., supra note 125, at 603 (describing oxidative stress as 
a “mechanism of action common to all pollutants”). 
 129. Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Luoping Zhang et al., Use of OctoChrome Fluorescence in Situ 
Hybridization to Detect Specific Aneuploidy Among All 24 Chromosomes in 
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some chromosomal aberrations that occur at much higher 
frequencies in leukemias of patients with known occupational 
benzene exposure, they also occur in the control groups of these 
studies.132 A number of different aberrations have been associated 
with benzene exposure.133 The metabolism of benzene is 
complex;134 several metabolites may be involved in the 
carcinogenic effect of benzene exposure, and benzene-caused 
carcinogenesis is likely a multi-step process.135 Researchers do 
not know exactly how benzene causes chromosomal aberrations 
or exactly how those aberrations cause leukemia.136 Despite the 
progress in chromosomal and genetic study of leukemia in people 
exposed to benzene, the search for a “signature” biomarker 
continues.137 
Similar issues have dogged the search for smaller toxic 
signatures in DNA, such as mutations of individual genes. 
Investigators examined the DNA of persons with a type of kidney 
cancer called renal cell carcinoma (RCC), which is known to begin 
with the mutation of a particular gene. They observed that the 
tumors of RCC patients who had been occupationally exposed to 
                                                                                                     
Benzene-exposed Workers, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 117, 118 
(2005) (explaining that benzene is an “established human leukemogen[,]” and its 
metabolites cause aberrant numbers of chromosomes).  
 132. See Zhang et al., supra note 91, at 6 (describing a study in which 
chromosome abnormalities were present in 100% of leukemia patients with 
benzene exposure but 54% of non-exposed patients). 
 133. See Luoping Zhang et al., Chromosome-Wide Aneuploidy Study (CWAS) 
in Workers Exposed to an Established Leukemogen, Benzene, 32 CARCINOGENESIS 
605, 605 (2011) (finding that benzene-exposed subjects showed statistically 
significant increases in frequency of aberrations on eight chromosomes). 
 134. See Michael G. Bird et al., International Symposium: Recent Advances 
in Benzene Toxicity, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 1, 4 (2005) 
(describing benzene as an example of “metabolic multi-tasking”). 
 135. Michael G. Bird et al., BENZENE 2009—Health Effects and 
Mechanisms of Bone Marrow Toxicity: Implications for t-AML and the Mode of 
Action Framework, 184 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 1, 5 (2010); see also 
Eric S. Johnson et al., A Critique of Benzene Exposure in the General Population, 
375 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 183, 192–94 (2007) (listing potentially significant benzene 
metabolites and sources of exposure). 
 136. Zhang et al., supra note 133, at 610; see also Bird et al., supra note 134, 
at 3 (explaining that it is not known if chromosomal aberrations are random or 
which metabolites are responsible). 
 137. Zhang et al., supra note 133, at 610. 
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trichloroethylene (TCE) carried a pattern of mutations not 
observed in people who had not been exposed or whose cancer 
resulted from inherited alterations in the gene.138 But fewer than 
half of the TCE-exposed study subjects showed that mutation 
pattern.139 Another group of researchers could not replicate the 
finding of the purported signature mutation.140 
RCC, moreover, is atypical in being traceable to mutations in a 
single gene. Much more commonly, cancer is characterized by 
many mutated genes, and sorting out causes from effects is 
difficult.141 The recently published genomic atlases of colon and 
rectal cancer142 and breast cancer,143 for example, identified a large 
number of genetic changes in the studied sample of tumors. In 
colon and rectal cancer, some of those changes were found in a 
large proportion of the tumors.144 That is good news from the 
perspective of treatment, because it suggests that a relatively 
                                                                                                     
 138. Hiltrud Brauch et al., Trichloroethylene Exposure and Specific Somatic 
Mutations in Patients with Renal Cell Carcinoma, 91 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 854, 854 
(1999). 
 139. Id. at 859. 
 140. Barbara Charbotel et al., Trichloroethylene Exposure and Somatic 
Mutations of the VHL Gene in Patients with Renal Cell Carcinoma, 2 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL MED. & TOXICOLOGY 13, at *6 (2007), http://www.occup-
med.com/content/pdf/1745-6673-2-13.pdf. 
 141. WILLS, supra note 54, at 23 (“Genetic mayhem at the gene and chromosome 
level can continue even after the cell becomes cancerous. This confuses the picture, 
covering up the traces of the original cancer-causing events.”); The Cancer Genome 
Atlas Network, Comprehensive Molecular Characterization of Human Colon and 
Rectal Cancer, 487 NATURE 330, 330 (2012) [hereinafter Human Colon and Rectal 
Cancer] (identifying thirty-two recurrently mutated genes and many other genetic 
alterations in colon cancer); Guyton et al., supra note 109, at 233 (noting it is 
unlikely that all 1,149 somatic mutations found in a group of breast and colorectal 
cancers are key events); Yih-Horng Shiao, Genetic Signature for Human Risk 
Assessment: Lessons from Trichloroethylene, 50 ENVTL. & MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS 
68, 70 (2009) (stating that only some genetic alterations found in tumors are 
tumorigenic “drivers” while others are “passengers”). 
 142. Human Colon and Rectal Cancer, supra note 141, at 330 (identifying “32 
somatic recurrently mutated genes . . . in the hypermutated and nonhypermutated 
cancers”). 
 143. The Cancer Genome Atlas Network, Comprehensive Molecular 
Characterization of Human Breast Tumours, 490 NATURE 61, 61 (2012) [hereinafter 
Human Breast Tumours] (identifying “619 mutations across 177 previously reported 
cancer genes”). 
 144. Human Colon and Rectal Cancer, supra note 141, at 333–35. 
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small number of pathways drive the development of these 
cancers,145 but it also suggests that finding pathways unique to 
individual carcinogens seems less likely. For breast cancer, the 
research described four major subtypes of the disease 
characterized by different sets of genetic and epigenetic changes, 
with some changes found frequently within a subtype and a few 
relatively common across subtypes.146 
Changes in gene expression, a common subject of study by 
DNA microarrays, also often are similarly multifarious and may 
be mediated both by mutations and by epigenetic effects.147 Their 
significance as markers is more limited than biologists first 
believed.148 
                                                                                                     
 145. See Gina Kolata, In Gene Study, a Map to Fight Colon Cancer, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A3 (“The hope now is that the genetic alterations 
driving those 1,000 different tumors are operating through only a limited 
number of genetic pathways that can be targeted by a more manageable number 
of drugs.”). 
 146. Human Breast Tumours, supra note 143, at 61–62 (reporting that 
somatic mutations at three genes occurred in more than ten percent of all 
tumors studies, but numerous genes were frequently mutated in particular 
subtypes of breast cancer). 
 147. See Paolo Vineis & Miquel Porta, Causal Thinking, Biomarkers, and 
Mechanisms of Carcinogenesis, 49 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 951, 955 (1996) 
(noting that once people are sick it is hard to distinguish altered expression that 
shows they are sick from altered expression that causes sickness); see also, e.g., 
Yoko Hirabayashi, p53-Dependent Gene Profiling for Reactive Oxygen Species 
After Benzene Inhalation: Special Reference to Genes Associated with Cell Cycle 
Regulation, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 165, 165 (2005) 
(determining that expression changes after benzene exposure may be masked by 
other genes); Sarah X.L. Huang et al., Role of Mutagenicity in Asbestos Fiber-
induced Carcinogenicity and Other Diseases, 14 J. TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH 
PART B 179, 214–19 (2011) (describing many gene expression changes in cancers 
of patients who had been exposed to asbestos). 
 148. Alan Dove, Biomarker Hunters Probe the Proteome, 329 SCI. 1373, 1373 
(2010). 
[C]hanges in the RNA transcription levels of a gene are mere hints of 
what’s actually happening in cells and tissues; the complex 
interactions between proteins downstream of the transcripts drive 
much of an organism’s physiology. . . . [V]alidating a potential disease 
biomarker in the clinic turns out to be a much thornier problem than 
most investigators had realized. 
Id. Very recently, an international consortium of researchers published findings 
showing that the large amount of human DNA that does not contain protein-
encoding genes does include large numbers of DNA “switches” that are 
responsible for turning other genes on or off, and that may explain variable 
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Molecular complexes between possible carcinogens and DNA 
or proteins, known as addition products or adducts, are another 
potential toxic signature.149 Because of the long latency of many 
diseases that result from toxic exposure, an adduct would have to 
be long-lasting and detectable after disease has emerged in order 
to provide definitive proof in litigation.150 It also would have to be 
specific and sensitive: that is, a specific adduct would have to 
result only from the exposure at issue rather than from a 
metabolic pathway involving exposure to some other substance, 
and all metabolic pathways linking the accused exposure to 
disease would have to necessarily produce the adduct. Finally, 
perhaps most difficult, to satisfy this causal model the presence of 
the adduct would have to indicate causation and not merely 
exposure.151 The presence or absence of adducts will not 
                                                                                                     
incidence of disease despite identity of genes. Gina Kolata, Study Discovers 
Road Map of DNA, a Key to Biology, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A1. The 
consortium’s findings are expected to “force a rethink of the definition of a gene 
and of the minimum unit of heredity.” Ecker, supra note 107, at 52. Whether 
they herald biomarkers that will provide individualized proof in toxic tort cases, 
however, is far from clear. Legal use of any biomarkers that may be found in 
these genetic switches would face the same hurdles of specificity and sensitivity. 
The initial findings suggest that much complexity and interaction exist in the 
regulation of gene expression. See id. (describing findings of “poorly understood” 
regulation of genes by distant DNA regions); Wendy A. Bickmore, Expression 
Control, 489 NATURE 53, 53–54 (2012) (describing findings of more than 200,000 
DNA “enhancers” per cell type and pairing of 500,000 enhancers with nearby 
target genes, which still “leaves more than 2 million putative enhancers without 
known targets”); Benjamin Vernot et al., Personal and Population Genomics of 
Human Regulatory Variation, 22 GENOME RES. 1689, 1689 (2012) (“We estimate 
that individuals likely harbor many more functionally important variants in 
regulatory DNA compared with protein-coding regions, although they are likely 
to have, on average, smaller effect sizes.”).  
 149. See Frederica P. Perera, Molecular Epidemiology: On the Path to 
Prevention?, 92 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 602, 603 (2000) (“[U]sing adducts as 
biomarkers has the theoretical advantage that they reflect chemical-specific 
genetic damage.”). 
 150. This may be true for some, but not necessarily all, adducts. In one 
study, DNA adducts of the carcinogen acetaldehyde had a half-life of thirty-five 
hours. Kimiko Hori et al., Stability of Acetaldehyde-derived DNA Adduct in 
Vitro, 423 BIOCHEMICAL BIOPHYSICAL RES. COMM. 642, 644 (2012). 
 151. See, e.g., Yongquan Lai et al., New Evidence for Toxicity of 
Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers: DNA Adduct Formation from Quinone 
Metabolites, 45 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 10,720, 10,726 (2011) (discussing a study that 
demonstrated adduct formation in vitro but acknowledged that in vivo 
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necessarily sharply distinguish cases of disease caused by a 
particular exposure from background cases caused by something 
else.152 
What about viewing the gene–toxin interaction from the 
opposite direction: looking for genetic variations that increase 
susceptibility to the toxin, rather than seeking signs of the toxin’s 
effect on genetic material? Such research must confront a 
staggering amount of variability.153 Because of gene–gene or 
gene–environment interactions, individual genetic variants do 
not typically determine the occurrence of disease, either alone or 
in combination with exposure to toxic substances.154 A review of 
studies of genetic susceptibility to health effects of air pollution, 
for example, observed that the studies produced conflicting 
results. The review examined seven potentially relevant genes 
involved in antioxidant activity, but noted that many other 
                                                                                                     
implications of markers are unknown); Menglong Xiang et al., Chromosomal 
Damage and Polymorphisms of Metabolic Genes Among 1,3-butadiene-exposed 
Workers in a Matched Study in China, 27 MUTAGENESIS 415 (2012) 
(characterizing DNA alterations as markers of exposure). 
 152. See Stephen M. Rappaport et al., Protein Adducts as Biomarkers of 
Human Benzene Metabolism, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 103, 
104 (2005) (noting “significant background levels” of adducts in persons in 
control group); Vineis & Perera, supra note 59, at 1954 (stating that adduct 
studies have shown “overall correlations” between adduct levels and exposures). 
 153. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing the large number 
of variations found in human DNA). 
 154. See Liam R. Brunham & Michael R. Hayden, Response, 337 SCIENCE 
911, 911 (2012) (“[R]esults . . . appear to support [Nebert & Zhang’s] view as 
regards common diseases, as many studies have reported a large number of loci, 
each conferring a small risk of disease.”); D.W. Nebert & G. Zhang, Personalized 
Medicine: Temper Expectations, 337 SCIENCE 910, 910 (2012) (“[O]ne can infer 
that accurate statistical predictions of a complex trait require identification of 
many small-effect variants . . . . For most complex traits, this is an unachievable 
goal.”); Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 10 (“[I]t is extremely difficult in an 
individual patient confidently to link a disease to only one or two mutations.”); 
Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356 (asserting that the magnitude of genetic 
associations with toxic susceptibility “may be modest and involve multiple 
genes”); see also, e.g., Stacey et al., supra note 99, at 1098 (noting that the gene 
with the greatest increased risk of basal cell carcinoma had odds ratio of 2.36); 
Olivia Fletcher et al., Association of Genetic Variants at 8q24 with Breast 
Cancer Risk, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 702, 705 
(2008) (explaining that a study, although statistically equivalent to 12,000 
samples, had insufficient statistical power to detect modest gene–gene 
interactions). 
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potentially important genes exist and concluded that because 
antioxidant mechanisms are complex, it is unlikely that any one 
polymorphic gene has a large effect on susceptibility. Nongenetic 
factors also play a role, so three-way interactions (among a given 
gene, pollutants, and other genes or environmental factors other 
than pollution) are real possibilities.155 
More generally, the Environmental Genome Project has 
identified nearly 90,000 variations in more than 600 genes 
believed to be involved in response to environmental exposures.156 
For carcinogens, “[a]ddressing the role of genetic 
susceptibility . . . is . . . important; however, the stable and 
reproducible associations are few.”157 
In sum, many genes and epigenetic factors may affect toxic 
susceptibility, toxins may affect people in many ways, and many 
effects may result from more than one toxin.158 It would be foolish 
to predict that no signature biomarker will ever be found for any 
disease caused by any exposure, but the evidence so far does not 
seem to suggest that signature biomarkers are typical.159 
                                                                                                     
 155. See Minelli et al., supra note 125, at 603–05, 609–13 (describing studies 
of three-way interactions and the difficulties involved). 
 156. Mark J. Rieder, The Environmental Genome Project: Reference 
Polymorphisms for Drug Metabolism Genes and Genome-Wide Association 
Studies, 40 DRUG METABOLISM REV. 241, 244 (2008); see  Nebert & Zhang, supra 
note 154, at 910 (noting that “most examples of pharmacogenomic traits 
(adverse drug reactions, as well as drug efficacy) resemble complex diseases and 
other multi-factorial traits [that] reflect contributions from innumerable low-
effect genes”). 
 157. Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356. 
 158. See Huang et al., supra note 147, at 213 (describing multiple 
carcinogenic mechanisms for asbestos); Latterich & Schnitzer, supra note 114, 
at 602 (“Many pathologies . . . are complex and have multiple etiologies, 
especially at the molecular level.”). 
 159. See Guyton et al., supra note 109, at 231–32 (describing the necessity of 
evaluating multiple modes of action of carcinogens); Latterich & Schnitzer, 
supra note 114, at 602 (stating that “very few single biomarkers are likely to 
have the high sensitivity and specificity necessary to make diagnosis and 
treatment decisions,” although combining multiple markers might improve 
sensitivity and specificity); Shiao, supra note 141, at 69 (“Some agents can 
produce more than one type of DNA damage.”); Ward et al., supra note 79, at 
1360 (noting that genomic advances “are likely to increase the challenges and 
complexities of carcinogen testing and evaluation” in part because most 
carcinogenic mechanisms are not simple and carcinogens may act through 
diverse pathways). 
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Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are unlikely to undo 
the Gordian knot of specific causation in toxic torts.160 
C. The True Promise and Its Implications 
Advancing scientific understanding can assist in legal fact-
finding even if science will not provide law’s longed-for, 
conclusive post hoc answer to the question of what did make a 
particular plaintiff sick. But the law must understand how 
science can best contribute. That understanding begins with 
acceptance of the fact that bringing toxicological understanding 
to the molecular level will not bring causation to the individual 
level. Even toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology produce 
data that ultimately are group-based, statistical, and 
probabilistic—much like the data available before genomics. 
Thus, finding that a plaintiff does or does not have a genetic 
susceptibility to the disease-causing effect of a substance to which 
the plaintiff was exposed will provide probabilistic but not 
deterministic evidence of causation or its absence.161 Toxic 
                                                                                                     
 160. Such research, however, may be extremely probative with respect to 
general causation. Mechanistic insights can form part of the weight of the 
evidence supporting an inference of general causation. Milward v. Acuity 
Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11, 20–23 (1st Cir. 2011). A study of susceptible 
genotypes can provide evidence of general causation when classical 
epidemiology does not. Tomlinson et al., supra note 100, at 219. 
 161. As two researchers explained: 
Particularly in the case of low-dose toxicants, the interactions 
of susceptibility genes with specific environmental factors are 
probably the dominant cause of any res 
ultant human illness. However, the probability that an 
environmental exposure will cause illness is dependent on the 
capacity of the genetically-controlled metabolic machinery and 
repair mechanisms of the cell. . . . Thus, elucidating the cause 
of most chronic diseases will require an understanding of both 
the genetic and environmental contributions to their etiologies. 
Kenneth Olden & Janet Guthrie, Genomics: Implications for Toxicology, 473 
MUTATION RES. 3, 5 (2001); see also Radoje Drmanac, Response, 337 SCIENCE 
910, 911 (2012) (predicting that in the long run, limitations on measurement of 
gene effects on disease “will be less important than unpredictable environmental 
and stochastic effects”); Ebony B. Bookman et al., Gene-Environment Interplay 
in Common Complex Diseases: Forging an Integrative Model—Recommendations 
From an NIH Workshop, 35 GENETIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 217, 218–19 (2011) (stating 
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susceptibility genes do not determine that an individual of a 
particular genotype will contract a specified illness if subjected to 
a given exposure.162 Rather, “[t]hey modify risk.”163 So, for 
example, even though a particular genotype of the NAT2 gene 
makes it much more likely that a woman smoker will develop 
breast cancer, not all women of that genotype who smoke end up 
with breast cancer; some women who smoke develop breast 
cancer even though they do not have that genotype; some women 
develop breast cancer even though they neither smoke nor have 
that genotype.164 And multiple studies of toxic susceptibility 
genes are unlikely to give identical results because of the 
influence of other factors and of random chance.165 
Biomarkers of exposure or effect similarly provide 
probabilistic rather than deterministic evidence. For example, it 
would be relevant to know if a plaintiff’s kidney cancer had a 
mutation pattern that is found more often among patients who 
had been exposed to trichloroethylene, but the pattern could 
nevertheless be present without causation and vice versa.166 The 
same is true of the chromosome aberrations associated with 
benzene exposure in leukemia patients.167 
                                                                                                     
that susceptibility to most human diseases “is complex and multifactorial” and 
describing difficulty of assessing risk contribution in gene–environment 
interactions). 
 162. See, e.g., Bookman et al., supra note 161, at 218 (giving example of how 
variations in the NAT2 gene alter relative risk of smoking-related bladder 
cancer). 
 163. Olden & Guthrie, supra note 161, at 5. 
 164. See Ambrosone et al., supra note 97, at 23 (providing a table with data 
showing that while cigarette smoking increases the risk of breast cancer in 
those with the NAT2 gene, possessing that gene is not the sole determining 
factor). 
 165. See, e.g., Xiang et al., supra note 151, at 419 (discussing how a 
particular genotype showed a 2.28-fold increase in a specific type of DNA 
damage after exposure, and the results differed from earlier studies). 
 166. See Brauch et al., supra note 138, at 856 (providing data showing that 
of kidney cancer patients in the study who had occupational TCE exposure, 
fewer than half displayed a putatively characteristic mutation pattern); see also 
Scesnaite et al., supra note 77, at 426–27 (noting that various epigenetic 
changes were found more frequently in subjects exposed to tobacco smoke, but 
still in fewer than half of them). 
 167. See Vineis & Perera, supra note 59, at 1956 (describing a study that 
found “increased . . . frequencies of aberrations . . . frequently seen in . . . 
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Biomarkers are thus most useful from a scientific perspective 
“at the population level.”168 Their specificity, sensitivity, and 
predictive value are population-based rather than individualized 
attributes.169 
Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are producing 
evidence about suspected exposure-disease links at finer and 
finer scales of resolution,170 but they have not altered the 
essential nature of that evidence. What these sciences will do, 
however, is produce more such evidence. More agents will be 
investigated to see if they are associated with molecular 
consequences. More genes will be interrogated to see if they affect 
susceptibility to agents.171 The data will still be about relative 
risk, but risk will be parsed more and more finely. As research 
discriminates among genotypes, coexposures, and other variables 
that cannot be addressed with classical techniques, new 
associations will be detected or known associations will be 
disaggregated in new ways. This process has already begun even 
for causal connections that were already relatively well-
accepted.172 
At the same time, the enormous number of possible 
combinations of potentially interacting causal factors—genes, 
epigenetics, other individual characteristics, and exposures—
                                                                                                     
leukemias”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Bossuyt, supra note 114, at 197 (“Like sensitivity and specificity, 
predictive values are essentially group based measures.”). 
 170. See Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1360 (“Research gaps and 
opportunities have been identified that can help to resolve uncertainties. . . . We 
hope that this process will lead to well-planned epidemiologic and mechanistic 
studies for these agents . . . .”). 
 171. See id. (“Use of omics techniques will accelerate the understanding of 
the cellular and molecular basis for biological responses to environmental and 
occupational exposures, and high-throughput technologies will increase the 
number of agents that can be tested.”); Minelli et al., supra note 125, at 618 
(“The study of genetic susceptibility can greatly improve our understanding of 
air pollution pathophysiologic mechanisms of action and allow identification of 
those pollution components with the highest potential for harm.”). 
 172. See, e.g., E. Brigitte Gottschall, Taking a Retrospective Look at 
Asbestos-Related Thoracic Disease Produces Interesting Results, 255 RADIOLOGY 
681, 682 (2010) (discussing how polymorphisms in the gene for a certain enzyme 
appear to affect risk from asbestos). 
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makes it extraordinarily unlikely that complete risk 
characterization will ever be possible at an individual level.173 In 
a scientific research paradigm that depends on ceteris paribus, 
there is real doubt over whether every important variable can be 
held constant—or even identified—for the foreseeable future, if 
ever. Scientists know that there is much they do not know, but 
the “unknown unknowns” may be even more important.174 
With better data on multiple exposures,175 more frequent 
classification of risk by genotype,176 and increasing mechanistic 
knowledge, science will likely point toward multiple causal sets of 
genetic, epigenetic, and environmental factors that are associated 
with disease risk. Even if some of those combinations display 
strong associations with a particular toxic outcome, other 
combinations will display weaker ones.177 The better the science 
gets and the larger the data sets it can assemble, the easier it will 
be to identify relatively small incremental contributions to risk. 
The reality is that the available proof in the new world of 
biomarkers, toxicogenomics, and molecular epidemiology will look 
a lot like the proof that has been available until now in the world 
of differential diagnosis, toxicology, and classical epidemiology. 
These sciences will dramatically increase the quantity of 
scientific information available to the legal system but will not 
represent a qualitative change in the nature of the information 
available to address the question of ex post causal attribution. 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Christopher S. Carlson et al., Mapping Complex Disease Loci in 
Whole-Genome Association Studies, 429 NATURE 446, 450 (2004) (explaining how 
allowing for gene–gene or gene–environment interactions presents “intractable” 
problems for studies seeking association of genes and disease). 
 174. See Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 60 (concluding that new, next-
generation gene sequencing technology “now allows researchers to take an 
unbiased approach to gene discovery, and thus to look for ‘unknown 
unknowns’”). (Apologies to Donald Rumsfeld). 
 175. See Lin, supra note 110, at 1470–72 (describing prospects for improved 
exposure assessment); Wang et al., supra note 81, at 126 (describing a study 
that used personal monitors to measure exposure to air pollutants). 
 176. See Muin J. Khoury, Genetic Epidemiology and the Future of Disease 
Prevention and Public Health, 19 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 175, 176 (1997) 
(predicting that genotype information “will routinely be sought in almost every 
epidemiologic study”). 
 177. See, e.g., Pharoah et al., supra note 69, at 2797, 2801 (explaining that 
common genetic variations confer small incremental risks). 
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For the most part, increased knowledge of toxicity at the genomic 
and molecular levels will simply provide an increasingly detailed 
description of probabilistic associations—population-based 
frequencies rather than deterministic certainties. To seek a 
determined causal answer in this world would be like trying to 
determine the weather in Seurat’s Sunday Afternoon by looking 
very closely at a few points of color in a lady’s parasol. 
At a molecular level, many of the processes associated with 
toxicity and disease are simply random.178 The “probabilistic 
description of the mutation process cannot be replaced by a 
deterministic one.”179 Experiments have shown that even 
genetically identical cells exposed to the same environmental 
conditions can display random variations in gene expression, 
leading to significant differences in the chemical and phenotypic 
characteristics of the cells.180 Such “random phenotypic noise, 
consequent on stochastic epigenetic processes,” could have 
substantial effects on biological outcomes.181 “Nowadays it is 
commonly stated that disease is either genetic or environmental, 
when in reality stochastic events are equally important.”182 
In the end, toxic causation questions dwell in a world with a 
substantial stochastic component that does not fit well with a 
deterministic causal model. It does not matter whether the 
connection between exposure and disease is really random or 
whether it only looks random because a truly deterministic 
pathway is too complex to be fully specified. What matters is that 
for the reasonably foreseeable future, science will not be able to 
                                                                                                     
 178. See ANATOLY RUVINSKY, GENETICS AND RANDOMNESS 7, 33–35 (2010) 
(discussing how quantum uncertainty manifests in random genetic alterations). 
 179. Id. at 39. 
 180. See Mads Kaern et al., Stochasticity in Gene Expression: From Theories 
to Phenotypes, 6 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 451, 451 (2005) (describing the study, 
in which “[s]pecial emphasis is given to stochastic mechanisms that can lead to 
the emergence of phenotypically distinct subgroups within isogenic cell 
populations”). 
 181. Davey Smith, supra note 75, at 548; see also Drmanac, supra note 161, 
at 911 (noting importance of stochastic effects in attempting to measure genetic 
contribution to disease risk). 
 182. Robin Holliday, DNA Methylation and Epigenotypes, 70 BIOCHEMISTRY 
500, 503 (2005). 
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give law a deterministic answer. Look closely enough, and 
certainty dissolves into probability. 
IV. An Alternative Vision: Probabilistic Causal Contribution 
Courts’ square-peg–round-hole frustration continues as they 
try to make causation judgments by applying an individual-
based, deterministic model to population-level, frequency-based 
probabilistic evidence.183 The realization that reductionist science 
is not likely to discover the legal system’s way out of the toxic 
causation problem suggests that courts should be open to a 
different mental model of causation—one that treats cause and 
effect explicitly as probabilistic—and should reconsider 
alternative doctrinal approaches to suit.184 Adapting some ideas 
from earlier reform proposals offered by scholars, but largely 
ignored by courts,185 I propose that courts adopt an expressly 
probabilistic view of causation when the dominating evidence 
comprises population-based data of toxic effect. To frame the 
standard, an exposure should be considered a cause of disease if 
it was a contributing factor to the disease’s occurrence. To be a 
contributing factor, an exposure would be shown by a 
                                                                                                     
 183. See Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2011) (reiterating 
the view that “frequency data . . . cannot indicate the cause of a given 
individual’s disease [but the] use of scientifically reliable epidemiological studies 
and the requirement of more than a doubling of the risk strikes a balance 
between the needs of our legal system and the limits of science”) (quoting 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 718 (Tex. 1997)); 
Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 170 A.C. 229, [170] (Lady Hale) 
(contrasting use of risk data to advise individual patient before getting sick with 
use of risk data to infer causation of existing illness); id. [190]–[92] (Lord 
Mance) (describing tension between use of statistical evidence and law’s 
“concern[ ] with the rights and wrongs of an individual situation” and 
expressing preference for use of epidemiology “in conjunction with specific 
evidence related to the individual circumstances and parties”). 
 184. One clarification is essential. Although genomic data will not likely 
provide definitive particularistic proof of causation, such data could still be 
relevant to specific causation even if courts do not adopt probabilistic causal 
contribution, along with other evidence deemed relevant in the absence of 
deterministic proof. 
 185. Many of these are discussed in Michael D. Green, The Future of 
Proportional Liability: The Lessons of Toxic Substances Causation, in EXPLORING 
TORT LAW 352, 357–70 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005). 
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preponderance of the evidence—not limited to any single favored 
type of evidence—to have added incremental risk that the 
plaintiff would develop a disease that the plaintiff in fact 
developed. Damages should be apportioned to that contributing 
factor in proportion to its contribution to the plaintiff’s risk. 
A. A Metaphor 
An illustration from the Third Restatement of Torts allows a 
metaphorical comparison of the deterministic causation model 
that fits typical cases and the probabilistic model that better fits 
most toxic torts. The illustration posits three defendants—Able, 
Baker, and Charlie—who negligently, independently, and 
simultaneously lean against a car. Collectively they provide 
enough force to send the car over a diminutive curb and down the 
side of the mountain. Any two of the actors together would have 
propelled the car over the edge, yet each actor alone is too weak 
to budge the car. Thus, no single actor’s tort is either a sufficient 
or a necessary cause of the harm.186 
The illustration addresses the problem of multiple sufficient 
causal sets, which are analogous only to a particular subset of 
toxic tort claims.187 For present purposes, what matters is that 
                                                                                                     
 186. The hypothetical is given in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. f, illus. 3 (2010). See id. § 27 cmt. f (“In 
some cases, tortious conduct by one actor is insufficient . . . to cause the 
plaintiff’s harm. Nevertheless, when combined with conduct by other persons, 
the conduct overdetermines the harm, i.e., is more than sufficient to cause the 
harm.”). 
 187. The analogy is to several actors who contribute subthreshold doses of a 
toxin that exerts toxic effects only after a threshold dose is reached. See id. cmt. g 
(“Assuming that there is some threshold dose sufficient to cause the disease, the 
person may have been exposed to doses in excess of the threshold before 
contracting the disease. Thus, some or all of the person’s exposures may not have 
been but-for causes of the disease.”). The Restatement’s quite proper rule, in both 
cases, is that at least until the threshold is reached, each contributor is a cause of 
the harm, even though causal sets that did not include that contributor would 
also have been sufficient to produce the harm. See id. cmt. f (“When an actor's 
tortious conduct is not a factual cause of physical harm under the [but-for] 
standard . . . only because one or more other causal sets exist that are also 
sufficient to cause the harm at the same time, the actor's tortious conduct is a 
factual cause of the harm.”); id. cmt. g (“Nevertheless, each of the exposures prior 
to the person’s contracting the disease . . . is a factual cause of the person’s 
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the illustration works only because it fits an implicitly assumed 
mechanistic model of causation. Simple Newtonian physics 
describes the situation: we can compute the force required to 
overcome the car’s inertia and the static friction of its tires on the 
parking surface. If we could reconstruct the accident, we might 
find that 300 pounds of force were required to move the car and 
that Able, Baker, and Charlie each provided 200 pounds. This 
knowledge, at least in qualitative terms, is implicit in the 
illustration’s assumptions. 
Suppose, however, that Able, Baker, and Charlie could not be 
described by Newtonian physics but only by quantum mechanics. 
On a mountaintop ringed with cars, the three charge around 
blindfolded. What is more, they are joined by undetectable sprites 
that also impart momentum to any object they strike. Sometimes 
Able, Baker, and Charlie hit a car, and sometimes the impact is 
powerful enough to tip the car down the hill. But this is a 
quantum world: if we know what they hit, we cannot tell how 
hard they hit it.188 And we can’t detect the sprite strikes at all. 
Every once in a while a car rolls down the hill. But the most 
science can tell us—if we can say whether Able, Baker, Charlie, 
or any combination of the three hit the car at some point before 
its descent—is the probability that they hit the car hard enough 
to make it move. 
If Able, Baker, and Charlie represent independent risk 
factors for a disease, and the invisible sprites represent unknown 
causes, then the probabilistic metaphor fits a wide range of toxic 
tort cases. In fact, toxic tort plaintiffs with this much 
information—those who find some epidemiologic data that, 
despite being inherently group-based and probabilistic, connect 
their exposure with their disease—have been the lucky ones. 
Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will make that type 
of information available in more cases and in a more tailored 
                                                                                                     
disease under the rule in this Section.”); see also Jane Stapleton, Two Causal 
Fictions at the Heart of U.S. Asbestos Doctrine, 122 L.Q. REV. 189, 191 (2006) 
(discussing threshold toxic mechanisms). 
 188. This of course is a metaphorical modification of the uncertainty 
principle. See RUVINSKY, supra note 178, at 4 (explaining Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle). 
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way, but they will not change the nature of the appropriate 
model. 
B. Contributing Factor Causation 
The first step toward a different model of causation is to 
acknowledge frankly the irreducible indeterminism of post hoc 
causal assessments. A few courts that decided relatively early 
toxic tort cases, recognizing that the traditional “logical model . . . 
does not suit the toxic tort explanandum,” seemed to move toward 
such an alternative model.189 These courts used “substantial 
factor” as their anchor.190 Allen v. United States191 remains a 
leading example and stands in analytical counterpoint to the 
Tenth Circuit’s decisions in June and Wilcox.192 
                                                                                                     
 189. Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 190. The Third Restatement explained Elam as an instance in which 
“substantial factor” was invoked to deal with multiple sufficient causes. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. c, 
reporters’ note (2010). Elam discussed multiple-sufficient-cause situations, but 
the issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs’ evidence proved that defendant’s 
chemical releases caused injury to plaintiffs at all. Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 174, 
183. The court invoked “substantial factor,” but never suggested that it believed 
the evidence showed more than one sufficient cause had operated to produce 
plaintiffs’ conditions. See id. at 174 (determining that the substantial factor test 
suited toxic exposure cases where harm may result from a “confluence of 
causes”); id. at 187 n.63 (“[T]he substantial factor rule of causation . . . applies to 
[toxic tort] cases.”); id. at 195 (referring to many different possible causes). 
 191. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d on other 
grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 192. Compare id. at 429–43 (applying the substantial factor rule to the 
plaintiffs), and Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 174–77 (distinguishing but-for from 
substantial factor), with June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (determining that but-for causation was appropriate), and Wilcox v. 
Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with 
June).  See also James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898, 908–09 (N.J. 
1998) (“To prove medical causation, a plaintiff must show ‘that the exposure [to 
each defendant’s product] was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating 
the disease.’”) (citation omitted); id. at 913 (holding, without ever referring to 
“but-for” causation, that plaintiff, who worked at a drum reconditioning facility, 
had produced sufficient evidence of causation to withstand motion for summary 
judgment despite inability to prove the number or specific contents of drums 
from various defendants). 
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In Allen, twenty-four plaintiffs contended that radiation from 
above-ground nuclear weapons tests caused their cancers. As in 
June and Wilcox, general causation was indisputable, but specific 
causation was another matter. The plaintiffs’ various “non-
specific” cancers193 might have been caused by the accused bomb-
test radiation, by radiation from other sources, or by something 
other than radiation. The impossibility of proof led the court to 
eschew but-for causation. Instead, Allen concluded that 
[w]here it appears from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the conduct of the defendant significantly increased or 
augmented the risk of somatic injury to a plaintiff and that the 
risk has taken effect in the form of a biologically and 
statistically consistent somatic injury, i.e., cancer or leukemia, 
the inference may rationally be drawn that defendant’s 
conduct was a substantial factor contributing to plaintiff’s 
injury.194 
Allen’s creative move was the deft elision of risk 
augmentation with injury causation. The court’s inference from 
one to the other was “rationally drawn” because the scientific 
evidence needed to prove causation was, and could be, framed 
only in risk terms. Nevertheless, Allen broke new ground.195 Its 
statement of the standard for proof of causation followed a 
lengthy discussion of creative common law solutions to other 
problems of causal indeterminacy, but none of those re-envisioned 
causation in probabilistic terms based on risk augmentation.196 
The closest parallel is a sixteen-year-old opinion by the 
California Supreme Court in a worker’s compensation case, 
McAllister v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board.197 In 
                                                                                                     
 193. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 406. Presumably, by “non-specific” the court 
meant that the cancers were not uniquely associated with a particular exposure, 
i.e., they were not “signature” diseases. Id. 
 194. Id. at 428. The court allowed the defendant to defeat the inference if 
“the facts [were] proven otherwise by sufficient evidence.” Id. 
 195. See id. at 415 (“A remedial framework can certainly be fashioned to 
meet the circumstances and requirements of the parties and issues now before 
this court in this action.”). 
 196. Id. at 406–10. Allen cited alternative liability cases, multiple sufficient 
cause cases, and idiosyncratic cases in which absence of evidence makes the post 
hoc counterfactual inference especially difficult. Id. 
 197. McAllister v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 445 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1968). 
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McAllister, a firefighter’s widow claimed that her husband’s on-
the-job exposure to smoke caused his fatal lung cancer, although 
he had also smoked cigarettes for decades.198 The opinion 
prefigured the factual causation issues that would come to 
bedevil toxic tort litigation: 
Given the present state of medical knowledge, we cannot say 
whether it was the employment or the cigarettes which 
“actually” caused the disease; we can only recognize that both 
contributed substantially to the likelihood of his contracting 
lung cancer. . . . Future scientific developments will tell us 
more about lung cancer. Ultimately it may be possible to 
pinpoint with certainty the cause of each case of the disease. 
But the Legislature did not contemplate years of damnum 
absque injuria pending such scientific certainty.199 
To avoid that result, McAllister invoked precedent holding 
that a worker could obtain benefits if the employment was a 
“contributing cause” of an injury.200 How could one tell whether 
exposure to smoke while firefighting was a “contributing cause” of 
lung cancer in a long-term tobacco smoker? By considering 
whether “the likelihood of contracting lung cancer from the 
smoking was so great that the danger could not have been 
materially increased by exposure to the smoke produced by 
burning buildings.”201 
Thus, in different contexts and with dramatically different 
amounts of evidence to work with, both McAllister and Allen 
recognized that scientific indeterminacy of specific causation 
justifies a risk-based, probabilistic reconceptualization of cause-
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 314. 
 199. Id. at 319. 
 200. Id. McAllister went far beyond the precedent it relied on, which simply 
recognized that an event could have more than one cause. Emp’rs Mut. Liab. 
Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 263 P.2d 4, 6 (Cal. 1953) (holding 
that injury could arise out of employment even if employment was not “the sole 
cause” but only “a contributory cause”). 
 201. McAllister, 445 P.2d at 319 (emphasis added). McAllister also held that 
there was sufficient evidence to establish what is now known as general 
causation, even though there was no proof of exactly how smoke from building 
fires caused cancer. Id.  
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in-fact. But McAllister remained obscure and Allen’s causation 
analysis garnered little attention.202 
To address a different but related problem of inherent causal 
indeterminacy, however, courts in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom have much more prominently linked evidence of 
risk creation to inferences of causation. In Rutherford v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc.,203 the California Supreme Court confronted the 
“indeterminate defendant” problem typical of many asbestos 
cases.204 Mr. Rutherford had died of lung cancer after being 
tortiously exposed to asbestos fibers by numerous defendants, 
including his former employer and the manufacturers of asbestos-
containing products that he had used at work.205 Science could 
not interrogate the cancer to determine the source of the asbestos 
fiber or fibers that caused the malignancy.206 The trial court 
instructed the jury on alternative liability, shifting the burden of 
proof on causation to the defendants.207 The California Supreme 
Court held that doctrine inapplicable, but not because the 
                                                                                                     
 202. Just a handful of California worker’s compensation cases and two 
dissenting opinions outside of California have cited McAllister. Only Elam v. 
Alcolac, Inc. cited Allen in the course of adopting a causation standard anything 
like Allen’s. See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) 
(“The substantial factor standard . . . is particularly suited to injury from 
chronic exposure to toxic chemicals where the sequent manifestation of 
biological disease may be the result of a confluence of causes.”). 
 203. Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997). 
 204. See id. at 1218 (“[A]sbestos-related cancer would, under the single-fiber 
theory of carcinogenesis, be an example of alternative causation, i.e., a result 
produced by a single but interminable member of a group of possible causes.”). 
 205. Id. at 1207. 
 206. See id. at 1206 (implying that plaintiff could not “prove with medical 
exactitude that fibers from a particular defendant’s asbestos-containing 
products were those, or among those, that actually began the cellular process of 
malignancy”). 
 207. See id. at 1206–08. (“This instruction shifts the burden of proof to 
defendants in asbestos cases tried on a products liability theory to prove that 
their products were not a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries , provided the 
plaintiff first establishes certain predicate facts . . . .”). Mr. Rutherford also had 
been a smoker, adding the possibility that the cancer had really been caused by 
tobacco smoke rather than asbestos. See id. at 1209 (“Undisputed evidence 
indicated that smoking sharply increases the risk of lung disease, including lung 
cancer, and works ‘synergistically’ with asbestos exposure to enhance the 
severity of resulting damage to the lungs.”); infra notes 268–69 and 
accompanying text. 
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plaintiff could (and therefore must) establish which of the 
tortfeasors had delivered the fiber that actually caused his 
cancer.208 Rather, the court held, “no insuperable barriers” 
prevented the plaintiff from proving causation without relying on 
the alternative causation doctrine—if causation were 
appropriately understood in the circumstances of the case.209 
The most important of those circumstances was the 
“irreducible uncertainty” of determining which defendants’ 
asbestos fibers actually contributed to the cellular development of 
cancer.210 Despite that uncertainty, the court observed, every 
exposure to asbestos increased plaintiff’s risk of disease.211 The 
court therefore conceived all of the exposures as concurrent 
rather than alternative causes.212 Left implicit in this conceptual 
shift was rejection of the deterministic model of causation as 
inappropriate.213 Implementing that rejection, the court held that 
a particular product would be a “substantial factor in causing or 
bringing about the disease” if “it was a substantial factor 
                                                                                                     
 208. See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1223 (“In an asbestos-related cancer case, 
the plaintiff need not prove that fibers from the defendant’s product were the 
ones, or among the ones, that actually began the process of malignant cellular 
growth.”). 
 209. Id. at 1206. 
 210. Id. at 1218. 
 211. See id. at 1209 (“[The defendant’s] own medical expert . . . testified . . . 
that if a worker had occupational exposure to many different asbestos-
containing products, each such exposure would contribute to the risk of 
contracting asbestos-related lung cancer . . . .”). As Michael Green pointed out to 
me, if any exposure occurred after the malignant transformation, that exposure 
did not in fact contribute to the risk of developing the tumor that plaintiff 
actually developed. Determining which exposures occurred before and after the 
malignancy began, however, is also impossible. Moreover, it is at least possible 
that continued exposure presents an additional carcinogenic risk even after a 
particular tumor has begun to grow. 
 212. Id. at 1220–21, 1223. 
 213. Cf. id. at 1218 (stating that the mechanism of cancer causation by 
asbestos remained a debated scientific issue, the resolution of which could affect 
legal conclusions regarding causation in cases of exposures from multiple 
sources). But cf. Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation 
Doctrines Central to Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1029 (2009) 
(stating that Rutherford’s concurrent causation approach is based on “a fiction[] 
that every asbestos fiber was involved in the cancer mechanism”). 
WHEN CERTAINTY DISSOLVES INTO PROBABILITY 289 
contributing to plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing 
cancer.”214 
A year after Rutherford, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
issued an opinion that was consistent with Rutherford’s 
reasoning, although it did not explicitly equate risk augmentation 
and causation.215 Mr. James worked in a drum reprocessing 
facility where he was exposed to different types of chemical and 
petroleum residues in drums from many  companies. His widow 
alleged that these residues caused Mr. James’s fatal stomach and 
liver cancer.216 Witnesses testified about which companies’ drums 
were processed during Mr. James’s employment, and expert 
witnesses testified that residues these companies shipped were 
carcinogenic.217 But a lack of records made it impossible to prove 
how much of which residues from which companies Mr. James 
had come in contact with.218 The court nevertheless decided that 
the evidence of causation against some defendants was adequate 
to survive summary judgment.219 To establish “medical 
causation,” the New Jersey Supreme Court held, a plaintiff like 
Mr. James must prove two things: (1) sufficient exposure to 
defendant’s products and (2) “medical and/or scientific proof of a 
nexus between the exposure and the plaintiff’s condition.”220 This 
is another way of saying that the defendant augmented the 
plaintiff’s risk of disease.221 
                                                                                                     
 214. Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Cal. 1997). 
 215. James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 898 (N.J. 1998). 
 216. Id. at 901. 
 217. Id. at 904–06. 
 218. Id. at 903, 913. 
 219. Id. at 913–14. 
 220. Id. at 911. To test sufficiency of exposure the court adopted the 
criterion of “frequent, regular and proximate exposure” borrowed from many 
asbestos cases. Id. 
 221. The close relation of risk augmentation to the James description of 
medical causation is evident in the court’s description of the way a defendant 
might avoid joint and several liability under New Jersey’s Comparative 
Negligence Act. Once “deemed [a] substantial factor[] in causing James’s 
cancer,” the court held, a defendant would bear the burden of proving a basis for 
apportioning fault. Id. at 916. “[E]ach defendant may seek to reduce its 
individual percentage of fault by submitting proof that its products . . . were less 
carcinogenic . . . or that James’s exposure to its products was more limited . . . .” 
Id. 
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Courts in the United Kingdom reached a similar result by a 
path that began with a decision in a somewhat odd case, McGhee 
v. National Coal Board.222 Mr. McGhee became covered in dust 
and sweat while cleaning out brick kilns and had to bicycle home 
in that condition because his employer did not provide washing 
facilities.223 He developed dermatitis and sued his employer.224 
The medical experts agreed that the presence of the irritating 
dust on skin made vulnerable by perspiration caused Mr. 
McGhee’s dermatitis.225 The rub was that only the lack of a 
shower that extended the exposure to the dust, and not the 
working conditions that first deposited the dust on Mr. McGhee’s 
skin, was held negligent.226 Longer exposure increased the risk, 
but no expert could say whether Mr. McGhee would have avoided 
dermatitis had he showered at his workplace.227 Therefore, the 
trial and intermediate appellate courts concluded, Mr. McGhee 
could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employer’s negligence had caused his dermatitis.228 The losing 
plaintiff229 appealed to, and prevailed in, the House of Lords.230 
Four of the five members of the panel reasoned that in the 
circumstances of the case, to establish causation, it was sufficient 
that Mr. McGhee had shown that his employer’s negligence had 
                                                                                                     
 222. McGhee v. Nat’l Coal Bd. [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1 
(H.L.). 
 223. Id. at 3–4 (Lord Reid). 
 224. Id. at 3. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. at 5 (Lord Wilburforce) (“The experts could [determine the cause 
of dermatitis], but had to admit that they knew little of the quantity of dust or 
the time of exposure necessary to cause a critical change.”). 
 228. See McGhee, 1 W.L.R. at 3–4 (Lord Reid) (“It was held in the Court of 
Session that the appellant had to prove that his additional exposure to 
injury . . . caused the disease in the sense that it was more probable than not 
that this additional exposure to injury was the cause of it.”). 
 229. The British cases refer to the party seeking relief as the pursuer or 
claimant, and to the party from whom relief is sought as the defender. For 
simplicity and ease of reading, I use the familiar American terms plaintiff and 
defendant (including survivors of decedents). 
 230. See id. at 13 (“Appeal allowed.”). 
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materially increased his risk of disease. Lord Salmon’s speech 
was representative: 
[W]hen it is proved, on a balance of probabilities, that an 
employer has been negligent and that his negligence has 
materially increased the risk of his employee contracting an 
industrial disease, then he is liable in damages to that 
employee if he contracts the disease notwithstanding that the 
employer is not responsible for other factors which have 
materially contributed to the disease . . . . In the circumstances 
of the present case, the possibility of a distinction existing 
between (a) having materially increased the risk of contracting 
the disease, and (b) having materially contributed to causing 
the disease may no doubt be a fruitful source of interesting 
academic discussions between students of philosophy. Such a 
distinction is, however, far too unreal to be recognised by the 
common law.231 
The House of Lords revived McGhee’s reformulation of the 
concept of causation when it confronted a case similar to 
Rutherford, in which each claimant or decedent had developed 
mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos by multiple 
defendants.232 In Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.,233 
the Lords allowed the appeals of three claimants who had lost 
below for failure to establish but-for causation.234 The committee 
members differed in their analyses and in the limits they would 
impose on the doctrine being announced.235 They were 
                                                                                                     
 231. Id. at 12–13 (Lord Salmon); see also id. at 5 (Lord Reid) (“From a broad 
and practical viewpoint I can see no substantial difference between saying that 
what the respondents did materially increased the risk of injury to the appellant 
and saying that what the respondents did made a material contribution to his 
injury.”); id. at 8 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale) (“‘[M]aterial reduction of the risk’ 
and ‘substantial contribution to the injury’ are mirror concepts in this type of 
case.”). 
 232. McGhee’s formulation needed to be revived because intervening cases 
had cast doubt on the interpretation of McGhee. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 
23–28 (tracing the discussion of the relation between risk contribution and 
causation in United Kingdom cases). 
 233. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 
A.C. 32. 
 234. See id. [1] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (“[I]t was announced that these 
three appeals would be allowed.”). 
 235. See id. [35]; [45] (Lord Nicholls); [118] (Lord Hutton); [170] (Lord 
Rodger). 
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unanimous, however, on the implication of the “rock of 
uncertainty”236 that made it impossible for each claimant to prove 
which asbestos fiber(s) had invaded the cell from which the fatal 
mesothelioma grew.237 In light of that scientific indeterminacy, a 
material contribution to risk should be considered a “sufficient 
degree of causal connection” to support a finding of causation.238 
The panel members noted the parallels with Rutherford,239 and 
all but one openly acknowledged that Fairchild embraced a legal 
standard of causation different from the deterministic but-for 
model.240 
These cases, from McAllister to Allen to Rutherford to James 
to Fairchild, groped toward a redefinition of specific causation in 
cases in which scientific indeterminacy rendered it impossible to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular 
exposure was a but-for cause of a plaintiff’s harm. Treating risk 
creation as causal contribution is appropriate when a plaintiff 
can prove that tortious conduct “materially increased the risk of 
him contracting a particular disease and the disease occurred, 
but where in the state of existing medical knowledge he is unable 
to prove by medical evidence that the [conduct] was a [but-for] 
cause of the disease.”241 
                                                                                                     
 236. Id. [7] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
 237. See id. [7] (Lord Bingham), [49] (Lord Hoffmann), [77] (Lord Hutton), 
[120] (Lord Rodger) (acknowledging that current medical knowledge is 
insufficient to determine which asbestos fiber caused the cancer). 
 238. Id. [42] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); accord id. [34] (Lord Bingham); 
id. [47] (Lord Hoffmann); id. [108]–[09] (Lord Hutton); id. [168] (Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry). 
 239. See id. [31] (Lord Bingham), [73] (Lord Hoffmann), [105] (Lord Hutton), 
[161] (Lord Rodger) (noting that the court was asked to apply the rule from 
Rutherford that “the causal requirements of the tort were satisfied by proving 
that exposure to a particular product”). 
 240. See id. [9] (Lord Bingham), [41], [43] (Lord Nicholls), [56], [63] (Lord 
Hoffmann), [168] (Lord Rodger) (variously characterizing the Fairchild holding 
as a variation, relaxation, or policy-based deviation from traditional rules of 
factual causation); but see id. [109] (Lord Hutton) (taking the view that in 
McGhee and Fairchild the plaintiffs succeeded based on judicial inference that 
but-for causation had been established more likely than not, though 
acknowledging that this interpretation makes “little practical difference”).  
 241. Id. [108] (Lord Hutton). This formulation, by the one member of the 
Appellate Panel who declined to deviate expressly from traditional but-for 
causation, is almost indistinguishable from the way the other members of the 
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It is immediately apparent that this general statement of 
principle need not be restricted to asbestos cases or even to 
indeterminate-defendant cases,242 despite the courts’ tendency to 
do so.243 The same type of indeterminacy afflicts a wide range of 
toxic tort claims that have two salient characteristics: (1) general 
causation is reasonably well-established (for example, by 
appropriately confirmed epidemiologic data showing increased 
risk associated with exposure); and (2) science cannot specify the 
cause of an individual case of disease. As explained above, 
molecular science is likely to increase the prevalence of the first 
characteristic without greatly decreasing the prevalence of the 
second. Thus, increasingly, a probabilistic conception of causation 
based on risk contribution will be needed to conform legal 
doctrine to the realistically available evidence. 
Two asserted bases for limiting this view of causation to 
asbestos indeterminate-defendant cases merit discussion. The 
first argues that this concept of causation should apply only if the 
competing possible causes of plaintiff’s illness all contributed to 
risk in the same way, e.g., by exposing a plaintiff to the same 
substance (i.e., asbestos).244 The second argues that this concept 
                                                                                                     
panel expressed the rule. See also Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, 
[2006] 2 A.C. 572, [77] (Lord Rodger) (noting that McGhee held “that, in the 
particular circumstances, by proving that the defenders had materially 
increased the risk of injury, the pursuer had proved that they had materially 
contributed to his injury”). 
 242. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 
[2003] 1 A.C. 32, [163] (Lord Rodger) (noting that although Rutherford limited 
its holding to asbestos cases, “the reasoning itself develops from the 
impossibility of proof inherent in those cases”). 
 243. Sanders, supra note 1, at 32–33 (describing reticence of courts, 
including California courts, to extend the Rutherford “risk rule” to contexts 
beyond asbestos); but cf. Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 284 S.W.3d 29, 35–40 (Ark. 
2008) (using “substantial factor” formulation, frequency-regularity-proximity 
test from asbestos cases, and testimony about leukemogenic risks of arsenic, to 
reverse summary judgment for poultry producers, each of which contributed an 
unknown amount of plaintiff’s exposure to arsenic-laced chicken litter). 
 244. See Fairchild, [2002] UKHL 22, [115], [118] (Lord Hutton) (arguing 
that risk contribution model is inappropriate if multiple possible causal agents 
exist); Green, supra note 94, at 546 (“[A]ny risk contribution scheme should be 
limited to a single toxic substance whose risk profile is established (asbestos is 
surely that) and in which multiple defendants contributed to the risk but 
plaintiff is unable to prove which one(s) is the actual cause of her harm.”). 
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of causation should apply only if all of the sources of plaintiff’s 
exposure to enhanced risk are tortious.245 From a theoretical 
perspective, neither argument is persuasive. 
The first argument seems rooted in a concern for being 
reasonably certain of the substance that caused the disease and 
for being able to compare various risk contributions. It fails 
because exposure to an additional risk factor, and not only 
exposure to more of a single risk factor to which the plaintiff was 
already exposed, may increase a plaintiff’s risk. As Lord 
Hoffmann noted in Fairchild, “what if [a plaintiff] had been 
exposed to two different agents—asbestos dust and some other 
dust—both of which created a material risk of the same cancer 
and it was equally impossible to say which had caused the fatal 
cell mutation? I cannot see why this should make a difference.”246 
Lord Hoffmann later tweaked this view, explaining that the 
substance to which a plaintiff was exposed need not be the same, 
but the mechanism of disease causation must be the same for all 
of the exposures at issue.247 The latter distinction, however, is 
equally untenable. The justification for the “risk rule”248—the 
inability to tell which of multiple exposures caused a given case of 
illness—is just as strong when the exposures increase the risk of 
a disease in different ways, if after the plaintiff is sick it is 
impossible to tell which mechanism operated to cause the illness. 
Further, if identity of mechanism were crucial, then defining 
mechanism would become critical. That definition would depend 
on both the state of scientific knowledge and on judicial line-
                                                                                                     
 245. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [14]–[16] (Lord Hoffmann) 
(acknowledging though disagreeing with the argument that a risk-based 
conception of causation should not apply if one of the sources of exposure was 
not tortious); id. [128] (Baroness Hale) (opining that rationale for imposing 
liability on those responsible for all asbestos exposures is absent or weakened if 
not all exposures were tortious). 
 246. Fairchild, [2002] UKHL 22, [72] (Lord Hoffmann). 
 247. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [24] (Lord Rodger) (“It may have been 
different in some causally irrelevant respect, as in Lord Rodger’s example of the 
different kinds of dust, but the mechanism by which it caused the damage, 
whatever it was, must have been the same.”) Cf. id. [17] (referring ambiguously 
to exposure to “the same risk”); see also Sanders, supra note 1, at 29 (calling 
Lord Hoffmann’s revision “a delightful piece of self-reinterpretation”). 
 248. The nomenclature is Joseph Sanders’s. Sanders, supra note 1, at 11. 
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drawing.249 For Lord Hoffmann, asbestos and some other 
hypothesized “dust” were similar enough, but asbestos and 
tobacco smoke were not.250 For the California Supreme Court in 
1968 (when the mechanism of lung carcinogenesis was completely 
mysterious) smoke was smoke, whether it came from cigarettes or 
burning buildings.251 If two substances are shown to cause the 
same histological form of cancer, should the law treat them as 
acting by the same mechanism? What if it can be shown that both 
are capable of altering DNA? Or must each be shown to increase 
cancer risk by turning off a tumor suppressor gene? Must it be 
the same tumor suppressor gene? What if both of them are shown 
sometimes to turn off the same tumor suppressor gene, and other 
times to turn off another tumor suppressor gene, and both genes 
are turned off in the patient’s cancer? If the mechanisms by 
which two or more substances cause a disease were distinct, 
specific, and determinable after the fact—the false promise—then 
specific causation would be scientifically knowable, and there 
would be no need to conceptualize causation in probabilistic 
terms. In any other situation, however, mechanistic 
understanding at smaller scales will make it harder for two 
exposures to look the “same” but will not solve the indeterminacy 
problem that led to the Fairchild solution.252 
The second argument, that a probabilistic, risk-augmentation 
view of causation should be limited to cases in which all the 
contributors of increased risk are tortious, seems rooted in the 
view that the only justification for modifying causation rules in 
                                                                                                     
 249. See id. at 36 (noting that such limits are both arbitrary and subject to 
change as science learns more). 
 250. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [24] (Lord Rodger) (“I do not think that 
the exception applies when the claimant suffers lung cancer which may have 
been caused by exposure to asbestos or some other carcinogenic matter but may 
also have been caused by smoking . . . .”). 
 251. See McAllister v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 445 P.2d 313, 318–19 
(Cal. 1968) (“We cannot doubt that the more smoke decedent inhaled—from 
whatever source—the greater the danger of his contracting lung cancer. . . . 
Given the present state of medical knowledge, we cannot say whether it was the 
employment or the cigarettes which ‘actually caused the disease . . . .’”). 
 252. It is true, however, that exposure to multiple risk factors may present 
formidable factual complexities. See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text 
(discussing the possibility of the same solvent in materials produced by two 
different manufacturers). 
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the face of indeterminacy is the relative moral position of an 
“innocent” plaintiff and multiple “wrongdoers.”253 It also fails, as 
can be seen even in the context of asbestos mesothelioma cases. 
The fact that each claimant in Fairchild had been exposed to 
asbestos by multiple employers distinguished each claim from 
what would have been an easy case if only one entity had been 
responsible for the exposure. But what distinguished these 
claimants from the general population of the United Kingdom 
was the fact that they were exposed to asbestos on the job. The 
source of the other exposure did not logically affect the 
determination of whether the tortious exposure contributed 
materially to the risk. The House of Lords recognized this in 
Barker v. Corus UK Ltd.,254 which applied Fairchild to hold 
defendant employers liable to a claimant even though one of the 
claimant’s material exposures to asbestos was entirely his own 
fault.255 
The same reasoning would apply regardless of the competing 
source of exposure or risk. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom reaffirmed this aspect of the logic of Barker in 
Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK), Ltd.,256 which involved two women with 
mesothelioma who had been exposed to relatively small amounts 
of asbestos at their respective workplaces.257 The defendants 
                                                                                                     
 253. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [128] (Baroness Hale) (making this 
argument). 
 254. Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572. 
 255. See id. at [17] (Lord Hoffmann) (“These distinctions may be relevant to 
whether and to whom responsibility can also be attributed, but from the point of 
view of satisfying the requirement of a sufficient causal link between the 
defendant’s conduct and the claimant’s injury, they should not matter.”); id. 
[58]–[59] (Lord Scott) (asking how the Fairchild principle would apply to a case 
involving a claimant’s exposure to multiple sources and determining that this 
would make no difference); id. [97] (Lord Rodger) (“Having reserved my opinion 
on the point in Fairchild, I would now hold that the rule should apply in that 
situation.”); id. [117] (Lord Walker) (agreeing, except still believing that 
“the Fairchild principle [should apply] to cases where less than 100% of the risk 
has been caused by employers or occupiers guilty of breaches of duty”); id. [128] 
(Baroness Hale) (explaining that because Barker imposed only several liability 
based on risk contribution, “[t]he victim’s own behaviour is only relevant if he 
fails to take reasonable care for his own safety during a period of tortious 
exposure by a defendant.”). 
 256. Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 A.C. 229. 
 257. See id. [2]–[4], [59]–[60], [115], [117]–[19], [124]–[25] (describing the 
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argued that each woman’s exposure to asbestos in the ambient 
air exceeded her incremental exposure at work, and therefore it 
was more likely than not that the ambient exposure, rather than 
the workplace exposure, had caused her disease.258 The Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected the argument, holding that so long as 
the negligent employer’s contribution to the risk of mesothelioma 
had been “material,” that negligence would be considered a cause 
of the claimant’s mesothelioma.259 Similarly, it should not matter 
if the competing exposure was not created by human agency at 
all, such as exposure to radiation by naturally occurring 
radioisotopes as in Allen, June, and Wilcox.260 
Allen shows that the traditional “substantial contributing 
factor” formulation of the causal connection opens the possibility 
of reformulating causation in risk-creation terms to address 
specific causation in toxic torts. The treatment of asbestos 
indeterminate-defendant cases in California and the United 
Kingdom shows that the reformulation can be credibly applied. 
“At the very least,” it proves “that it is not necessarily the 
hallmark of a civilised and sophisticated legal system that it 
treats cases where strict proof of causation is impossible in 
exactly the same way as cases where such proof is possible.”261 
C. Risk as Cause, Not as Harm 
A probabilistic model of specific causation in toxic torts, as 
opposed to deterministic but-for causation, is best supported by 
                                                                                                     
facts). 
 258. See id. [60]–[61] (Lord Phillips) (“[T]he judge . . . heard expert evidence 
which quantified this exposure and compared it to the environmental exposure 
that would be experienced by everyone. . . . It was on the basis of this finding 
that the judge held that the claimant’s case on causation had not been made 
out.”). 
 259. See id. [107]–[09] (Lord Phillips) (determining what constitutes a 
“material risk” and applying that determination to this case). 
 260. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 40 (“[A]ll of the distinctions designed to 
rein in the reach of the risk rule feel arbitrary.”). 
 261. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 168, 
[2002] 1 A.C. 32, [168] (Lord Rodger). The appropriate scope of liability in such 
cases is discussed infra Part IV.E. 
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existing and developing scientific evidence—but not in the sense 
that some particularistic trait of an individual’s disease allows a 
direct estimate of the likelihood that his or her case was caused 
by a particular exposure.262 Rather, an individual’s combination 
of genetic makeup and exposure increases the likelihood of the 
disease relative to genetically similar individuals not exposed.263 
The exposure, accordingly, is considered a risk factor for the 
disease. The courts that decided Allen, Rutherford, McGhee, and 
Fairchild all recognized that in light of causal indeterminacy, it is 
appropriate to treat proof of contribution to risk as proof of 
contribution to cause. 
In Barker, however, the House of Lords adopted a different 
conceptual framework to explain its Fairchild holding. According 
to the Barker majority, the Fairchild defendants were held liable 
not because the tortious augmentation of a plaintiff’s risk was a 
contributing factor to the plaintiff’s harm of mesothelioma, but 
because the tortious exposure of a plaintiff to asbestos caused the 
plaintiff’s harm of increased risk of developing mesothelioma.264 
This reformulation extended Fairchild considerably with respect 
to the harm element of a tort.265 With respect to causation 
                                                                                                     
 262. The reasoning process known as differential etiology (usually—though 
inaccurately—called differential diagnosis) may seem to approach a direct 
estimate of a probability of causation in an individual case. Differential etiology 
attempts to prove that but-for causation is more likely than not, by ruling out 
other possible causes of the plaintiff’s disease. It could be fully determinative if 
a set of deterministic causes of plaintiff’s disease were fully characterized (e.g., 
if an infection were caused only by a known virus or a known bacterium, and 
exposure to one were ruled out). More often, however, the disease in question is 
characterized by several risk factors and a residuum of disease incidence 
unaccounted for by any known risk factor. Ruling out some risk factors may 
allow a more refined estimate of risk, but that estimate still would be derived 
ultimately from population-based studies. 
 263. Other traits besides genetics and exposure may be pertinent, such as 
exposures to additional toxins, environmental factors (e.g., nutrition or 
weather), or personal factors (e.g., age). 
 264. See Barker v. Corus U.K. Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572, 
[35]–[36] (Lord Hoffmann), [59]–[62] (Lord Scott), [126] (Baroness Hale) (noting 
that the defendants in Fairchild were not found to have ultimately caused the 
harm but that they were liable for creating the risk). 
 265. As Lord Rodger noted in dissent, the majority took pains to limit the 
extension, without convincing rationale, to the context of multiple asbestos 
exposures and mesothelioma. Id. [85] (Lord Rodger). 
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doctrine, however, it implicitly retreated to the comfortable 
confines of but-for: each material exposure to asbestos, 
tautologically, was a but-for cause of the increment of risk 
associated with that exposure. 
Although the increased risk caused by a tortious toxic 
exposure could be considered sufficient harm to support a cause 
of action,266 reconceptualization of causation-in-fact as proposed 
here has advantages over recognizing liability for a new tort 
based on creation of risk alone. The latter would invite the 
objection that many negligent or otherwise wrongful acts create 
risk of harm, but tort law ordinarily does not, and practicably 
                                                                                                     
 266. See id. [71] (Lord Rodger) (“[T]he majority of the House proceeded on 
the simple basis that the creation of a material risk of mesothelioma was 
sufficient for liability.”). The Barker majority’s attempt to reframe Fairchild was 
unconvincing. The majority labeled the equation of risk creation with 
contribution to injury a “fiction” and cited passages from Fairchild rejecting 
reliance on legal fictions, but those passages rejected a different fiction—that 
proof of material contribution to risk permitted an inference of but-for 
causation. Compare id. [31]–[34] (Lord Hoffmann) (arguing that the Fairchild 
Court did not rely on the fiction that creation of a material risk constitutes 
material contribution to contraction of disease), with id. [80]–[83] (Lord Rodger) 
(countering that Lord Hoffmann’s view that Fairchild “did not proceed on the 
basis that a defendant who had created a material risk of mesothelioma was 
deemed to have caused . . . the disease” was true only of Lord Hoffmann’s own 
speech in Fairchild but not true of the Fairchild majority). This reframing was 
used to justify the conclusion that each defendant should be liable only severally 
for its proportionate share of risk contribution, rather than for the plaintiff’s full 
damages as United Kingdom law would otherwise have required. See id. [2], [31] 
(Lord Hoffmann), [60]–[62] (Lord Scott), [112]–[13] (Lord Walker) (concluding 
that if tort consisted of exposure to risk then several liability proportionate to 
risk would be appropriate). Barker held that fairness demanded that result. See 
id. [127] (Baroness Hale) (“It seems to me most fair that the contribution [that 
defendants in a Fairchild-type situation] should make [to plaintiff’s 
compensation] is in proportion to the contribution they have made to the risk of 
that harm occurring.”). Parliament promptly reversed that policy judgment. 
Compensation Act, 2006, c. 29, § 3(1)(a), (c), (2) (U.K.). The Supreme Court, with 
some justices holding their noses, later adhered to the precedent that material 
contribution to risk was sufficient causal connection despite the statutory 
requirement of joint and several liability. E.g., Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011] 
UKSC 10, [2011] 2 A.C. 229 [167]–[68] (Baroness Hale). In the United States, 
risk contribution as a tort is the premise underlying some claims for medical 
monitoring. E.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 
2009). This Article takes no position on whether claims for medical monitoring 
should be permitted upon proof of toxic exposure even absent manifest illness.  
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could not, compensate every person exposed to such risks.267 The 
Barker majority answered this objection, despite holding that the 
harm caused by tortious asbestos exposure was creation of a risk 
of mesothelioma, by holding that tortfeasors would be liable only 
if the harm of mesothelioma had materialized. It imposed this 
limit by assertion rather than by reasoning, however.268 
By contrast, if risk augmentation is recognized as a cause of 
injury within a model of probabilistic causal contribution, a 
                                                                                                     
 267. Another problem soon led the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court to 
repudiate the risk-as-harm formulation. A group of employers’ liability insurers 
balked at covering liabilities owed to employees who developed disease long 
after their workplace exposures to asbestos. Cf. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The 
Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203, 209–10 (2010) 
(recounting history of similar litigation in United States). The insurers argued 
that their policies covered only liability for disease that became manifest during 
the policy period, not for disease that became manifest after the policy period 
even if it had been caused by exposure during the policy period. BAI (Run Off) 
Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14, 3 (Lord Mance). The justices unanimously 
rejected this argument. Id. 76 (Lord Clarke) (“Like other members of the Court, 
I agree . . . [that] for the purposes of the . . . policies, mesothelioma is ‘sustained’ 
or ‘contracted’ when the process that leads to the disease is initiated” by 
exposure to asbestos). Lord Phillips, however, would have held nevertheless that 
the insurance was not triggered. He argued that Barker correctly interpreted 
Fairchild as imposing liability for risk creation alone, and that because no one 
could tell which employer’s fiber actually caused a plaintiff’s mesothelioma, 
liability based on risk creation did not satisfy the insurance policies’ 
requirements of causation and injury. Id. 124, 134–35. The majority, however, 
disagreed. Id. 65 (Lord Mance) (“[I[t is impossible, or at least inaccurate, to 
speak of the cause of action recognized in Fairchild and Barker as being simply 
‘for the risk created by exposing’ someone to asbestos.”); id. 82 (Lord Clarke) 
(Barker “cannot have intended to hold, without more, that the basis of liability 
was the wrongful creation of the risk . . . because there would be no liability at 
all but for the subsequent existence of the mesothelioma.”) I am indebted to 
Sandy Steel for calling my attention to the insurance trigger litigation. 
 268. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [48] (Lord Hoffmann) (“Although the 
Fairchild exception treats the risk of contracting mesothelioma as the damage, 
it applies only when the disease has actually been contracted.”); id. [61] (Lord 
Scott) (“If, in the event, the victim does not contract the disease, no claim can be 
made for the trauma of being subjected to the risk.”); Chris Miller, Liability for 
Negligently Increased Risk: The Repercussions of Barker v. Corus UK (PLC), 8 
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 39, 42 (2009) (emphasizing distinction between 
liability for creating risk of harm and liability for creating risk that eventuates 
in actual harm). Courts that accept “lost chance” doctrines similarly limit their 
application by pronouncement. See generally David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for 
Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001) (discussing possible 
limiting principles for application of lost chance doctrine).  
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plaintiff would still need to establish an injury.269 The 
mechanistic view of causation deems a cause-in-fact of that injury 
to be any necessary element of a sufficient causal set. A stochastic 
model of causation would imply that in any particular toxic tort 
case it is impossible to tell whether even a known risk factor fits 
that description. The causal set that matters, instead, is a set of 
factors that increased the probability of the plaintiff’s injurious 
result. Each element of this set should be considered a cause-in-
fact of the harm the plaintiff experienced. 
Jane Stapleton has called such reasoning a “fiction” in 
asbestos cancer cases because, so far as is known, asbestos-
related lung cancer or mesothelioma does not result only if 
aggregate asbestos exposure exceeds some threshold and is not 
made more severe by additional exposure. Thus, she reasoned, a 
tortfeasor who contributed part of the plaintiff’s total exposure 
can in no factual way be said to have “caused” just a “part” of the 
plaintiff’s disease.270 
Professor Stapleton’s careful distinctions among cumulative, 
threshold, and non-threshold mechanisms of toxic injury are 
valuable and informative. But probabilistic causal contribution is 
a fiction only in relation to assumed scientific271 and legal models 
                                                                                                     
 269. Jamie Grodsky argued that injury itself could be reconceptualized to 
include detectable sub-clinical cellular or biochemical changes. Grodsky, supra 
note 110, at 1671–74. Although this Article takes no position on that suggestion, 
there is nothing about Professor Grodsky’s suggestion that is inconsistent with 
this Article’s proposal. 
 270. Stapleton, supra note 187, at 191. See generally Wagner v. Bondex Int’l, 
Inc., 368 S.W.3d 340, 349, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (attempting to harmonize 
requirement of but-for causation with reality of indeterminacy by ruling that  
based on testimony of “cumulative nature of mesothelioma,” a reasonable juror 
could conclude that asbestos in defendant’s product “contributed to cause” 
plaintiff’s mesothelioma and death). 
 271. I do not mean to suggest that mesothelioma may be a cumulative 
disease like asbestosis or that asbestos can only cause mesothelioma after a 
threshold exposure is achieved. At bottom, however, the assertion that 
contributing-factor causation is a legal fiction depends on the scientific model 
that assumes that the interaction of one asbestos fiber with one cell causes 
mesothelioma. This may well be true, although, curiously, the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom asserted, without citation, that “[t]he single fibre theory 
has . . . been discredited.” Sienkiewicz, [2011] UKSC 10, 102 (Lord Phillips). It is 
clear, at least, that more than one molecular change is necessary for a 
mesothelium cell to become malignant. Huang, et al., supra note 147, at 180–81. 
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of causation. The deterministic legal model assumes that one and 
only one source of asbestos exposure should be treated as “the” 
cause of the plaintiff’s entire illness: that as a matter of historical 
fact, the physical tumor in the plaintiff’s body originated with a 
cellular alteration initiated by a particular defendant’s fiber,272 
which could be identified if only science were omniscient. Even if 
reality matches this assumption, the counterfactual inference 
required by the but-for test does not necessarily follow. We 
cannot say that if only plaintiff had been protected from inhaling 
this one fiber, plaintiff would not have mesothelioma today, 
because it is quite plausible that if this fiber had not turned this 
cell malignant, some other fiber would have—or would have 
enabled another cell, already mutated multiple times, to evade 
the body’s defenses and take the last step to cancer.273 A 
probabilistic view of causation acknowledges this uncertainty. 
Moreover, the lack of omniscience alters the balance between 
historical fact and legal fiction. We can know as a fact that a 
particular defendant’s tortious exposure of the plaintiff to 
asbestos increased the risk that the plaintiff would develop 
cancer. We can make some type of estimate of that risk 
contribution as compared to other risk contributions. We cannot 
know, as a fact, which fiber is the one without which plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                     
Even the possibility that more than one fiber may be involved (which could, 
indistinguishably, come from more than one source) would weaken the scientific 
basis for the legal assumption that one and only one source of asbestos was the 
cause of a plaintiff’s mesothelioma. More fundamentally, even if the model of 
how a fiber causes a mesothelioma is accurate, the best scientific model of which 
source the fatal fiber came from is, at present, a stochastic one. 
 272. I say “defendant’s fiber” for ease of reference. The party responsible for 
the exposure in a given case might not be a defendant for any of a variety of 
reasons (insolvency, worker’s compensation bar, inapplicability of any theory of 
tort liability, inability to identify the source of an ambient exposure). 
 273. See Noel F.C.C. de Miranda et al., Role of the Microenvironment in the 
Tumourigenesis of Microsatellite Unstable and MUTYH-associated Polyposis 
Colorectal Cancers, 27 MUTAGENESIS 247, 247 (2012) (explaining that after 
accumulating genetic alterations, various clones of tumor cells compete against 
one another for growth and space). In theory, a similar argument could be made 
about any tort: how can we say that, if the pedestrian plaintiff’s leg had not been 
broken by impact with the negligently driven car, it would not have been broken 
by something else? The difference is that in the ordinary case no reason exists to 
suppose that at the time of plaintiff’s injury some other cause created a material 
risk of the same injury. 
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disease would not have developed. To preclude recovery as a 
result would embrace a legal fiction that the defendant did no 
harm. 
To think of causation in risk-creation terms requires a shift 
in the legal mindset, despite the centrality of risk creation to 
many parts of tort theory. Lawyers customarily think of risk as “a 
forward-looking concept” while “[c]ausation usually looks 
backwards.”274 But even in traditional counterfactual causal 
inference, the causal generalizations that support the inference 
derive from experience that associates the event we call a cause 
with the occurrence that is the result of interest. We do not 
speculate that the pedestrian plaintiff’s broken leg might have 
resulted from something other than impact with the negligently 
driven car because common experience tells us that such impacts 
break legs that otherwise normally remain intact. In other words, 
impact with vehicles is an extremely powerful risk factor for 
broken legs.275 The difference in toxic torts is that scientific 
indeterminacy makes the reasoning from ex ante risk creation to 
ex post injury causation both more explicit and more necessary. 
Despite the doubts some courts have expressed about causal proof 
based on population-based estimates of relative risk,276 such 
measures are relevant to individual cases—even though they do 
not directly measure the probability of causation in an individual 
case.277 Because such measures will continue to be the type of 
                                                                                                     
 274. Sienkiewicz, [2011] UKSC 10, [170] (Lady Hale). 
 275. The inference is strengthened because of the typical absence of 
competing strong risk factors that might have caused the broken leg. Yet I 
strongly suspect that even a plaintiff with a diseased leg that might 
spontaneously fracture at any time would be able to obtain a factual finding of 
causation, and certainly would be able to reach a jury. 
 276. This skepticism has manifested in various ways. In Sienkiewicz, some 
members of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom questioned whether 
population-based relative risk data were at all useful to causal judgments about 
an individual case. Id. The Texas Supreme Court, by contrast, acknowledged 
that epidemiologic data could be relevant, but its skepticism led it to impose the 
doubling+ rule and other unrealistic requirements. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 719 (Tex. 1997) (justifying doubling+ rule and 
other requirements as “strik[ing] a balance” allowing acceptance of 
epidemiologic proof). 
 277. See Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and 
the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS 321, 322 (2000) (noting that 
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evidence that science can provide, it is time for a corresponding 
probabilistic contributing-factor model of causation. 
D. The Question of Substantiality 
Probabilistic causal contribution begins with the idea that 
when causal evidence is population-based, the law should treat 
risk factors as contributing causal factors despite the inability to 
infer but-for causation. In the United States, however, the 
prevailing verbal formulation of causation in tort has been the 
“substantial factor” test of the Second Restatement.278 In light of 
the Third Restatement’s decisive rejection of “substantial factor” 
as vague and analytically inchoate, it may seem contrarian to 
propose a “contributing factor” concept of causation. Probabilistic 
causal contribution can avoid the biggest problems of “substantial 
factor” simply by jettisoning the requirement of substantiality. 
That Allen v. United States relied on the then-current Second 
Restatement’s “substantial factor” formulation is hardly 
surprising, but this reliance exemplified some of the confusion 
that led to the next Restatement’s rejection of “substantial 
factor.”279 Allen held that to be deemed a “substantial factor” in 
causing a plaintiff’s illness, the defendant must have 
“significantly” increased that plaintiff’s risk.280 The court’s 
interpretation of “significance,” therefore, had a dispositive effect. 
In that regard, Allen considered but rejected adopting the 
doubling+ rule.281 Yet, apparently because of a heuristic view of 
“significant” risk contribution, the outcome of each plaintiff’s case 
                                                                                                     
“equating the probability of causation to the attributable fraction [derived from 
relative risk] leads to systematic underestimation” of probability of causation); 
see also Steve C. Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, 
Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379–82 
(1986) (distinguishing population-based from individually applicable probability 
concepts). 
 278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965). 
 279. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 26 cmt. j (“The substantial-factor test has not, however, withstood the 
test of time, as it has proved confusing and been misused.”). 
 280. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 428 (D. Utah 1984). 
 281. Id. at 416–18. 
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closely mirrored what might have been expected with a doubling+ 
requirement.282 
Thus, Allen’s use of “substantial factor” served two purposes. 
First, the court treated “substantial factor” as an alternative test 
of factual causation that better fit the nature of the available 
evidence. Second, the court used “substantial factor” to narrow 
the alternative test it had created. The latter use, more policy 
judgment than factual determination, is problematic because it so 
closely tracks the doubling+ version of but-for causation, when 
doubling+ always was an inappropriate test of cause-in-fact and 
will become more so as risk characterization improves. 
Rutherford, too, used the word “substantial” to describe the 
risk contribution that would be required for an exposure to be 
considered a cause of a plaintiff’s illness.283 Rutherford cautioned, 
however, that the “substantial factor standard . . . requir[es] only 
that the contribution of the individual cause be more than 
negligible or theoretical.”284 Similarly, throughout the 
development of the mesothelioma case law in the United 
Kingdom, only exposures creating “material” increases in risk 
have been considered causative,285 but in that context “material” 
simply means “not de minimis.”286 
In an analogously difficult situation requiring proof of 
causation, a federal district court287 applied a “contributing 
factor” standard to a claim for damages arising under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA).288 The government plaintiffs alleged that 
                                                                                                     
 282. See id. at 429–40 (describing the specific details and outcome of each 
plaintiff’s case). 
 283. See Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1223 (Cal. 1997) 
(holding that “a substantial factor contributing to plaintiff’s . . . risk” would be 
deemed a “substantial factor in causing or bringing about the disease”). 
 284. Id. at 1219. 
 285. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 64, 
[2002] 3 All E.R. 305 (Lord Hoffmann). 
 286. See Sienkiewicz, [2011] UKSC 10, 107–12 (Lord Phillips) (holding 
“material” an asbestos exposure increasing mesothelioma risk by 18% above 
background). 
 287. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893 (D. 
Mass. 1989). 
 288. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
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defendants were liable for damages for “injury to, destruction of, 
or loss of natural resources” caused by defendants’ releases of 
PCBs to New Bedford Harbor.289 The defendants claimed, 
however, that some releases had been “federally permitted” and 
were therefore exempt from liability.290 Commingled in the 
harbor, the PCBs from allegedly exempt and non-exempt releases 
could not be distinguished in situ.291 The court considered the 
question: what would the government need to prove to establish 
that the non-exempt releases caused injury?292 
The court held that the non-exempt releases would result in 
liability if shown to be “a contributing factor to an injury to 
natural resources.”293 The court specifically considered and 
rejected requiring a showing of a “substantial contributing 
factor,” noting appellate precedent holding that defendants could 
be liable—even jointly and severally liable—for CERCLA 
response costs despite a lack of proof that their contribution to 
hazardous substance releases had been “substantial.”294 
An injury to natural resources provides a useful analogy: it is 
essentially a toxic tort committed on an ecosystem.295 In that 
                                                                                                     
 289. Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 900; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (2006) 
(creating a cause of action for such damages). 
 290. Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 897; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) (2006) 
(“Recovery . . . for response costs or damages resulting from a federally 
permitted release shall be pursuant to existing law in lieu of this section.”). 
 291. Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 897. 
 292. Id. at 897–98. 
 293. Id. at 897. 
 294. Id. at 897 n.8 (citing O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n.4 (1st Cir. 
1989)). In O’Neil, the trial judge held that defendants, who asserted they had 
arranged for disposal of only a relatively small portion of the hazardous 
substances at a dump, were jointly and severally liable for the full cleanup costs. 
O’Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 730–31 (D.R.I. 1988); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (creating a cause of action for recovery of government response 
costs). On appeal, defendants contended that Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 433B required the government to prove that each defendant was “a 
‘substantial’ cause of the harm.” O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 179 n.4. The court of 
appeals rejected that contention, observing that to require proof of substantial 
contribution would impose an “almost impossible task” on the government, in 
conflict with statutory objectives. Id. 
 295. The Acushnet court announced a legal standard for proof of causation 
but did not have to determine whether the evidence satisfied the standard. The 
particular harm allegedly inflicted on New Bedford Harbor—the concentration 
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context and in indeterminate-defendant toxic tort cases, courts 
have successfully eliminated the substantiality requirement for 
contributing factors. With only a sensible exclusion for de 
minimis contributions,296 “contributing factor” defined by 
increases in risk fits well with the causal world that 
toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are in the process of 
revealing. 
E. Discounted Recoveries 
The preceding discussion showed that a “contributing factor” 
standard of causation, based on risk contribution, can be used to 
implement a stochastic, probabilistic model of causation that 
better fits the realities of proof of specific causation in many toxic 
tort cases—even, perhaps especially, in light of the anticipated 
results of continued research at the genomic and molecular 
scales. This proposed standard will face an easily anticipated 
objection: that tortfeasors will overpay if held liable for full 
damages for all harms of which they created incremental risk, no 
                                                                                                     
of PCBs in water, fish and shellfish above the maximum allowed for 
consumption, Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 898 n.12, is similar to a disease that 
appears if a threshold dose of toxin is administered but that does not get worse 
with larger doses. Nevertheless, Acushnet’s discussion is not limited by a 
particular fact-bound causal model. For example, the court considered the 
possibility that the non-exempt releases alone might not have been a 
contributing factor to any harm, id. at 897 n.11, which would seem impossible if 
the harm inhered solely in exceeding a threshold quantity of PCBs. Cf. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. g. 
 296. Rejecting causal attribution for de minimis risk contributions would 
reduce some of the complexity that a probabilistic causal contribution model 
could introduce to toxic tort litigation. It would take some care, however, to 
apply this sensible limit sensibly. A common scenario in CERCLA cases involves 
many contributors of small fractions of a hazardous substance release that, as a 
whole, requires response action. An analogous situation in toxic torts—many 
exposures, each of which adds a small increment of risk—is plausible and may 
become increasingly apparent with improved ability to characterize both risk 
and exposures. Eliminating liability for each contributor as de minimis would 
allocate the loss entirely to the victim. Thus, de minimis ultimately must be a 
matter of relative contribution rather than an arbitrarily fixed absolute 
proportion of risk contribution. See also infra notes 319–20 and accompanying 
text. 
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matter how small their (non-de minimis) risk contribution. The 
objection impinges, in different ways, on both corrective justice 
and efficiency rationales for tort liability. And, in different ways, 
the objection may be overcome by a carefully designed system of 
discounted recoveries in proportion to the degree of risk created 
by the tortious exposure, a suggestion that has recurred in the 
literature in various forms since the early 1980s.297 
The corrective justice or fairness argument is that 
contributing factor causation would unjustly hold some 
defendants liable for illnesses they did not cause. That criticism 
tautologically depends on the deterministic model of causation 
and the assumption that specific causation is knowable. If specific 
causation is not deterministically knowable, but population-based 
data are available, the deterministic all-or-nothing model would 
allow two outcomes that are different from contributing factor 
causation. The first possible outcome would be to deny recovery 
in every case because measures of relative risk are insufficient to 
establish specific causation. That would offend corrective justice 
and fairness just as much as contributing factor causation, but in 
the opposite direction. The second possible outcome would be to 
take specific causation as true only if the relative risk exceeded 
some threshold (e.g., doubling+). That, however, is internally 
inconsistent with the deterministic model’s insistence that each 
affirmative finding of causation represents a belief about what 
would probably have happened to the particular plaintiff had the 
plaintiff not been exposed. The doubling+ rule simply glosses over 
the fact that each group of exposed and sick plaintiffs—whether 
they prevail or not—necessarily includes some whose litigation 
outcomes would have been different but for the irreducible 
scientific indeterminacy. 
The efficiency argument takes a population perspective from 
the outset, contending that contributing factor causation would 
make tortfeasors overpay—and thus be over-deterred—by holding 
defendants liable for an aggregate amount in excess of the total 
amount of harm the defendants could have prevented. 
Discounting recoveries to reflect risk contribution is, at least 
                                                                                                     
 297. For a thorough survey of prior proportional liability proposals, see 
Green, supra note 185, at 357–70. 
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theoretically, a complete response to that objection. The claim 
that such discounting would produce optimum deterrence has 
figured prominently in arguments for proportional liability 
schemes.298 
From the perspective of a probabilistic model of causation, 
discounted recoveries would be a form of causal apportionment 
that would cohere conceptually with the available evidence on 
specific causation in many toxic torts. Consider a relatively 
simple yet paradigmatic hypothetical case. The plaintiff worked 
for many years at a job that entailed daily inhaling vapors of 
some solvent. After the appropriate latency period, the plaintiff’s 
doctors diagnosed a particular cancer. Undisputed, peer-reviewed 
scientific research shows that: (1) cells of this cancer almost 
always have mutations in a particular set of genes; (2) DNA 
treated with the solvent in vitro is statistically significantly more 
likely than untreated DNA to contain mutations in at least some 
of those genes; (3) the frequency of this cancer among exposed 
individuals with a specific susceptible genotype is slightly, but 
statistically significantly, greater than among unexposed 
individuals of similar genotype; and (4) no other specific risk 
factors for this cancer have yet been identified, so the vast 
majority of cases are considered unexplained or idiopathic. This 
hypothetical evidence of both biological mechanism and 
statistical association should suffice to support a reasonable 
factual finding of general causation. 
Assume that genetic testing showed that the plaintiff’s tumor 
has mutations in the usual genes and the plaintiff has the 
susceptible genotype. Under the contributing factor standard of 
probabilistic causal contribution, the evidence of specific 
causation would be sufficient for submission to a fact-finder. The 
fact-finder would be asked to determine by a preponderance of 
the evidence whether the exposure caused the cancer; cause 
would be defined as a non-trivial increase in plaintiff’s risk of 
developing cancer. Upon an affirmative answer, the fact-finder 
                                                                                                     
 298. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure 
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 868 
(1984); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of 
Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 589 (1985). 
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would estimate, as a percentage, the extent to which the solvent 
exposure contributed to the plaintiff’s risk of the cancer. The fact-
finder would also determine the plaintiff’s total damages under 
the jurisdiction’s damages rules. The court would enter judgment 
for the determined percentage of the total damages. 
The preceding hypothetical deliberately did not specify a 
value for the relative risk estimated by molecular epidemiologic 
investigation, in order to avoid the suggestion of automatic 
equivalence between observed relative risk and causal 
apportionment in a particular case (i.e., relative risk of 2 equates 
to 50% risk contribution, relative risk of 1.5 equates to 33.33% 
risk contribution, etc.). A fact-finder might rationally apply such 
reasoning, but also might, for various reasons, reach a different 
result. The biological assumptions implicit in such reasoning 
might be disputed.299 The significance and weight to be assigned 
multiple studies that reported different relative risk values might 
be disputed. The fact-finder might understand the reported 
relative risk(s) not as point values but as estimates of a 
parametric value as indicated by a statistical confidence interval, 
and might find a central tendency in overlapping confidence 
intervals of multiple studies. Or facts particular to the case at 
hand—characteristics of the plaintiff, the exposure, or both, as 
compared to the study subjects—might prompt the fact-finder to 
make a causal apportionment greater or less than implied by the 
study’s relative risk. Adjustments for these reasons are 
appropriate and are, or should be, part of the fact-finding process 
under the but-for mechanistic model of causation as well. 
The hypothetical can be made more complicated by assuming 
that two or more parties contributed to the solvent exposure. The 
analysis would depend on the nature of the multiple 
contributions and on what is known about the effect on risk of 
increasing amounts of exposure. A solvent manufacturer that 
failed to warn that its product should not be inhaled and a 
company that used the product without taking reasonable 
precautions to prevent inhalation, for example, would both be 
                                                                                                     
 299. See Greenland & Robins, supra note 277, at 325 (discussing, as an 
example, the independence-of-background assumption and explaining that 
many plausible disease mechanisms do not satisfy this assumption). 
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but-for causes of the same exposure under traditional causation 
analysis; therefore each should be treated as fully causally 
responsible for the share of damages attributed to the solvent 
exposure.300 By contrast, if the plaintiff was exposed to the same 
solvent in products made by two different manufacturers, the 
question of causal attribution between the manufacturers would 
resemble the mesothelioma indeterminate-defendant cases, with 
the important difference that the causal link between plaintiff’s 
cancer and the overall solvent exposure would be treated 
probabilistically.301 Assuming that the amount of risk created by 
the solvent exposure was somehow proportional to the amount of 
exposure,302 the logic of probabilistic causal contribution implies 
division of the solvent’s causal contribution in proportion to each 
source’s contribution of solvent exposure. In some cases this rule 
would invite fine parsing of whether multiple exposures truly 
involved the same agent; that assessment would best be tailored 
to the available evidence in particular circumstances. 
The next complication adds other proven, non-de minimis 
contributing risk factors. As noted above, conceptually it does not 
matter whether the plaintiff’s exposure to additional risk factors 
required human agency or not, whether it was tortious, or 
whether it was created by a defendant or the plaintiff or a third 
party. If multiple risk factors apply to a plaintiff, a court’s first 
                                                                                                     
 300. This illustration assumes that all other requisites of liability are 
satisfied for both these parties. Applicable comparative fault and scope-of-
liability rules would determine whether judgment would be entered against 
each tortfeasor for the full amount of this apportioned share. 
 301. In the mesothelioma cases, by contrast, it was not in dispute that 
asbestos, rather than something else, caused the disease. 
 302. This critical biological assumption might be well established in some 
cases (e.g., asbestos-mesothelioma) and in other cases might reasonably be 
treated as an acceptable approximation. It should be subject to factual dispute, 
however. For example, the available data might show any of the following: 
increased risk only after exposure exceeded a threshold amount; increased risk 
relatively insensitive to dose (perhaps after dose exceeded a threshold); 
increased risk in some way proportional to dose up to a limit beyond which 
increasing dose adds no increment of risk. Perhaps the most likely scenario, 
even in molecular epidemiology studies, would be insufficient data to assess the 
assumption, i.e. studies that simply compared relative risk among “exposed” and 
“unexposed” groups. In that scenario the reasonableness of the proportionality 
assumption could be a subject for expert debate. 
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instinct might be to ask the fact-finder to assign percentages to 
all of them, but strictly speaking it would not be necessary to 
quantify the proportion assigned to any individual non-defendant 
risk factor. The crucial assessment would be what causal share to 
attribute to each of the exposures for which any defendant was 
liable. The non-defendant risk factors could be treated, 
collectively, as part of that plaintiff’s “background” risk, although 
of course they could elevate that plaintiff’s background risk value 
above the background risk faced by somebody not affected by any 
known risk factors. 
Proof that the plaintiff had been exposed to multiple risk 
factors would present significant factual complications, however. 
If each risk factor independently added incremental risk, a fact-
finder could relatively easily assign causal contributions by 
comparing the risk increments to one another. But risk 
contributions from diverse factors might not be independent of 
one another, and if they were not, they could interact in a variety 
of ways.303 The best-known example is the synergistic effect of 
tobacco smoking and occupational asbestos exposure on the risk 
of lung cancer.304 Exposure to both carcinogens increases lung 
cancer risk far more than the sum of the risk contributions of 
each acting alone.305 Although some courts have tried to divide 
the additional risk resulting from the synergy between the two 
contributing factors, there is no entirely satisfying way to do so.306 
An alternative would be to assign the additional risk resulting 
from a synergistic interaction to each of the interacting risk 
factors. The latter approach would mean that, as compared to a 
                                                                                                     
 303. Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution 
to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 233–34 (1992). 
 304. Huang et al., supra note 147, at 203. 
 305. Sanders, supra note 1, at 35. 
 306. See, e.g., Dafler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 611 A.2d 136, 145–56 (N.J. 
Super. 1992), aff’d, 622 A.2d 1305 (N.J. 1993) (affirming a jury verdict that 
appeared to apportion the synergistic risk in proportion to the amount of risk 
added by exposure to each carcinogen separately and independently); see also V. 
McCormack et al., Estimating the Asbestos-Related Lung Cancer Burden from 
Mesothelioma Mortality, 106 BRIT. J. CANCER 575, 575 (2012) (“Quantifying the 
asbestos-related lung cancer burden is difficult in the presence of this disease’s 
multiple causes.”). But see Green, supra note 94, at 545 (“[V]arious plausible, yet 
complicated, methods for determining risk contribution exist . . . .”). 
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case of independent and additive risk factors, in a case of synergy 
the proof of plaintiff’s exposure to an additional risk factor would 
have less effect on the causal share assigned to the risk factor 
contributed by defendant(s).307 
The quality of evidence concerning potential interaction of 
multiple risk factors will likely vary from case to case. In some 
cases the effect of combined exposure will itself have been the 
subject of scientific study designed to assess the independence or 
interaction of risk contributions. Even then, factual issues such 
as the extent of exposure to the various risk factors might affect 
the causal attribution. In other cases each risk factor might have 
been studied independently, with the attendant possibility of 
confounding by the other risk factor(s), leaving the experts to 
battle over whether an assumption of independence or of synergy 
best fit the available data. Toxicogenomic and molecular evidence 
about the mechanism of toxicity for the various risk factors could 
inform that debate. 
In a probabilistic causal contribution model, a plaintiff 
seeking to prove a risk contribution need not exclude other risk 
factors, unlike a plaintiff using differential diagnosis in a 
deterministic causation model. Thus, defendants should be 
assigned the initial burden of production of evidence that plaintiff 
was exposed to additional risk factors and of general causation 
with respect to those risk factors. There would be no justification, 
however, for shifting the ultimate burden of persuasion: plaintiff 
must persuade the fact-finder by a preponderance of the evidence 
                                                                                                     
 307. Susan Poulter used the asbestos-tobacco-lung cancer example to show 
how under this approach, if the relative risk jointly created by two exposures is 
the product rather than the sum of the relative risks of each acting individually, 
the fraction of cases attributed to each exposure in the population exposed to 
both is exactly the same as the fraction attributed to each in the population 
exposed only to it. See Poulter, supra note 303, at 233–34, n.215. (This handy 
result obtains only if the synergistic risk exactly equals the product of the 
individual risks, but applying this approach to any synergistic interaction will 
result in attributable shares closer to the individual shares than would be the 
case if the risks were additive.) Because this approach assigns overlapping parts 
of the synergistic risk to both exposures, the sum of the assigned risk fractions 
would exceed one. See also Susan R. Poulter, Genetic Testing in Toxic Injury 
Litigation: The Path to Scientific Certainty or Blind Alley?, 41 JURIMETRICS 211, 
223–31 (2001) (describing possible interactions among genetic and 
environmental causes of disease). 
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that defendant increased plaintiff’s risk of disease with evidence 
that will permit the fact-finder to make some estimate of a 
percentage causal contribution (even if, as will usually be true, 
the scientific evidence does not produce a single point value for 
that contribution). 
Undeniably, in these cases the proof, and the fact-finders’ 
task, will be complicated. One can imagine cases as complex as 
one cares to: exposures to many different risk factors, from 
tortious, non-tortious human, plaintiff, and natural sources, with 
each tortious exposure including contributions of multiple 
tortfeasors. A premise of this Article is that toxicogenomics and 
molecular epidemiology will make these cases more, rather than 
less, complex. Nonetheless, it is possible to exaggerate the 
concern about complexity. The adversary system, the human 
decision-making process, the reduced importance of additional 
risk factors in cases of synergy, and the de minimis limitation on 
risk factors that “count,” all will tend to focus litigation on the 
most salient tortious conduct and alternative causes. In any 
event, complexity of the facts is not a good excuse for 
oversimplification of the law. 
Here, too, an analogy from CERCLA is instructive, 
demonstrating that causal apportionment is feasible even if 
factually difficult. A defendant liable for the government’s 
response costs incurred under CERCLA is jointly and severally 
liable, unless the defendant shows, on a purely causal and not 
equitable basis, that the environmental harm to which it 
contributed is reasonably capable of apportionment.308 The 
statute makes liable several qualitatively different classes of 
actors.309 Information about their relative contributions is often 
                                                                                                     
 308. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–
14 (2009) (following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)). The 
decision expresses what is required to justify apportionment in at least three 
ways: whether the harm is “capable of apportionment,” whether “a reasonable 
basis for apportionment exists,” and whether the harm is “a single, indivisible 
harm.” Id. at 1881. The Court emphasized that the analysis is purely causal, 
invoking none of the equitable factors courts use to allocate responsibility 
among jointly and severally liable parties. See id. at 1882 n.9; United States v. 
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 718–19 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twp. of 
Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 318–19 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 309. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4) (2012) (listing “covered persons” as 
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scant. Apportionment may require substantial amounts of 
assumption and inference. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
upheld a trial court’s use of data that were extremely limited—in 
type, in clarity of causal significance, and in precision—to 
apportion liability.310 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals required causal 
apportionment in another different yet analogous context. The 
plaintiffs in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Bickerstaff311 sued their 
employer railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA).312 They alleged that they suffered osteoarthritis of the 
                                                                                                     
including the owner and operator of a vessel or facility, any person who owned 
or operated a facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance, any 
person who arranged for disposal, treatment, or transport for disposal or 
treatment of hazardous substances at a facility owned by another person, and 
any person who accepted substances for transport to a disposal or treatment 
facility selected by that person). 
 310. See Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 619 (concluding that “the District 
Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads’ share of the site remediation costs 
at 9%”). The trial court apportioned liability among three parties that owned or 
operated a facility when hazardous substances were disposed of there: an 
agricultural chemical distributor that spilled toxic chemicals during its 
operations and two railroads that jointly owned a piece of property that the 
distributor leased. Id. at 1874–76. By the time the United States sued to recover 
more than eight million dollars in response costs, the distributor was defunct. 
Id. at 1876. The railroads’ parcel was only a portion of the land the distributor 
used, was used for only a portion of the time during which the distributor 
operated, and was used to handle only two of the three chemicals that were the 
subject of the cleanup. Id. The district court concluded that the product of these 
three fractions represented a reasonable apportionment of the harm, and then 
increased the computed share by a 50% fudge factor to account for uncertainty. 
Id. at 1882. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the district court had 
received little evidence on the apportionment issue, that one could question the 
assumption that the harm was proportional to geographic area and years of 
operation, and that little record evidence supported the conclusion that the two 
chemicals handled on the railroads’ parcel were responsible for two-thirds of the 
harm. Id. at 1882–83. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the apportionment as 
reasonable with only one justice dissenting. Id.; see also United States v. Bell 
Petrol. Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing judgment of joint and 
several liability because, although it was “not possible to determine with 
absolute certainty the exact amount of chromium each defendant introduced,” 
the evidence sufficed for “reasonable and rational approximation of each 
defendant’s individual contribution to the contamination”). 
 311. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bickerstaff, 978 A.2d 760 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2009), cert. denied, 984 A.2d 244 (2009). 
 312. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012). 
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knee because CSX negligently used mainline ballast—relatively 
large rocks—as a walking surface in the rail yards where they 
worked.313 The trial court instructed the jury on comparative 
negligence, and the jury returned verdicts assigning some fault to 
the plaintiffs but larger shares to the defendant.314 The defendant 
contended that in addition to the parties’ negligence, “other 
significant causes such as obesity, smoking, other pre-existing 
medical conditions, and age,”315 as well as genetics,316 had 
contributed to causing the plaintiffs’ injuries. The appellate court 
agreed that the trial court should have treated such alleged 
causes separately from the plaintiffs’ own negligence.317 
On appeal, the defendant did not argue that any of these 
other factors was a but-for cause of plaintiffs’ injuries and the 
ballast was not.318 Rather, CSX relied on evidence that 
osteoarthritis is “multifactorial, meaning that there are many 
factors involved in contributing to it.”319 A defense expert had 
defined a “risk factor” as “something that would cause or lend 
someone to have a certain problem or condition.”320 The appellate 
court treated these risk factors as concurrent causes and held 
that the trial court should have instructed the jury to apportion 
any fraction of damages the jury found “attributable” to these 
“other causes and factors.”321 
So, in addition to the House of Lords’s application of causal 
apportionment to asbestos indeterminate-defendant cases in 
Barker,322 American courts have held that causal apportionment 
                                                                                                     
 313. Bickerstaff, 978 A.2d at 770. 
 314. Id. at 770–71, 793. 
 315. Id. at 793. 
 316. A defense expert testified that a “small percentage of osteoarthritis” is 
hereditary, and argued (without presenting genomic evidence) that one 
plaintiff’s inherited bowleggedness was a significant cause of that plaintiff’s 
injury. Id. at 797, 799. 
 317. Id. at 799. 
 318. The trial judge seemed to think this the only proper use of evidence of 
such non-negligent causes. See id. at 794–95 (summarizing the transcript of the 
trial judge’s ruling). 
 319. Id. at 798 (quoting plaintiffs’ expert witness). 
 320. Id. at 797 (quoting defendant’s expert witness). 
 321. Id. at 799 n.22. 
 322. Some American courts have used comparative fault to achieve results 
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can work in a CERCLA case in which multiple defendants were 
liable in different ways and in a FELA case in which plaintiffs 
bore non-negligent risk factors for their injuries.323 These 
examples show that causal apportionment is a practicable 
approach that has received judicial imprimatur, even when facts 
are complex and data limited.324 Causal apportionment, via a 
probabilistic causal contribution model as described here, can 
work in toxic tort cases more generally. Although imperfect, it is 
the best available solution to the problem of liability 
disproportionate to the contribution to risk.  
To apply probabilistic causal contribution correctly, however, 
courts will need to take care to avoid duplicate reductions of 
plaintiff’s damages through comparative responsibility regimes. 
                                                                                                     
similar to Barker’s. See, e.g., Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 
815, 822–23 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying Kentucky comparative fault statute); 
Green, supra note 185, at 353 (distinguishing apportionment based on relative 
culpability from determining and apportioning liability based on probabilistic 
assessments). 
 323. Each of these holdings may be criticized for undermining a joint and 
several liability scheme that fosters core objectives of the statute involved. See 
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 165–66 (2003) (holding that under 
FELA, “an employee who suffers an ‘injury’ caused ‘in whole or in part’ by a 
railroad’s negligence may recover his or her full damages from the railroad”); 
United States v. NCR Corp., No. 12-2069, 2012 WL 3140191, at *8 (7th Cir. Aug. 
3, 2012) (agreeing with defendants that under Burlington Northern, 
“apportionment calculations need not be precise. To the contrary, the [Supreme] 
Court upheld a district court’s rather rough, sua sponte calculation of 
apportionment. . . . But we do not agree that . . . lower courts must always take 
such an approach”). This Article takes no position on whether Burlington 
Northern and Bickerstaff correctly applied CERCLA and FELA, respectively. 
 324. See, e.g., Loui v. Oakley, 438 P.2d 393, 396–97 (Haw. 1968) (requiring 
instruction that if the jury “is unable to determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence how much of the plaintiff’s damages can be attributed to the 
defendant’s negligence” in causing one of two entirely separate auto accidents 
that injured plaintiff, the jury “may make a rough apportionment”); Campione v. 
Soden, 695 A.2d 1364, 1375 (N.J. 1997) (holding that a comparative negligence 
statute required apportionment of damages for injuries caused in part by each of 
two auto accidents occurring in rapid succession, although the “absence of 
conclusive evidence concerning allocation . . . will necessarily result in a less 
precise allocation”). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 cmt. h (discussing the difficulty of apportioning 
harm on causal grounds). The Restatement endorsed placing the burden of proof 
on a party seeking to avoid responsibility for an entire injury, but relaxing such 
a party’s burden of production of evidence. Id. 
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Consider three hypothetical workers with lung cancer, each of 
whom was exposed to an asbestos product made by a 
manufacturer that negligently failed to warn of the product’s 
dangers. Each worker contributed to his or her elevated risk of 
lung cancer in a different way. Worker #1 negligently failed to 
use a protective respirator provided by the worker’s employer. 
Worker #2 negligently inhaled fibers from a similar product 
(made by an unidentifiable manufacturer) during a home 
renovation project. Worker #3 negligently smoked cigarettes. 
Worker #1 would be causally responsible for the same increment 
of lung cancer risk as the manufacturer; the only apportionment 
between them would be based on comparative fault. Worker #2 
would be causally responsible for an apportioned share of the 
fraction of lung cancer risk causally attributed to asbestos 
exposure; after the causal apportionment, further reduction in 
the plaintiff’s damages based on a share of fault would be 
inappropriate, as the plaintiff bore no fault for the portion of risk 
attributed to the manufacturer. Worker #3, for the same reason, 
would recover damages subject to causal apportionment (with 
appropriate treatment of the asbestos/tobacco synergy), but not 
further reduced by comparative fault. 
Critics of apportionment (whether causal or fault-based) 
argue that joint and several liability appropriately places the risk 
that some tortfeasors will be insolvent on other tortfeasors rather 
than on injured plaintiffs.325 There is much to this argument, 
particularly as applied to situations like asbestos, where the total 
harm caused was so great that many liable parties entered 
bankruptcy.326 In the controversy over specific causation in toxic 
torts, however, the real choice frequently will not be between 
joint and several liability for full damages or only several liability 
for apportioned damages—it will be between liability based on 
probabilistic causal contribution and no liability at all based on 
deterministic models of but-for causation. Moreover, as the 
                                                                                                     
 325. E.g., Mark M. Hager, What’s (Not!) in a Restatement? ALI Issue-
Dodging on Liability Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 77, 95–96 (2000); Richard 
W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A 
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk 
Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1185–86 (1988). 
 326. Sanders, supra note 1, at 13. 
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variety of state comparative fault regimes demonstrates, 
acceptance of apportionment need not dictate the allocation of the 
risk of insolvency.327 Courts or legislatures could, despite the 
tension with the theoretical rationale for probabilistic causal 
contribution, make the policy choice that a tortious risk 
contributor should bear all or part of the portion of risk 
contributed by another tortfeasor that is insolvent. That choice 
would make a party liable for a risk the person did not cause, but 
not necessarily for a harm the person did not cause (which cannot 
be determined). 
F. Boundaries 
Commentators on the components of probabilistic causal 
contribution—treating risk contribution as causation and 
discounting recoveries in proportion to relative contribution of 
risk—often question whether, once accepted in one class of cases, 
these doctrines can sensibly be restricted to that class.328 
Limiting doctrinal reform to asbestos mesothelioma cases, for 
example, has been criticized as arbitrary.329 
I propose probabilistic causal contribution as a response to a 
particular problem of causal indeterminacy that will be 
exacerbated rather than solved by scientific advances. Although 
it is tempting to say that if the concept is appropriate in some 
cases it could be applied in every case, the boundaries of the 
solution need not extend beyond the boundaries of the problem.330 
                                                                                                     
 327. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 10 cmt. 
a (describing five variously adopted “tracks”). 
 328. See Jonathan Morgan, Causation, Politics and Law: The English—and 
Scottish—Asbestos Saga, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 57, 
64–65 (despairing that judicially-imposed limits can withstand “common law’s 
ineluctable method of reasoning by analogy”); see also Sanders, supra note 1, at 
39 (expressing concern that the scope of risk rule could be difficult to limit).  
 329. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 36 (expressing concern that the scope of 
the risk rule could be difficult to limit). 
 330. See generally BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 346 S.W.3d 533, 545 (Tex. 2011) 
(distinguishing toxic tort cases and refusing to allow plaintiff to apply doubling+ 
rule and statistical evidence of increased risk to support claim that defect in 
cigarette lighter caused injury). 
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And the boundaries of the problem can be defined, if not 
precisely, then reasonably well.331 
Once again a metaphor from the physical sciences is helpful. 
At a quantum scale, the behavior of elementary particles is 
inherently random and unpredictable.332 But the behavior of 
millions of particles in a beam is not.333 Quantum mechanics did 
not render Newtonian physics useless for describing the motion of 
billiard balls. But a probabilistic view is required to describe the 
motion of the electrons of the atoms of which those balls are 
made.334 
Causation is always an inference, and all evidence of 
causation can be conceived as probabilistic.335 But in most cases a 
fact-finder can comfortably fit that evidence to an inferential 
process grounded in the deterministic model, deciding whether 
the proof leads it to a level of belief in but-for causation that 
satisfies the standard of persuasion.336 The mechanistic model 
fails when proof of causation rests on evidence derived from 
                                                                                                     
 331. Probabilistic causal contribution would hardly be the first doctrinal 
adjustment to recognized difficulties of proof. Professor Green gave as examples 
res ipsa loquitur, market share liability, the rationale for strict products 
liability, see Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 461–63 
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (citing plaintiff’s inability to refute evidence 
of due care as grounds for strict liability), and the sufficiency standard for the 
magnitude of damages caused by a defendant’s wrongdoing. Michael D. Green, 
Pessimism About Milward, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (on 
file with author). 
 332. RUVINSKY, supra note 178, at 4–6. 
 333. Id. at 6. 
 334. See id. at 4 (explaining that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle means 
that position and speed of elementary particles “is always characterized by a 
probability distribution”). 
 335. See Rosenberg, supra note 298, at 870 (suggesting that particularistic 
evidence is no different than statistical evidence in that it “offers nothing more 
than a basis for conclusions about a perceived balance of probabilities”); see also 
Gold, supra note 277, at 384 n.42 (agreeing with Rosenberg that “all 
evidence . . . involves inference from observed probability patterns,” but 
acknowledging the “power of particularistic proof to generate belief probabilities 
regardless of known fact probabilities”). 
 336. In a civil case “preponderance of the evidence” is routinely described as 
proof leading the fact-finder to believe that the fact is more likely than not, but 
Professor Wright has argued that to find a fact proven, legal fact-finders 
actually require a degree of belief much higher than belief that the fact and its 
negative are equally likely. Wright, supra note 19, at 201–02.  
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population-based data on the association of disease and exposure, 
or of disease and genotype and exposure, or of exposure and 
disease-related biomarkers. In such cases the fact-finder must 
test its belief in a frequentist-probability value supported by 
evidence of risk contribution. Probabilistic causal contribution is 
therefore the appropriate model to apply. Advances in 
toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will make such 
evidence available more often than it has been in the past. 
Sometimes, of course, such evidence will not be available 
although other evidence exists that might support an inference of 
general causation. To require relative risk data as proof of 
specific causation in every case is to ask too much. Compelling 
cases may exist in which such data are unavailable for perfectly 
good reasons. Zuchowicz v. United States,337 in which 
epidemiologic study was implausible because both the disease 
and the exposure were exceptionally rare, is an example.338 Or a 
plaintiff may have adequate mechanistic evidence of general 
causation, as in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, 
Inc.339 Most likely the best that can be done in such cases is to 
muddle through under the all-or-nothing, but-for causation rule, 
as courts have been doing.340 It is ironic that a plaintiff who 
succeeds without relative risk data would receive a full recovery 
while a plaintiff with “better” evidence would recover only a 
discounted award, but then again, the absence of relative risk 
data would in most cases make success substantially more 
difficult for the plaintiff. 
                                                                                                     
 337. Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 338. Id. at 384–85, 391 (affirming a verdict that negligent prescription of 
endometriosis drug at a dose that “very, very few women” had ever received had 
caused plaintiff’s “very rare” disease). 
 339. See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1002 (2012) (reversing summary judgment for 
defendant because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff’s 
expert testimony on general causation). Because general causation was 
addressed before other issues in the case, id. at 13, the decision does not address 
how plaintiffs intended to prove specific causation. 
 340. See generally Sanders, supra note 20, at 1375–80 (discussing 
admissibility standards for specific causation testimony in toxic tort cases in 
which the plaintiff presents adequate evidence of general causation). 
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V. Probabilistic Causal Contribution and Tort Goals 
Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will strengthen 
the argument for reenvisioning specific causation in toxic tort 
cases, but the indeterminacy at the core of that argument was 
understood even in the pre-genomic era. Nevertheless, American 
courts, as in June and Wilcox, have generally continued to insist 
on rules that assign all-or-nothing liability depending on whether 
there is more-likely-than-not proof of but-for causation.341 
Michael Green has noted that this insistence seems to buck two 
tides: a general trend away from an all-or-nothing rule in tort law 
and a “striking consensus” among academic writers (from which 
Professor Green dissented) in support of proportional liability.342 
Although courts have not typically explained their resistance by 
reference to the goals of tort law recognized by scholars, it is 
worth assessing probabilistic causal contribution against those 
goals. 
A. Deterrence Goals: Is Probabilistic Precision Probable? 
Legal economists have argued that using probabilities to 
discount recoveries, across a population of exposed and sick 
claimants, would produce an economically efficient deterrence 
signal in which the aggregate amount of awarded damages 
matched the value of the harm actually caused.343 Professor 
                                                                                                     
 341. The view in other countries is less monolithic. See Ken Oliphant, 
Uncertain Factual Causation in the Third Restatement: Some Comparative 
Notes, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1599, 1624–30 (2011) (comparing the tort 
principles of several European nations). 
 342. Green, supra note 185, at 352 (noting that modern tort law is “more 
receptive” to apportioning liability); id. at 357 (scholarly consensus); id. at 397 
(“[T]here is good reason for the courts’ unwillingness.”); see also Michael D. 
Green, Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a Crystal Ball, 37 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 995 (2011) (saying he has been “critical of the pro-
proportional liability literature”). 
 343. See, e.g., Green, supra note 185, at 354–55 (noting that proportional 
liability to acknowledge probabilistic uncertainty in fact-finding, “the argument 
goes, would, through more accurate outcomes, provide more fine-tuned 
deterrence incentives”); Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal 
Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
1399, 1427–28 (1980); Rosenberg, supra note 298, at 867. 
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Green questioned how well epidemiologic reality would match 
economic theory. He pointed out that when epidemiologists 
repeatedly investigate a suspected association between exposure 
and disease, the resulting relative risk values generally vary 
considerably. This real-world variability derives in part from 
random sampling error but also from the inherent difficulty of 
epidemiologic study design. With the possible exception of very 
large and expensive studies, any two epidemiologic investigations 
are likely to be conducted in ways that create different biases and 
confounding factors that can affect the results. Because the 
notion of a single, knowable quantitative measure of risk 
contribution is illusory, Professor Green noted, so too is the 
notion of an accurately modulated optimum deterrence signal 
based on risk contribution.344 
The improbability of probabilistic precision is indisputable. 
Significant variation in measured relative risk characterizes even 
some of the strongest and most accepted substance-disease links 
uncovered by classical epidemiology.345 Even if repeated studies 
could be designed to be perfectly comparable in avoiding bias and 
confounding, sampling error would frustrate any hope of 
replicating relative risk values. For claims involving rare 
diseases, uncommon exposures, or small toxic effects, an 
epidemiologic study’s a priori statistical power will be relatively 
low, and the statistically computed sampling error relatively 
high.346 
                                                                                                     
 344. Green, supra note 185, at 371–84, 395–96. 
 345. See, e.g., W.C. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CANCERS OF 
THE URINARY SYSTEM 118–19, 156 tbl.48 (1969) (describing studies reporting 
relative risk of bladder cancer ranging from 8.7 to 17 in aniline dye industry 
workers). Estimates of the fraction of mesothelioma cases that occur absent 
known exposure to asbestos range from less than ten percent to upward of thirty 
percent. Compare Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. 
LITIG. 501, 527 (2009) (asserting that “there is wide agreement that a significant 
number (by some estimates, twenty to thirty percent) of mesotheliomas are not 
asbestos-induced”), with Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1993) (noting that “well over ninety-percent” of mesothelioma deaths 
are attributable to asbestos exposure). See also Becker v. Baron Bros., Coliseum 
Auto Parts, Inc., 649 A.2d 613, 618 (N.J. 1994) (reporting that plaintiff’s witness 
testified that fifteen percent of cases “have no known cause,” and defendant’s 
witness testified that twenty to forty percent of cases have “unknown causes”). 
 346. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in 
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Shifting epidemiologic analysis to the molecular level will 
improve this situation. In past epidemiologic studies, undetected 
genetic differences contributed to the variability of results 
(because the research subjects were not all equally susceptible to 
the toxic effect under study or not equally at risk for the disease 
even without exposure).347 Assessing relative risk by genotype 
will reduce that variability. Biomarkers of exposure will enable 
finer calibration of the very rough distinctions between “exposed” 
and “unexposed” samples to which epidemiologists have 
previously been limited. Biomarkers of effect or pre-clinical 
biomarkers of disease (even if not associated with toxic exposure) 
will similarly allow more precise delineations.348 
Nonetheless, toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will 
not produce quantitative precision for the legal system’s 
convenience. Their results will inherently be probabilistic, 
statistical, and variable. Molecular epidemiologists will be able to 
account for more causes of variation than classical 
epidemiologists could, but they will not be able to control for all 
sources of bias and confounding.349 The legal system must 
understand that neither classical nor molecular epidemiology is 
likely to satisfy a norm of mathematical precision. 
But where does that norm come from? Why should it be the 
norm? And why does it apply to causal findings but not to other 
elements of a tort claim? 
To a large extent, the precision norm arises directly from the 
economic efficiency rationale. Critics ask: If optimal deterrence is 
the sole rationale for abandoning all-or-nothing causation rules, 
                                                                                                     
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 253–54 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 
3d ed. 2011); see also Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, 
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 582–83 (2011) (describing 
application of statistical power concept in epidemiology). 
 347. See Marchant, supra note 53, at 7–8 (“[E]ach person is unique in his or 
her susceptibility to toxic agents, further complicating the inquiry into what 
caused illness in that individual.”). 
 348. See id. at 18–27 (discussing potential use of biomarkers to prove or 
disprove exposure, as well as general and specific causation); Grodsky, supra 
note 85, at 181–87 (defining biomarkers of exposure, susceptibility, and effect). 
 349. Paolo Boffetta, Biomarkers in Cancer Epidemiology: An Integrative 
Approach, 31 CARCINOGENESIS 121, 125 (2010) (asserting that molecular 
epidemiology studies “fit into the same framework” as classical epidemiology). 
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but optimization is impossible because of inadequate data, why 
forgo the perceived accountability advantages of traditional sine 
qua non causation?350 
The argument that probabilistic precision is illusory, 
however, applies also to factual determinations under the but-for 
test. This is especially true in jurisdictions that apply bright-line 
doubling+ relative risk standards for specific causation.351 Even 
absent bright line rules, the all-or-nothing but-for causation 
model forces a fractional statistical probability to either 1 or 0. As 
Professor Green acknowledged, no one can say that those errors 
balance each other out.352 Probabilistic causal contribution may 
not be able to discriminate finely between, say, a 40% risk 
contribution versus 35% or 45%. But even with limited accuracy, 
its results would more closely match the available risk evidence 
than the all-or-nothing test of but-for causation. It would avoid 
the under-deterrence problem that results when claims against 
tortious exposures to known risk factors fail because the but-for 
test cannot be satisfied, and it would provide some compensation 
and accountability in such cases.353 At the same time, it would 
                                                                                                     
 350. See Green, supra note 185, at 395–96 (doubting that proportional 
liability would enable “tort law to provide a liability signal precisely calibrated 
to the costs of accidents worth avoiding”); Klein, supra note 53, at 44 (asserting 
that although class-based, proportional liability schemes theoretically might 
provide optimal deterrence, Agent Orange experience suggests otherwise). 
 351. The arbitrary effects of the doubling+ rule have been felt in real cases. 
See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 267 (Tex. 2011) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s expert’s reliance on epidemiologic study with reported relative risk of 
1.92); Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 382 (Vt. 
2010) (affirming the exclusion of plaintiff’s expert testimony when epidemiologic 
results varied, some relative risks exceeded 2.0, and plaintiff’s expert testified to 
“summary risk estimate” of 1.51). 
 352. Green, supra note 185, at 396. The net effect of all-or-nothing causation 
in toxic tort cases is a subject of debate. Compare Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 
396 (“[T]here is reason to believe that the current system does not 
systematically underdeter.”), with Lin, supra note 110, at 1442 (stating that 
causation proof problems and litigation costs cause “systematic 
undercompensation of environmental tort victims and the systematic 
underdeterrence of polluters”). 
 353. Professor Green also argued that epidemiology cannot detect relatively 
small increases in risk as accurately as needed for proportional liability, and 
questioned the legal system’s ability to assess the causal significance of a weak 
association between exposure and disease. Green, supra note 185, at 375–87, 
392–95. Molecular epidemiology and toxicogenomics are likely to alleviate 
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reduce the over-deterrence of the “all” part of all-or-nothing 
rules.354 
Large swaths of tort law are, to put it charitably, highly 
approximate. It is somewhat ironic to criticize causal 
apportionment of damages as imprecise when the amount of 
damages itself contains a large heuristic component and when 
significant components even of seemingly objectively calculable 
economic damages are computed by informed probabilistic 
estimates. Furthermore, comparative fault regimes that divide up 
liability and thus affect deterrence signals have become nearly 
universal. Of course, apportioning among liable parties “on the 
basis of a normative judgment about relative culpability or 
responsibility is different from employing probabilistic 
assessments of the existence of an element of a prima facie case 
to determine the liability of a party and the damages for which 
the party is liable.”355 But both processes ask fact-finders to 
divide liability for a harm into pieces. Probabilistic causal 
contribution, although an imprecise fraction based on imprecise 
data, would at least be based to some degree on quantitative 
evidence. It is incongruous to let fact-finders hear all the evidence 
about the parties’ conduct and then carve up the liability based 
                                                                                                     
(though not completely eliminate) the problem of weak associations by 
disaggregating them into relatively strong associations for susceptible 
individuals and very weak or nonexistent associations for resistant individuals. 
Ofer Shpilberg et al., The Next Stage: Molecular Epidemiology, 50 J. CLINICAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 633, 637 (1997); see also Perera, supra note 149, at 608 (noting 
that “new molecular epidemiologic and other data invalidate the assumption of 
population homogeneity” with respect to toxic susceptibility). The need to decide 
whether an epidemiologic association is causal, which addresses general rather 
than specific causation, arises in every case in which a plaintiff relies on 
epidemiologic evidence, even under but-for causation. The decision requires 
consideration of the “aspects” of an association that epidemiologists use to 
assess the causal significance of an association, only one of which is the 
association’s strength. See Hill, supra note 18, at 295. Probabilistic causal 
contribution would be applied to specific causation only if the evidence were 
sufficient to support an inference of general causation. 
 354. Because of incomplete claiming, over-deterrence may in many cases be 
more theoretical than real. See Dan Markel, Reply: Punitive Damages and 
Private Ordering Fetishism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 283, 284 & n.4 (2010), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2010/Markel.pdf (noting “widely known 
problems of tort underenforcement”). 
 355. Green, supra note 185, at 353. 
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on a normative judgment,356 but prevent them from using relative 
risk as an apportionment tool because epidemiology is imprecise. 
In the CERCLA context, the Supreme Court accepted the 
division of millions of dollars of liability based on very indirect 
measures of causal contribution.357 Tort law tolerates the 
imposition of full liability based on a belief that each element of 
the claim is “more likely than not.” It tolerates the extremely 
rough justice of comparative fault. Why should it demand a 
higher level of accuracy for causal apportionment? Getting it 
right is important, but the presence of scientific evidence should 
not fool us into thinking the law can or must get it exactly right—
especially when the alternative is acknowledged over-deterrence 
in some cases and under-deterrence in many others.358 Detailed 
toxicogenomic and molecular information, to the extent available, 
will improve a fact finder’s ability to assign a causal share to a 
defendant’s toxic substance as opposed to all other contributors to 
the risk of a plaintiff’s disease. We should recognize this as an 
improvement—without feeling a need to pretend that such 
information will allow courts to impose theoretically perfect 
amounts of liability. 
                                                                                                     
 356. See Wright, supra note 325, at 1144–45 (stating that comparative 
responsibility is assessed “not according to any detailed formula but rather 
through rational commonsense judgment”). 
 357. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 612 
(2009) (affirming liability allocation under CERCLA even though “the evidence 
adduced by the parties did not allow the court to calculate precisely the amount 
of hazardous chemicals contributed by the Railroad parcel to the total site 
contamination or the exact percentage of harm caused by each chemical.”). 
 358. Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947 (Pa. 1987), 
illustrates the tensions inherent in all-or-nothing rules. The court rejected a 
jury verdict apportioning a plaintiff’s disability between his asbestos exposure 
and his tobacco smoke exposure. Id. at 950–51. Two dissents argued that 
apportionment should have been permitted using “rough approximation,” id. at 
951 (Nix, J., dissenting) without requiring “[m]athematical exactitude,” id. at 
954 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The first complained that apportionment was 
essential to avoid the “unconscionable” result of no recovery (presumably 
because the plaintiff’s own actions vitiated but-for causation by the defendant). 
Id. at 951 (Nix, J., dissenting). The second complained that apportionment was 
essential to avoid the “unjust” result of full liability (presumably because 
plaintiff’s and defendants’ acts would be treated as multiple sufficient causes). 
Id. at 954 (Hutchison, J., dissenting). 
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Another deterrence-based critique argues that causally-based 
apportionment of damages will provide inadequate deterrence 
because defendants will have incentives to hunt for extra risk 
factors to blame—and finding them would, perversely, reduce the 
liability of each wrongdoer as more wrongdoers (or at least risk 
factors) are found.359 Yet defendants have every incentive to 
conduct this hunt under an all-or-nothing but-for model of 
causation as well. The difference is that under the current regime 
a defendant that successfully posits additional risk factors as 
independent alternate causes has a good chance of avoiding 
liability altogether, while under probabilistic causal contribution 
the defendant would bear at least some liability even if many 
cases of the plaintiff’s disease have no known cause.360 
Probabilistic causal contribution would also shift the onus with 
respect to alternative risk factors. Under current law, plaintiffs 
often must attempt to “rule out” other possible causes to leap the 
“more likely than not” hurdle and obtain a finding of but-for 
causation. Under probabilistic causal contribution, if a plaintiff 
proves that the exposure for which a defendant is responsible 
increased the plaintiff’s risk, a defendant seeking to use another 
risk factor to reduce its own liability would have to justify that 
reduction by showing that the plaintiff was exposed to the other 
risk factor and consequently faced a greater risk than would have 
been the case with only the exposure for which the defendant was 
responsible. 
Moreover, the premise of the under-deterrence argument, 
that the tortfeasor caused the whole injury but is being held 
liable for only part of it, fits poorly with the reality of 
                                                                                                     
 359. See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence 
and the Probability Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201, 1211–14 (1993) (arguing 
that the “probability paradox” means that “probabilistic causation requires 
people to use the least care when the world is the most dangerous”). 
 360. If the evidence shows that the risk factors interact to create risk, the 
defendant is less likely to prevail under an all-or-nothing regime but also likely 
to pay a larger share under probabilistic causal contribution. See supra note 273 
and accompanying text. And in an all-or-nothing regime, even in the case of a 
synergistic interaction, a defendant might be able to convince a fact-finder that 
only the other risk factor was a “more likely than not” cause, depending on the 
strength of the interaction and the risk characteristics of the individual 
exposures. 
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indeterminate specific causation. Because that indeterminacy is 
the rationale for probabilistic causal contribution, exposure to 
multiple independent risk-contributing factors should matter: the 
additional risk factors reduce the relative role of a defendant’s 
risk factor. The deterrence signal of a discounted recovery, even if 
less than that of a full recovery, would still be higher—and 
therefore theoretically would produce greater investment in 
safety—than the signal that would result if but-for causation 
rules precluded any recovery.361 And if the hunt for alternative 
risk factors leads to legitimate scientific research, it will help 
society learn the truth and perhaps make better decisions about 
what products create risks that are not worth their benefits and 
vice versa.362 
                                                                                                     
 361. David Fischer’s contrary argument misapprehended the nature of 
epidemiologic data. Professor Fischer hypothesized seven known carcinogens, 
exposure to each of which posed a thirty percent risk of developing lung cancer. 
Fischer, supra note 359, at 1213. He argued that under proportional liability a 
plaintiff tortiously exposed to just one of them would probably receive a 90% 
recovery because there would be no other plausible cause, while if each of seven 
equally culpable defendants exposed the plaintiff to a different carcinogen, each 
defendant would be liable only for one-seventh of the damages. Id. The premise 
of a 90% recovery from the single tortfeasor, however, assumed that the seven 
known carcinogens are the only possible causes, so if the plaintiff was exposed to 
only one, that exposure must have been the cause—which is inconsistent with 
the hypothesized fact that ceteris paribus, exposure to that one carcinogen only 
explained 30% of the incidence of the disease. A court applying all-or-nothing 
but-for causation and the doubling+ rule would not let the hypothesized single-
tortfeasor case be tried. Under probabilistic causal contribution, the single 
tortfeasor would appropriately be liable for 30% of the damages. The seven-
defendant case would be more complicated, because the hypothetical treated the 
carcinogens independently but the hypothesized facts ruled out the possibility of 
independent additive risk contributions: the seven carcinogens could not 
together account for 210% of the risk of lung cancer. Based on equal relative risk 
values for each carcinogen, a fact-finder might attribute a one-seventh share to 
each, but evidence of the degree of confounding in the various studies, the 
similarity or differences of the carcinogens’ biological mechanisms, or studies of 
the interactions of multiple exposures might alter that result. 
 362. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 332 (1996) 
(noting that Bendectin litigation spurred scientific research into the drug’s 
effects). 
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B. Corrective Justice Goals: Is Causation Different? 
The Third Restatement of Torts acknowledged widespread 
adoption of comparative responsibility and apportionment 
principles. It embraced a theoretical distinction, however, 
between apportionment based on cause and apportionment based 
on fault or other norm-based conceptions of responsibility.363 
Apportionment based on cause, according to the Third 
Restatement, may be appropriate in limited circumstances when 
“legally culpable conduct . . . was a legal cause of less than the 
entire damages for which the plaintiff seeks recovery” and a fact-
finder can determine “the amount of damages separately caused 
by that conduct.”364 Other than straightforward enhanced-injury 
cases, however (as where a defendant negligently causes an 
accident that injures a plaintiff who is then further injured by 
medical malpractice), the Third Restatement did little to 
illustrate when such a situation might arise, noting that very 
little case law provides clear analysis of the problem.365 
The Third Restatement thus took a clear position that but-for 
causation is a prerequisite for any fault-based apportionment. 
The basis for this choice was the principle that “[n]o party should 
be liable for harm it did not cause.”366 
                                                                                                     
 363. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 (2010). 
 364. Id. § 26(b); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. d (2010) (discussing circumstances 
under which harm is “causally divisible”); id. cmt. l (distinguishing circumstance 
when each one of multiple actors causes all of a plaintiff’s harm from 
circumstances in which each actor causes part of a plaintiff’s harm). Under the 
Third Restatement, liability for what the Second Restatement called distinct 
“harms,” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1)(a) (1965), would be 
assigned to each defendant whose conduct was a but-for cause of the separate 
harms, with any apportionment to be determined by the jurisdiction’s scope of 
liability rules. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26(b) 
(2010). The Third Restatement appeared to abandon the Second Restatement’s 
concept of single harms for which there is a reasonable basis for apportionment, 
or “divisible” harm. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1)(b) & 
cmt. d (1965), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. 
§ 26 cmt. a, c (2010). 
 365. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 cmt. a 
(2010) (“[F]ew if any cases provide much analysis.”). 
 366. Id. 
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Andrew Klein relied heavily on the same principle in his 
argument for a strong requirement of sine qua non causation 
even in toxic torts. Professor Klein argued that requiring but-for 
causation is compelled by corrective justice principles.367 He also 
noted that to hold defendants liable for damages they did not 
“cause” undermines confidence in the legal system and bolsters 
calls for replacing tort law altogether.368 The powerful intuitive 
notion that cause is a yes-or-no phenomenon that cannot be 
divided up369 thus fits tightly with corrective justice theories of 
tort.370 
The principle that persons should be liable only for damages 
they cause, depends, however, on the meaning of “cause.” In the 
uncertain molecular world of toxic causation, if a substance is a 
risk factor for disease then that substance is causing injury to 
someone, but science does not let us identify that person in the 
routine, familiar way.371 Reliably attributing a particular 
plaintiff’s harm to a particular defendant’s conduct—were it 
possible—would be more satisfying than basing causation on 
contribution to risk, realized injury, and discounted recovery. But 
in the face of irreducible uncertainty, a discounted recovery 
provides at least some redress and is a better measure of 
corrective justice than no recovery at all.372 Probabilistic causal 
contribution thus can restore some degree of accountability that 
has been eroded by narrow judicial interpretations of the 
                                                                                                     
 367. See Klein, supra note 53, at 9–13 (discussing the value of sine qua non 
causation in terms of corrective justice principles). 
 368. Id. at 30. 
 369. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that mesothelioma is an 
indivisible injury not susceptible to apportionment, “[a]t least not 
apportionment based on causation”). 
 370. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2009). 
 371. Richard Delgado described this as the problem of the “indeterminate 
plaintiff.” See generally Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-
in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982). 
 372. See John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to 
Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1063, 1073–74 
(1989) (“While it is true that those who are actually injured by the tortious 
conduct do not receive their compensation in full and the others receive 
compensation to which they are not entitled under traditional tort theory, a 
fairer distribution of the damages is not possible given the uncertainty of 
causation.”). 
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admissibility and sufficiency of causation evidence.373 It is also 
better than allowing full recovery, which in the aggregate 
(assuming sufficient claiming) would force a defendant to pay for 
more harm than its actions created. 
The theoretical purity of but-for causation has already been 
diluted to some extent by comparative responsibility regimes. 
Fact-finders must, and do, weigh the incommensurate all the 
time in comparative responsibility cases, which may entail a 
quantitative comparison of behavior found blameworthy (i.e., 
negligent) to behavior that is fault-free but nevertheless gives 
rise to liability.374 Who is more responsible for the truck that 
backed up into its driver: the strictly liable auto manufacturer 
that designed the defective transmission that mis-shifted, or the 
negligent driver who exited the car without disengaging the 
ignition?375 It is fanciful to think jurors view such questions 
through polarized lenses that transmit no light on relative causal 
contribution. Judgments of blameworthiness incorporate causal 
judgments too. When a drunk driver runs a stop sign and injures 
another driver who could not avoid the crash because a mechanic 
erred when repairing her brakes, the drunk driver gets a greater 
share of liability not just because the conduct is worse, but also 
because of the sense that the brakes would not have been needed 
absent the drunk driving, even though the bad brakes were a but-
for cause of the accident. 
                                                                                                     
 373. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for 
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 444–45 (1990) (arguing that liability for 
imposing risks is consistent with corrective justice). See generally Thomas O. 
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“accountability crisis”). 
 374. New Jersey’s statute is exemplary: “In all negligence and strict liability 
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 375. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 598 (Tex. 1999) 
(holding that the plaintiff’s actual recovery would be reduced by the “jury’s 
finding of fifty percent comparative responsibility”). 
WHEN CERTAINTY DISSOLVES INTO PROBABILITY 333 
Current doctrine requires fact-finders to engage in sub 
silentio causal attribution in some toxic tort cases as well. As 
noted above, data show that exposure to both tobacco smoke and 
asbestos synergistically increases the risk of lung cancer above 
the sum of each product’s independent risk enhancement.376 Yet 
manufacturers of tobacco and asbestos products routinely name 
each other as the cause of lung cancer in plaintiffs exposed to 
both products. Even if fault dominates fact-finders’ thinking in 
such cases, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that they pay no 
attention to the risk data and other causal issues, such as the 
relative amounts of exposure, when they assign comparative 
responsibility.377 
A related view, prominently espoused by Richard Wright, 
relies on a sharp distinction between ex ante risk and ex post 
causation. The argument holds that statistical data derived from 
studies of populations provide insufficient information to satisfy 
corrective justice norms for a causal finding in an individual case; 
instead, particularistic evidence should be required to support a 
specific causal inference.378 If, however, particularistic evidence 
means evidence of some characteristic that distinguishes an 
exposure-caused case of disease from any other, this would imply 
that no plaintiff relying on epidemiologic or similarly population-
based evidence could ever prevail, even in the post-genomic era. 
Professor Wright has acknowledged the normative 
appropriateness of forms of proportional liability to avoid this 
harsh result, at least in some circumstances in which it is 
impossible to prove “who actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.”379 
                                                                                                     
 376. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 377. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 38 (noting blending of causal and 
normative concepts in comparative responsibility instructions). 
 378. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 19, at 196, 206–08 (“Legal fact-finders are 
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 379. Wright, supra note 5, at 1072; see also Green, supra note 185, at 362–63 
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note 19, at 214 (approving of market-share liability in DES cases and the 
proportional liability imposed in Barker, though disagreeing with Barker’s risk 
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When the causation evidence inherently must be statistical, 
however, probabilistic causal contribution is not just a second-
best approach; it is the approach that best fits knowable truth.380 
The indeterminacy of toxic tort causation is different from the 
familiar example in which the knowledge that one company 
operates a large majority of buses on a route will not suffice to 
hold that company liable when an unidentified bus runs a car off 
the road.381 The intuitive discomfort with holding the bus 
company liable arises not because of the statistical nature of the 
evidence that it was the most probable owner of the errant bus. 
Rather, we do not really believe that the statistic accurately 
reflects the probability. To say that the bus company probably 
caused the accident is to say that one of its drivers was probably 
at fault and we are loath to do that without more information.382 
Despite reductionist neurobiology, we don’t treat momentary 
lapses of attention as the result of random molecular movements 
in the driver’s brain. The statistical frequency of motor vehicle 
accidents per vehicle mile traveled is well known, yet most people 
think they can avoid accidents—indeed most people think they 
are above-average drivers.383 Instinctively we believe that road 
accidents, especially accidents caused by bad driving, are not 
                                                                                                     
 380. See Makdisi, supra note 372, at 1100–01 (when a causal link “is 
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randomly distributed, and that bad drivers may not be randomly 
distributed across bus companies either.384 
There is no morality to the molecule. In toxic torts, once a 
fact-finder concludes that general causation has been established 
by the available evidence,385 no reason exists to suspect anything 
other than randomness for specific causation.386 Or, at least, 
science usually won’t be able to distinguish the “actual” cause in a 
given case from the probability distribution of causes.387 In such 
cases, insisting upon particularistic evidence to protect 
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But if exposure constitutes sufficient particularistic proof only when “no other 
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No one can ever exclude every possible alternative cause, see Stubbs v. City of 
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not a specific risk factor but rather “unknown causes.” See, e.g., Henricksen v. 
ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (E.D. Wash. 2009).  
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defendants from paying for harm they did not cause rings hollow; 
probabilistic causal contribution requires them to pay for the 
harm that they did cause.388 
Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will continue to 
undermine the appropriateness of the deterministic model of but-
for cause in toxic tort cases. Corrective justice would be better 
served by using a more appropriate causation model. With but-for 
and toxic torts, if it doesn’t fit, abandon it. 
C. Truth-Seeking Goals: Wrong All the Time? 
In their helpful catalogue of “vices” of proportional recovery, 
Ariel Porat and Alex Stein include an epistemological problem: 
although all-or-nothing rules may produce erroneous results in 
some cases (either wrongly attributing causation where it did not 
actually exist or wrongly failing to attribute causation where it 
did actually exist), a rule that assigns a fractional recovery will 
produce a result at variance with historical truth in each 
individual case, because it will never be true that a tortious 
exposure caused x% of a plaintiff’s harm but not the remainder.389 
This is indisputable for a non-cumulative disease in a 
deterministic causal model when only population-based evidence 
is available.390 Any all-or-nothing rule, however, also accepts the 
existence of some erroneous adjudications, and further accepts 
that the aggregate result across a population of cases will be 
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 389. Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 221, 227–28. Porat and Stein, who are generally 
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wrong.391 It is not clear why having a lower count of errors is 
epistemologically superior to reducing the overall magnitude of 
the consequences of the errors.392 More fundamentally, if we 
adopt a probabilistic view of causation at the individual level—
even if that model is only a concession to the limits of scientific 
understanding—then probabilistic causal contribution gets it 
roughly right in every case, and the epistemological problem that 
Porat and Stein identified disappears. 
D. Administration of Justice Concerns: Too Much Information? 
In a thoughtful essay, Joseph Sanders emphasized a number 
of “practical, administration-of-justice” problems that he 
concluded outweighed the “persuasive substantive arguments” in 
favor of the “risk rule” of Rutherford and Barker.393 Professor 
Sanders expressed concern about the level of complexity that 
risk-based causal attribution would bring to toxic tort 
litigation,394 although he acknowledged that toxicogenomics could 
actually alleviate some of that concern by providing a more finely-
grained understanding of causal mechanisms.395 
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which adds a further element of unpredictability to the fact-finding accuracy of 
all-or-nothing rules. If the probability of claiming were strongly positively 
correlated with the probability of “true” causation (e.g., because only people with 
obvious exposures or known genetic susceptibility are likely to sue), but the 
applicable all-or-nothing rule bars recovery, the frequency of false negative 
errors among cases actually brought could approach 100%. 
 392. See Makdisi, supra note 382, at 1065, 1074 (arguing that proportional 
liability is more accurate and fair). 
 393. Sanders, supra note 1, at 34, 36. 
 394. See id. at 34 (doubting feasibility of identifying risk proportions in 
multi-agent cases); id. at 40 (“[R]isk rule introduces a substantial degree of 
conceptual complexity and uncertainty.”). Michael Green expressed similar 
concerns but suggested that apportionment based on risk contribution would be 
less of a “litigative quagmire” than apportionment based on comparative 
responsibility. Green, supra note 94, at 540–41. Andrew Klein has argued that 
administrative concerns justify the doubling+ rule with proportional recovery. 
Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1173, 1195–96 (1999). 
 395. Sanders, supra note 1, at 36. 
338 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013) 
The concern is well-founded. Probabilistic causal contribution 
does not have the virtue of simplicity. Courts will be challenged 
to administer cases in reasonable time, at reasonable cost, and 
with appropriate levels of scrutiny of expert testimony, which will 
be offered by all parties. But even if courts adhere to a 
deterministic “more-likely-than-not but-for” causation model, 
they will still be confronted with toxicogenomic and molecular 
epidemiologic data and all of the complexity such evidence will 
entail. As I’ve said elsewhere, that train is coming, and courts 
cannot get off the tracks.396 
The complexity courts will face will reflect the complex world 
that science reveals. If toxicogenomics, molecular epidemiology, 
and related sciences fulfill their potential, they will show us an 
elaborate landscape of toxic risks and variable genetic 
susceptibility to those risks, many of them relatively small but 
still significant. If, in the name of simplicity and reduced 
administrative expense, courts impose on that landscape the 
same all-or-nothing rules now in effect, the law will willfully 
blind itself to the truth, will too frequently fail to redress harm 
truly caused, and will impose too much liability for the harm it 
does redress. Such outcomes would be neither efficient nor just. 
VI. Conclusion 
Paradoxically, the emergence of toxicogenomics and 
molecular epidemiology promises to increase our understanding 
of the effects of toxic exposures while simultaneously highlighting 
the fundamental uncertainty of any individual claim. These 
scientific advances strengthen, rather than weaken, the case for 
reform of causation doctrine. 
The deterministic model of but-for causation does not fit toxic 
tort cases that depend on population-based data—even if the data 
come from studies at a molecular scale. Worse, it produces results 
that are inefficient and unjust. Commentators have recognized 
this for a quarter-century, but with few exceptions the courts 
have not responded. In the post-genomic era, it is time for the 
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courts to adapt,397 and to adopt a probabilistic causal contribution 
model in toxic tort cases. 
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toxic exposure). 
